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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Evidence that terrorists are actively seeking nuclear 
weapons and the materials needed to make them, 
and that some nuclear stockpiles around the world 
remain dangerously vulnerable to potential theft 
and transfer to terrorist groups, continued to accu-
mulate in the past year.  A comprehensive strategy 
for preventing nuclear terrorism would include many 
strands, from offensive action against terrorists with 
global reach to measures to stop nuclear smuggling. 
But the most crucial element of such a strategy is to 
lock down every nuclear weapon and every kilogram 
of potential nuclear bomb material everywhere. 
Because nuclear weapons and their essential ingredi-
ents do not occur in nature and are too difﬁcult for 
terrorists to plausibly produce on their own, if these 
stockpiles can be kept out of terrorist hands, nuclear 
terrorism can be reliably prevented.  
FOUNDATIONS FOR ACCELERATED ACTION— 
NEW IMPERATIVES 
Over the past year, the United States and other coun-
tries laid three critical foundations for an accelerated 
and expanded effort to prevent nuclear terrorism.
The UN Security Council unanimously passed 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 in April 2004, legally 
obligating every country in the world to put in 
place effective security and accounting for nuclear 
stockpiles, and thus providing the base for an 
accelerated nuclear security upgrade effort world-
wide, not just in the former Soviet Union.
In May 2004, the U.S. Department of Energy 
launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
(GTRI), offering the potential to accelerate and 
expand efforts to remove and secure potential 
nuclear bomb material from insecure sites around 
the world.
At their February 2005 summit in Bratislava, Slo-
vakia, U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian 
•
•
•
President Vladimir Putin issued a summit state-
ment calling for intensiﬁed cooperation to secure 
nuclear stockpiles in Russia, and for joint U.S.-Rus-
sian leadership of nuclear security upgrade efforts 
elsewhere around the world.
Translating last year’s pledges into the needed rapid 
action will require sustained leadership from both 
President Bush and President Putin—and from the 
leaders of other key nuclear states.  Action from the 
highest levels is needed because difﬁcult bureau-
cratic and political impediments persist that cut 
across agencies and departments and cannot be re-
solved by ofﬁcials within any one agency.  Success will 
require not just occasional encouraging statements, 
but in-depth, day-to-day engagement.  As the lead-
ers of the two countries that own the vast majority 
of the world’s nuclear weapons and weapons-usable 
nuclear material, President Bush and President Putin 
have an historic opportunity to leave behind, as a last-
ing legacy, a world in which the danger that terrorists 
could get hold of a nuclear weapon or the materials 
needed to make it has been dramatically reduced.
ON-THE-GROUND PROGRESS STILL SLOW— 
BUT HOPE FOR ACCELERATION
Unfortunately, the on-the-ground progress in secur-
ing, consolidating, and eliminating nuclear stockpiles 
in the last year remained slow, when compared to the 
urgency of the threat.  During ﬁscal year (FY) 2004, 
U.S.-funded comprehensive security and accounting 
upgrades were completed on only 4% of the weap-
ons-usable nuclear material in the former Soviet 
Union, bringing the total fraction with such upgrades 
completed by the end of the ﬁscal year to 26%.  Initial 
rapid upgrades were completed for 3% of the poten-
tially vulnerable weapons-usable nuclear material, so 
that by the end of the ﬁscal year, these ﬁrst steps had 
been taken for an additional 20% of the former Soviet 
stockpile.  Because huge quantities of material are lo-
cated at a small number of highly sensitive sites, the 
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picture looks substantially better when judged by the 
fraction of sites with potential nuclear bomb material 
where upgrades have been completed (some 75%) 
or the fraction of buildings containing such material 
with completed upgrades (some 56%).  Figure ES-1 
illustrates these differing measures.  The buildings 
ﬁgure is probably the best available indicator both of 
the fraction of the work that has been accomplished 
and the fraction of the potential theft threat that has 
been reduced; by that measure, roughly half of the 
job is completed, and roughly half remains.
In last year’s report, we noted, based on the ofﬁcial 
U.S. government data available at the time, that com-
prehensive security upgrades had been completed 
for more nuclear material in the two years before the 
9/11 attacks than in the two years after those attacks, 
and that if the quantity of nuclear material upgraded 
in FY 2003 continued unchanged, it would take 13 
years before upgrades were completed.  (The Depart-
ment of Energy subsequently revised its estimates of 
the amount of material covered by completed up-
grades each year, with the result that the amounts se-
cured in the two years before and the two years after 
the 9/11 attacks are now thought to have been ap-
proximately the same.) As comprehensive upgrades 
were ﬁnished on somewhat less material in FY 2004 
than in FY 2003, it remains clear that a dramatic ac-
celeration will be needed to meet DOE’s stated goal 
of ﬁnishing the upgrades in less than four years from 
now (by the end of 2008).  DOE appears to be on track 
to meet its goal of completing comprehensive secu-
rity and accounting upgrades for an additional 11% 
of the potential bomb material in the former Soviet 
Union in FY 2005, nearly tripling the FY 2004 pace. 
Achieving DOE’s stated goals for subsequent years 
will be more challenging.  The dramatic acceleration 
needed to achieve the 2008 goal remains possible, 
but only if both President Bush and President Putin 
make a sustained effort to sweep aside the obstacles 
to progress—including in particular agreeing on ac-
cess or other assurances for the last highly sensitive 
sites where access is still a major problem (an issue 
that was not resolved at the Bratislava summit, de-
spite some signiﬁcant progress over the past year).
Figure ES-1 
Status of Security Upgrades on Sites and Buildings in the Former Soviet Union 
Containing Former Soviet Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material
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Note:  The percentages for buildings and sites completed differ somewhat from DOE’s ofﬁcial estimate because we include only 
those buildings and sites containing nuclear material, treating nuclear warheads separately.
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In other categories, similarly, U.S.-funded programs 
have made major progress, but are far from ﬁnishing 
the job.  Figure ES-2 summarizes a comprehensive set 
of metrics for assessing the progress of U.S.-funded 
programs to improve controls on nuclear warheads, 
materials, and expertise to date, and how much of this 
progress was made during FY 2004.  These estimates 
are described and documented in Chapter Three of 
this report.  For example, approximately 10% of the 
Russian sites for actual nuclear warheads (as op-
posed to nuclear material) had received U.S.-funded 
comprehensive security upgrades by the end of FY 
2004.  Many thousands of bombs’ worth of Russian 
bomb uranium has been destroyed—but the stock-
pile eliminated to date represents less than a ﬁfth of 
Russia’s total.  It will still be years before destruction 
Figure ES-2 
Controlling Nuclear Warheads, Material, and Expertise: 
How Much Work Have U.S.-Funded Programs Completed?
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of substantial quantities of U.S. and Russian excess 
bomb plutonium even begins.  While thousands of 
nuclear scientists received short-term grants to ease 
the desperate transition of the 1990s, only a tiny frac-
tion of Russia’s excess nuclear weapons experts have 
yet received self-supporting long-term civilian jobs 
through internationally funded programs.  Outside 
the former Soviet Union, only a few sites had substan-
tial security upgrades put in place or their potential 
nuclear bomb material removed.  
Such assessments of the number of buildings with 
security equipment installed, or the tons of HEU de-
stroyed, do not describe the whole picture of nuclear 
security.  “Security culture,” in particular, is difﬁcult to 
measure, but critical, as highlighted in the Bratislava 
summit statement: if guards are patrolling without 
ammunition in their guns to avoid accidental ﬁring, 
monitors are turning off intrusion detectors because 
of their annoying false alarms, and workers are prop-
ping open security doors for convenience, the best 
equipment will not provide high security.  More-
over, measures of how much progress U.S.-funded 
programs have made, by their nature, miss the im-
provements Russia and other potential recipient 
states have made in upgrading security on their own, 
without U.S. or other foreign assistance (or even for-
eign awareness that the changes have been made). 
Such measures are also a snapshot in time that says 
nothing about how well security will be sustained 
and improved at sites after international assistance 
comes to an end.  Hence, it is quite possible that some 
material counted as “completed” in these measures 
remains insecure—or will become so again in the fu-
ture as equipment breaks or is no longer used—and 
that some material counted as “not completed” is al-
ready secure.
PROPOSED BUDGET INCREASES  
AND REMAINING OPPORTUNITIES
The Bush administration has requested a signiﬁcant 
increase in funding for programs to improve controls 
on nuclear warheads, materials, and expertise around 
the world for FY 2006.  The proposed budget for these 
programs is $982 million, a 22% increase over the pre-
vious year’s appropriation, and more than this group 
of programs has ever been granted before.  The total 
proposed budget for all cooperative threat reduction 
efforts around the world (which also include control 
and elimination of chemical and biological weap-
ons and strategic missiles, bombers, and submarines, 
among other efforts) for FY 2006, is $1.312 billion, just 
short of 25% more than the Bush administration’s 
proposal for the previous year.  While that amounts 
to less than one-quarter of one percent of the U.S. de-
fense budget, most programs are limited more by the 
level of cooperation that has been achieved with po-
tential recipient states than by money.  But there are 
several areas where small increases in available funds 
could accelerate progress.
OUTLINE OF A MAXIMUM EFFORT
There is an urgent imperative to build a fast-paced 
global partnership to secure the world’s nuclear 
stockpiles on the foundations laid in the last year, 
before those opportunities slip away.  As the 9/11 
Commission most recently put it, what is needed is a 
“maximum effort” to keep nuclear weapons and the 
materials needed to make them out of terrorist hands. 
This global effort will have to be at the top of the dip-
lomatic agenda—an item to be addressed with every 
country with stockpiles to secure or resources to help, 
at every level, at every opportunity, until the job is 
done.  A comprehensive global nuclear security part-
nership would have many ingredients, but there are 
three that are essential: accelerating and strengthen-
ing the effort in Russia, where the largest stockpiles 
of potentially vulnerable nuclear materials still exist; 
removing the material entirely from the world’s most 
vulnerable sites; and building a fast-paced global co-
alition to improve security for the remaining nuclear 
stockpiles around the world.
Step 1: An Accelerated and Strengthened 
Partnership with Russia
The ﬁrst and most crucial step is to put in place an ac-
celerated and strengthened effort with Russia, based 
on genuine partnership.
In the aftermath of the horrifying slaughter of school-
children at Beslan, President Putin should take many 
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of the same steps to secure Russia’s stockpiles that 
the Department of Energy has taken to secure com-
parable stockpiles in the United States—sending 
out a team to rapidly assess nuclear security vul-
nerabilities and suggest ﬁxes; requiring all facilities 
with nuclear weapons or materials to put in place 
security capable of defeating demonstrated terrorist 
and criminal threats, both from outsiders and insid-
ers; consolidating nuclear weapons and materials at 
fewer locations, to provide more security at lower 
cost; working to transform the guard force into an 
elite ﬁghting force; and substantially increasing nu-
clear security spending.  The United States can share 
its experience and offer to pay some of the costs of 
such measures.
President Bush’s critical diplomatic tasks in the af-
termath of Bratislava include: using his excellent 
relationship with President Putin to convince the 
Russian president of the urgency of action, both for 
Russia’s own security and as a central requirement 
of a positive relationship with the United States; 
pressing for agreement with Russia on key steps to 
strengthen and accelerate the nuclear security effort 
in Russia and around the world; and stepping in to 
overcome the obstacles to a fast-paced U.S.-Russian 
nuclear security partnership that still exist on the 
U.S. side.  
Following up on the Bratislava summit statement, 
the United States and Russia should agree on (a) a 
joint plan to complete security upgrades for all nu-
clear warhead and material sites by the end of 2008; 
(b) approaches to overcoming the key impediments 
to progress (including compromises on the issues of 
both access and liability); (c) steps to build strong se-
curity cultures at nuclear sites in both countries; (d) 
a joint plan to provide the resources, organizations, 
and incentives necessary to sustain and improve se-
curity after U.S. and international assistance phases 
out; and (e) a new initiative to secure, monitor, 
and in many cases dismantle the most dangerous 
warheads—particularly those not equipped with 
modern, difﬁcult-to-bypass electronic locks.  The 
interagency committee on nuclear security coopera-
tion established at the Bratislava summit should be 
used to focus high-level attention on reaching such 
agreements and taking the decisions needed to 
sweep aside the obstacles to accelerated progress.
Building genuine Russian commitment—a sense in 
Russia that cooperation on nuclear security is not 
just a favor to the Americans but essential for Russia’s 
own security—will be crucial to success.  The United 
States should (a) encourage Russia to undertake a 
fast-paced review by Russian experts of security vul-
nerabilities at Russian sites, judging whether they 
are adequately defended against Beslan-scale out-
sider attacks or substantial insider conspiracies; (b) 
pursue joint U.S.-Russian nuclear theft and terrorism 
threat brieﬁngs for senior ofﬁcials; (c) sponsor simu-
lations and war games focused on nuclear theft and 
terrorism for senior ofﬁcials; (d) develop jointly with 
Russia, as part of ongoing security awareness train-
ing, a video highlighting the very real possibility that 
terrorists could make a crude nuclear bomb if they 
got the nuclear material.
To achieve both the top-level Russian commitment 
necessary to move nuclear security cooperation 
forward and the working-level Russian “buy-in” es-
sential to ensure that upgraded security systems 
will be sustained and improved over time, a shift 
from a donor-recipient relationship toward a true 
partnership will be essential. In a real partnership, 
Russia would have to contribute more of its own re-
sources, and the United States would have to pursue 
a truly joint approach, with Russian and U.S. experts 
involved in all stages of the conception, design, im-
plementation, and evaluation of these programs. 
Shifting from a focus only on improving nuclear se-
curity in Russia with U.S. help toward a focus on joint 
U.S. and Russian leadership in improving security 
around the world (starting with making sure their 
own houses are in order) can strengthen this sense 
of partnership.  A leading Russian role can greatly 
strengthen the global effort, as there are key coun-
tries where Russia has the relationships necessary to 
work on nuclear security or negotiate the removal 
of nuclear material, and the United States does not. 
Building a genuine nuclear security partnership will 
be more likely to succeed if political issues that have 
been souring U.S.-Russian relations and strengthen-
ing those who are suspicious of cooperation in these 
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sensitive areas, on both sides of the ocean, are also 
addressed.
Step 2: Fast-Paced Removal from  
Vulnerable Sites Worldwide
The surest way to ensure that nuclear material will 
not be stolen from a particular site is to remove it, 
so there is nothing left to steal.  What is needed now 
is a fast-paced effort to remove the weapons-us-
able nuclear material entirely from the world’s most 
vulnerable sites, particularly including HEU-fueled 
research reactors.  The goal should be to remove 
the nuclear material entirely from the world’s most 
vulnerable sites within four years—substantially 
upgrading security wherever that cannot be accom-
plished—and to eliminate all HEU from civil sites 
worldwide within roughly a decade.  The United 
States should make every effort to build interna-
tional consensus that the civilian use of HEU is no 
longer acceptable, that all HEU should be removed 
from all civilian sites, and that all civilian commerce 
in HEU should be brought to an end as quickly as 
possible.  Those goals are challenging, and achieving 
them will require a substantial effort, but the scale 
and urgency of the threat demands no less.  Success 
in achieving them will require focusing compre-
hensively on all the facilities that have vulnerable 
potential nuclear bomb material, not just those that 
happen to be operating civilian research reactors, or 
whose nuclear material happens to be Russian-sup-
plied or U.S. supplied.  Success will require ﬂexible 
and creative tactics, with approaches—including in-
centives to give up the nuclear material—targeted 
to the needs of each facility and host country, and 
it will require the United States to convert and ade-
quately secure its own HEU-fueled research reactors 
as part of convincing others to do so.
Step 3: A Global Partnership to  
Prevent Nuclear Terrorism
The problem of insecure nuclear material is global. 
Solving it will require forging a global coalition of 
countries around the world willing to work together 
to ensure that every cache of nuclear weapons or 
weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide is se-
cure and accounted for, to a level sufﬁcient to defeat 
plausible terrorist and criminal threats from both out-
siders and insiders.
Given the devastating global economic impact a nu-
clear terrorist attack would have, every country has 
a strong self-interest in cooperating to reduce this 
threat.  But the intense secrecy surrounding nuclear 
stockpiles and their security arrangements will make 
building the needed global effort an extraordinary 
challenge.  The United States should seek to convince 
the top leadership of states around the world of the 
urgency of the threat, using approaches similar to 
those suggested above in the case of Russia.
The United States should (a) put forging such a 
global nuclear security partnership at the top of its 
diplomatic agenda with every relevant country with 
resources to offer or stockpiles to secure; (b) move 
quickly to implement UNSCR 1540, seeking general 
agreement that its requirement for “appropriate effec-
tive” security requires that every facility with nuclear 
weapons or potential nuclear bomb material should 
be secured against the terrorist and criminal threats 
that have been demonstrated in that country, and 
moving quickly to help countries around the world 
put such security in place; (c) adapt threat reduction 
assistance to new contexts, working with states such 
as Pakistan, India, and China to ensure that their nu-
clear stockpiles are secure and accounted for, ﬁnding 
creative ways to do so without forcing these states 
to reveal sensitive nuclear information; (d) exchange 
nuclear security and accounting best practices—par-
ticularly institutionalized approaches to regularly 
ﬁnding and ﬁxing nuclear security weaknesses—with 
countries around the world; (e) seek to forge effective 
and binding global nuclear security standards, build-
ing from UNSCR 1540; and (f ) work with other states 
to expand the mission, personnel, and resources of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Of-
ﬁce of Nuclear Security, substantially increasing its 
contribution to preventing nuclear terrorism. 
Steps the G8 and Other  
Leading Powers Should Take
At their July 2005 summit, the leaders of the G8 (along 
with the other participants in the Global Partner-
ship Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of 
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Mass Destruction) should (a) explicitly identify lock-
ing down nuclear stockpiles and interdicting nuclear 
smuggling as top priorities for expenditure of the 
$20 billion they have pledged to provide; (b) put the 
“global” back in the Global Partnership by explicitly 
focusing the effort not just on Russia and the former 
Soviet states, but on helping states worldwide put in 
place the controls on weapons of mass destruction 
and related materials and technologies required by 
UNSCR 1540; and (c) take a range of other steps to 
secure, consolidate, and eliminate dangerous nuclear 
stockpiles.
All states with nuclear weapons (including Pakistan, 
India, and Israel), and all states with signiﬁcant stock-
piles of weapons-usable nuclear material, should 
join in this global nuclear security effort, and adopt 
national rules requiring every facility with nuclear 
weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material to 
be secured against speciﬁed outsider and insider 
threats, comparable to those terrorists and criminals 
have demonstrated in their country.
The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference 
in May 2005 should (a) call on all states to adopt ef-
fective national nuclear security rules, and agree to 
interpret UNSCR 1540 as requiring such steps; (b) 
call for new efforts to secure, consolidate, and where 
possible eliminate nuclear stockpiles (particularly 
HEU and tactical nuclear weapons); (c) support the 
rapid conclusion of a veriﬁable ﬁssile material cutoff 
agreement, which would limit additions to the stocks 
that need to be secured; and (d) agree on the need 
for new measures to control the spread of nation-
ally controlled enrichment and reprocessing facilities 
(which would add to the sources of new stocks re-
quiring security).  
Options for the U.S. Congress
The U.S. Congress should consider additional action 
to make the priority of these efforts clear, to exert 
performance-based oversight, to enable and autho-
rize key steps while removing legal constraints, and 
to mandate particular steps where necessary.  In 
particular, Congress should consider (a) eliminating 
certiﬁcation requirements and restrictions, or giv-
ing the president long-term authority to waive them 
when that serves U.S. interests; (b) broadening the 
government’s legal authority to provide incentives to 
convince vulnerable facilities and their host states to 
allow potential bomb material to be removed, while 
ensuring that the programs cover all potentially 
dangerous caches of nuclear material; (c) providing 
increased funds and authority for a global effort to 
help countries implement all the key requirements 
of UNSCR 1540; (d) appropriating additional funds 
for efforts to remove and secure nuclear material at 
vulnerable facilities around the world; and (e) man-
dating other new initiatives.
SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITIES
Much remains to be done to build on the foundations 
for a fast-paced global nuclear security partnership 
that were laid in the past year, transforming cur-
rent programs into the “maximum effort” the 9/11 
Commission called for.  The need for action is ur-
gent—both because terrorists and criminals will not 
wait, and because the opportunities created by GTRI, 
UNSCR 1540, and the Bratislava summit may well be 
ﬂeeting.  Few of the steps recommended here will 
happen without sustained leadership and political 
heavy lifting from the White House and its coun-
terparts around the world.  President Bush should 
appoint a senior full-time White House ofﬁcial, with 
the access needed to walk in and ask for presidential 
action when needed, to lead these efforts, to keep 
them on the front burner at the White House every 
day, to set priorities, to eliminate gaps and overlaps, 
and to seize opportunities for synergy.  If the world 
can muster the will to change its past approaches, 
there remains an excellent chance of preventing a 
nuclear 9/11.

1 INTRODUCTION
On September 1, 2004, 32 terrorists armed with au-
tomatic riﬂes, machine guns, grenade launchers, and 
explosives seized a school in Beslan, Russia, and took 
1,200 schoolchildren and adults as hostages.  The at-
tack was carefully planned and well organized.  The 
terrorists quickly wired the gymnasium where they 
had gathered their hostages with explosives, shot 
out the windows so that security forces could not ﬁll 
the gym with incapacitating gas, and dug holes in 
the ﬂoor so that security forces could not come up 
unnoticed from beneath.  In the ﬁreﬁght that ended 
the standoff, the terrorists slaughtered some 330 hos-
tages, 186 of them children.1  
The images of the child victims of Beslan shocked 
Russia and the world.  The Beslan attack again con-
ﬁrmed terrorists’ ability and willingness to strike in 
force, without warning or mercy.  If the perpetrators 
of the Beslan atrocity, or of the 9/11 attacks, could get 
a nuclear bomb, the same hate and heartlessness that 
produced the Beslan attack could reduce a major city 
to a smoldering ruin in an instant.
Unfortunately, a force of the size and sophistication of 
the one that struck at Beslan—or an insider conspiracy 
as capable as those that have repeatedly stolen valu-
able items around the world in recent years—might 
well be sufﬁcient to break through security at a nu-
clear site in Russia or in many other countries around 
the world, and steal a nuclear weapon or the nuclear 
materials needed to make one.  Preventing nuclear 
terrorism requires a multi-pronged approach, includ-
ing focused offensive action against terrorists with 
global reach and enhanced efforts to prevent nuclear 
weapons and materials from being smuggled across 
national borders.2  But because nuclear weapons and 
their essential ingredients do not occur in nature and 
are too difﬁcult for terrorists to plausibly produce on 
their own, if nuclear weapons and nuclear materi-
als can be kept out of terrorist hands, terrorism with 
nuclear weapons can be reliably prevented.  Thus the 
most crucial element in preventing nuclear terrorism, 
and therefore one of the steps most critical for the se-
curity of the United States, Russia, and the world, is to 
lock down every nuclear weapon and every kilogram 
of potential nuclear bomb material everywhere.  Se-
curity for these nuclear stockpiles that is sufﬁcient 
to defeat the threats terrorists and criminals have al-
ready shown they can pose must be put in place as 
rapidly as that can possibly be done.
This report provides an update on progress in 
achieving that and other closely related objectives in 
the last year, along with targeted recommendations 
for strengthening and accelerating the effort.  The 
past year was still one of slow progress in most cat-
egories, raising the danger that the world may fail in 
securing these stockpiles before terrorists and crimi-
nals can get to them.  But it was also a year in which 
the United States and other countries joined in lay-
ing what could be the foundation of an urgently 
needed, fast-paced global partnership to prevent 
nuclear terrorism.  The unanimous passage of UN Se-
curity Council Resolution 1540 in April 2004 legally 
obliges every country in the world to put in place ef-
fective controls over weapons of mass destruction 
and related materials, including effective security 
and accounting for nuclear material—providing the 
1 Boris Yamshanov, “Bribes Reeking of Explosives,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 16 September 2004; Nikolai Gritchin, “The Actions of Police Of-
ﬁcers in Beslan Helped the Terrorists,” Izvestia, 11 November 2004; Robert Greenali, “What Happened in Beslan?” BBC News Online, 10 
September 2004; “Terror’s New Depths,” Economist (11 September 2004); Paul Thompson and James Clench, “Two Days of Sheer Ter-
ror; Russia’s Nightmare,” The Sun, 4 September 2004; “Beslan Hostage-Taking Death Toll Is 330 - Deputy Prosecutor General,” Interfax 
News Service, 30 December 2004.
2 For a discussion of the steps terrorists would have to take to get and use a nuclear weapon on a U.S. city, and government ac-
tions that could prevent these steps from being taken, see Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John Holdren, “Blocking the Terrorist 
Pathway to the Bomb,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2003; available at 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/path.asp as of 1 February 2005).
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base for an accelerated global effort to put effective 
security measures for nuclear stockpiles in place.3 
The May 2004 launch of the Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative (GTRI) by the U.S. Department of Energy 
offers great potential to accelerate and expand ef-
forts to remove and secure potential nuclear bomb 
material from insecure sites around the world.4  The 
statement on accelerating and strengthening coop-
erative nuclear security programs agreed to by U.S. 
President George W. Bush and Russian President 
Vladimir Putin at their February 2005 summit in 
Bratislava, Slovakia, creates new possibilities for ac-
celerating and strengthening cooperation to secure 
nuclear stockpiles in Russia and around the world.5
Sustained, daily leadership from both President Bush 
and President Putin—and from the leaders of other 
key nuclear states—will be needed to fulﬁll the prom-
ise of the foundations laid in the last year.  Translating 
last year’s pledges into this year’s rapid action will 
require a continuing push from the highest levels, 
as difﬁcult bureaucratic and political impediments 
persist that cut across agencies and departments 
and cannot be resolved by ofﬁcials within any one 
agency.  As the leaders of the two countries that own 
the vast majority of the world’s nuclear weapons and 
weapons-usable nuclear material, President Bush and 
President Putin have an historic opportunity to leave 
behind, as a lasting legacy, a world in which the dan-
ger that terrorists could get hold of a nuclear weapon 
or the materials needed to make it has been dra-
matically reduced.  We hope that this report will help 
accomplish that objective.
GROWING GLOBAL CONSENSUS  
ON THE URGENCY OF THE DANGER
Even for a group combining the cold-blooded moti-
vation and the well-honed preparation of the Beslan 
terrorists, an attack using an actual nuclear explosive 
would be among the most difﬁcult types of attack 
for terrorists to accomplish.  For years, many experts 
around the world have dismissed the possibility of 
a terrorist nuclear bomb—either a stolen nuclear 
weapon that terrorists succeeded in detonating, or a 
bomb they managed to make themselves with stolen 
plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU)—as too 
far-fetched to require serious attention to prevent 
it.  But difﬁcult is not the same as impossible.  As we 
discussed at length in our previous report, the prob-
ability that terrorists could succeed in carrying out 
a nuclear attack is large enough to justify doing “ev-
erything in our power,” in President Bush’s words, to 
prevent it.6
3 For the text of the resolution, see United Nations, “1540 Committee” (New York: UN, 2005; available at http://disarmament2.un.org/
Committee1540/meeting.html as of 25 February 2005).
4 For the initial announcement of this effort, see Spencer Abraham, “International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna: Remarks Prepared 
for Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 2004; available at http://www.energy.gov as 
of 18 March 2005).
5 For the text of the Bratislava statement, see “Joint Statement by President Bush and President Putin on Nuclear Security 
Cooperation” (Bratislava, Slovakia: The White House, Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary, 2005; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2005/02/20050224-8.html as of 25 February 2005).
6 See “Debunking Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Theft” in Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An 
Agenda for Action (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat 
Initiative, 2004; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/2004report.asp as of 1 February 2005), pp. 10-30.  Two 
other particularly important recent publications on nuclear terrorism and its prevention are Graham T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The 
Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2004), and Charles Ferguson and William Potter, The 
Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey, Cal.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, 2004). 
These publications have undoubtedly played critical roles in fostering the increased global consensus on the reality of the danger 
of nuclear terrorism and the urgency of actions to prevent it.  So, too, have efforts by a range of non-government experts, in the 
United States and some other countries.  The efforts of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) have been particularly notable, including 
the “Safer World” public education campaign in key primary states in 2003-2004, which contributed to greatly increased attention 
candidates devoted to the subject in the 2004 campaign, and ultimately to the comments in the ﬁrst presidential debate; statements 
in many fora by NTI President Sam Nunn and other board members and staff; and NTI’s sponsorship of efforts by a range of other 
groups (including our own work) designed to highlight both the threat and the available opportunities to strengthen global efforts 
to address it. 
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Fortunately, the years since the 9/11 attacks have 
witnessed a growing international understanding 
of the danger of nuclear terrorism.  This emerging 
global consensus was perhaps best summed up in 
the last year by the United Nations High-Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges, and Change, appointed by UN 
Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan, which included lead-
ing security ﬁgures from around the world, such as 
Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser to the 
ﬁrst President Bush, and Yevgeny Primakov, a former 
prime minister of Russia.  The panel warned that ter-
rorists might well be able to get hold of “inadequately 
secured” nuclear material, and that if they did, “scien-
tists have repeatedly warned of the ease with which 
terrorists could, with parts from the open market, as-
semble a simple ‘gun-type’ nuclear device.”  A terrorist 
nuclear bomb, the panel warned, might kill “tens of 
thousands to more than one million people.”  The 
panel called for “urgent short-term action” to reduce 
the danger, focused particularly on “consolidating, se-
curing, and when possible eliminating” nuclear bomb 
materials and other ingredients of weapons of mass 
destruction.7
In early 2005, Annan himself followed the panel’s 
warnings by emphasizing that nuclear terrorism was 
not “science ﬁction,” and that the world now had “a 
last chance for preventive action,” including “con-
solidating, securing, and when possible eliminating” 
nuclear materials.  Annan emphasized that a terror-
ist nuclear attack would not only be a catastrophe 
for the country attacked, but was truly a threat to 
everyone, as it would “stagger the world economy 
and thrust tens of millions of people into dire pov-
erty,” creating “a second death toll throughout the 
developing world.”8  Similarly, Mohammed ElBara-
dei, Director-General of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), warned in late 2004 that the 
world was in a “race against time” to secure nuclear 
stockpiles before terrorists and criminals could get to 
them.9  Stressing that al Qaeda and other extremist 
groups were “actively looking into acquiring a nuclear 
weapon and other weapons of mass destruction,” 
ElBaradei told an interviewer that terrorists armed 
with a nuclear bomb would be “the most horrible 
scenario,” and warned: “We can’t afford one single 
lapse in the system of security of nuclear material 
or nuclear weapons.”10  The February 2005 Bush-Pu-
tin summit statement, in which the two presidents 
described nuclear terrorism as “one of the gravest 
threats our two countries face,” and called for acceler-
ated action to secure nuclear stockpiles as a critical 
element of protecting the national security of both 
countries, emphasized again that Russian President 
Putin shares in this consensus on the urgency of the 
danger.11
Within the United States, this was one of the very 
few topics on which President Bush and Senator 
John Kerry, his Democratic challenger, agreed in their 
ﬁrst 2004 presidential debate, calling the possibility 
that terrorists would get a nuclear bomb the “single 
most serious threat” to U.S. national security.12  As the 
comments in that debate suggest, concern over the 
danger of nuclear terrorism, and the need to secure 
nuclear stockpiles and interdict nuclear smuggling to 
address it, is shared across the U.S. political spectrum. 
From the Democratic National Committee to the 
House Republican Policy Committee to Vice President 
Cheney to former Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
more and more policymakers of every political ori-
entation are voicing a belief that the greatest danger 
7 United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York: 
2004; available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/ as of January 28, 2005), pp. 40, 45.
8 Koﬁ Annan, “A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism: Keynote Address to the Closing Plenary” in International Summit on Democracy, 
Terrorism and Security (Madrid: Club de Madrid, 2005; available at http://english.safe-democracy.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-
ﬁghting-terrorism.html as of 10 March 2005).
9 Mike Corder, “U.N.’s Elbaradei: It’s a Race against Time to Stop Terrorists Getting Nuclear Weapon,” Associated Press Newswires, 8 
November 2004.
10 “IAEA Chief Says Al Qaeda Sought Nuclear Weapon-TV,” Reuters News, 9 April 2005.
11 “Joint Statement by President Bush and President Putin on Nuclear Security Cooperation.”
12 “The First Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate” (University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida: Commission on Presidential Debates, 2004; 
available at http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004a.html as of 31 January 2005).
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facing the United States in the war on terrorism is the 
possibility that al Qaeda or similar groups could gain 
access to a nuclear bomb.13  Leading members of the 
U.S. Congress, from both parties and both chambers, 
have sponsored legislation to enable and mandate 
new steps to consolidate, secure, and destroy nuclear 
stockpiles, and to interdict nuclear smuggling.14  In its 
2004 report, the bipartisan 9/11 Commission, after 
reviewing the failures and missteps that led to the 
9/11 attacks, called upon Americans and their lead-
ers to take action to ensure that nuclear weapons 
would not be used in any future terrorist attack:  “The 
greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the 
United States,” the commission said, “will materialize 
if the world’s most dangerous terrorists acquire the 
world’s most dangerous weapons.  ... Preventing the 
proliferation of these weapons warrants a maximum 
effort... .”15
This growing consensus on the danger also includes 
the community of technical experts with access to 
the relevant classiﬁed information.  For example, at 
a January 2005 conference of nuclear scientists and 
terrorism experts organized by Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, when Washington Post editor Steve Coll 
queried the group on the probability of a terrorist 
nuclear bomb being detonated on U.S. soil in the 
coming decade, only a handful of conferees said that 
they thought the risk was less than ﬁve percent.16
The challenge now is to convert this growing global 
recognition of the threat of nuclear terrorism into the 
fast-paced action needed to reduce the danger.  
PLAN OF THE REPORT
This report is the fourth in an annual series, and does 
not cover every subject we have addressed previously.17 
13 The Democratic Party platform concluded, “There is no greater threat to American security than the possibility of terrorists armed 
with weapons of mass destruction.  Preventing terrorists from gaining access to these weapons must be our number one security 
goal.”  It can be found at 2004 Democratic National Convention, Strong at Home, Respected in the World: The 2004 Democratic National 
Platform for America (Boston, Mass.: Democratic National Committee, 2004; available at http://a9.g.akamai.net/7/9/8082/v002/www.
democrats.org/pdfs/2004platform.pdf as of 31 January 2005). See also, House Policy Committee, Subcommittee on National Secu-
rity and Foreign Affairs, All Tools at Our Disposal: Addressing Nuclear Proliferation in a Post–9/11 World (Washington, D.C.: United States 
House of Representatives, 2005; available at http://policy.house.gov/assets/ATOD.pdf as of 31 January 2005). The chair of the sub-
committee, Representative Heather Wilson (R-NM), summarized the scenario of a nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist or rogue 
state as “everyone’s worst nightmare.”  See “Report: Threat of Nukes in Terrorists’ Hands Is Urgent “ (Washington, D.C.: House Policy 
Committee, 2005; available at http://policy.house.gov/html/news_release.cfm?id=162 as of 1 February 2005).  Cheney referred to 
terrorists with weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, in an American city as “the biggest threat we face now as 
a nation”; see Vice President Dick Cheney, “Vice President and Mrs. Cheney’s Remarks and Q&A in Carroll, Ohio” (Carroll, Ohio: Ofﬁce 
of the Vice President, 2004; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041020-2.html as of 13 April 2005). 
Ashcroft’s comments, in which he regarded the possibility that al Qaeda or its sympathizers could gain access to a nuclear bomb 
as the greatest danger facing the United States in the war on terrorism, were reported in Curt Anderson, “Ashcroft: Nuke Threat the 
Largest Danger,” Associated Press Newswires, 27 January 2005.   
14 For discussion of pending legislation, see Anthony Wier, “Legislative Update,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Controlling 
Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2004; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/legislative.asp as of 2 February 
2005).  Also see “Modest Progress on Nuclear Security at Bush-Putin Meeting” (Washington, D.C.: Russian American Nuclear Security 
Advisory Council, 2005; available at http://www.ransac.org as of 7 March 2005).
15 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commis-
sion on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 2004; available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.
html as of 28 January 2005), pp. 380-381.
16 Steve Coll, “What Bin Laden Sees in Hiroshima,” Washington Post, 6 February 2005.  Coll, the author of a book on al Qaeda and the 
Taliban, emphasizes al Qaeda’s long-term determination to get nuclear weapons.
17 The previous reports are: Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action; Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John Holdren, 
Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing 
the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2003; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/report.
asp as of 1 February 2005); Matthew Bunn, John Holdren, and Anthony Wier, Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials: Seven Steps for 
Immediate Action (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initia-
tive, 2002; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/securing_nuclear_weapons_and_materials_May2002.pdf as of 1 February 2005). 
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In 2002, the ﬁrst report in this series recommended 
seven actions to accelerate and strengthen efforts to 
secure nuclear stockpiles around the world.  In 2003, 
the second report described all the steps on the ter-
rorist pathway to a nuclear bomb and the actions of 
the United States and other governments could con-
tribute to blocking each step; it developed for the ﬁrst 
time a comprehensive set of metrics for assessing how 
much progress had been made in securing nuclear 
stockpiles, interdicting nuclear smuggling, stabilizing 
employment for nuclear personnel, monitoring nu-
clear stockpiles, ending further production of nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials, and 
reducing nuclear stockpiles; and it provided compre-
hensive recommendations for next steps in each of 
those six categories of effort.  In 2004, the third report 
provided a more detailed assessment of the threat of 
nuclear terrorism, debunking a series of myths that 
have led many to downplay the danger; it updated 
the assessments of progress; and it provided a tar-
geted set of recommendations focused on “security 
ﬁrst,” stressing locking down nuclear stockpiles as a 
ﬁrst step toward the broader actions described the 
previous year.
Building on our previous work, this report provides 
updates on the threat and progress in addressing 
it, along with a detailed set of recommendations—
again focused on a “security ﬁrst” agenda—intended 
to build on the foundations for rapid progress laid in 
the last year.  After this introduction, Chapter Two re-
views key changes in the picture of the threat posed 
by nuclear terrorism.  In Chapter Three, we exam-
ine the key developments in efforts to reduce that 
threat in the past year, and then assess in detail, us-
ing a set of quantiﬁable metrics, both the progress 
U.S.-funded programs have made to date in reducing 
the threat posed by inadequate security for nuclear 
weapons, materials, and expertise in the former So-
viet Union and around the world, and the rate at 
which further progress is being made.  The key lesson 
from the analysis in Chapter Three is that, while prog-
ress has remained slow in many areas, real successes 
have been achieved, demonstrating that effective 
action to address the threat is not only possible, but 
is underway every day—and opportunities exist for 
leadership from the highest levels to sweep aside the 
obstacles and further accelerate the effort.
But assessing the number of buildings with security 
equipment installed, or the tons of HEU destroyed, 
does not describe the whole picture of nuclear se-
curity.  Many absolutely critical elements of nuclear 
security—whether the people at the site take se-
curity seriously and use the equipment effectively, 
whether the regulators have the mission, the power, 
and the resources to set and enforce effective nu-
clear security rules, and more—are not captured by 
these standard measures.  For each category of ef-
forts, therefore, we offer a description of the issues 
our metrics do not yet capture, and suggestions of 
additional measures which, if data became available, 
could help provide a clearer picture of the real state 
of progress.  The progress assessment is followed by 
Chapter Four, which reviews the current and pro-
posed U.S. budgets focused on controlling nuclear 
warheads and materials.  
Finally, in Chapter Five we outline an updated action 
agenda, offering ways that the United States, Russia, 
and other key states can build toward a global effort 
whose scope and pace might match the urgency of 
the threat.  Building genuine Russian commitment—
a sense in Russia that cooperation on nuclear security 
is not just a favor to the Americans but an essential 
step for Russia’s own security—will be crucial to suc-
cess.  If President Putin became seized of the issue 
and made it his mission to resolve it, he could assign 
the resources necessary for nuclear security, direct his 
agencies to set and enforce effective nuclear security 
rules and give them the power and resources to do 
so, establish assessment teams with the mission of 
ﬁnding nuclear security problems and recommend-
ing steps to ﬁx them, and more.
This report and its predecessors have an on-line companion, “Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials” (available at http://www.
nti.org/cnwm), which provides in-depth supporting information, including the most comprehensive assessments available anywhere 
of the individual programs focused on keeping nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise out of terrorist hands; an interactive threat 
reduction budget database; technical background; legislative updates; scores of photographs; and hundreds of annotated links to the 
best information on these efforts available on the web.
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A shift from a donor-recipient relationship toward a 
true partnership will be essential in achieving both 
the top-level Russian commitment necessary to move 
nuclear security cooperation forward and the work-
ing-level Russian “buy-in” essential to ensuring that 
upgraded security systems will be sustained and im-
proved over time.  In a real partnership, Russia would 
have to contribute more of its own resources, and the 
United States would have to pursue a truly joint ap-
proach, with Russian and U.S. experts involved in all 
stages of the conception, design, implementation, 
and evaluation of these programs.  Shifting from a 
focus only on improving nuclear security in Russia 
with U.S. help toward a focus on joint U.S. and Rus-
sian leadership in improving security around the 
world (starting with making sure their own houses 
are in order) can strengthen this sense of partnership. 
A leading Russian role can greatly strengthen the 
global effort, as there are key countries where Russia 
has the relationships necessary to work on nuclear 
security or negotiate the removal of nuclear material, 
and the United States does not. 
Rapidly securing the world’s nuclear stockpiles is a 
big job, but a doable one.  The technology to do so 
already exists.  These stockpiles exist in hundreds of 
buildings around the world, not millions.  The key is 
mustering the political will to overcome the secrecy, 
mistrust, and bureaucratic obstacles that dangerously 
slow the needed cooperation.  The task will require 
sustained and focused leadership.  Finding ways to 
ensure that high levels of nuclear security are put in 
place in countries such as Pakistan, India, China, and 
Israel, where direct foreign access to key nuclear sites 
is unlikely to be possible in the near term, will de-
mand considerable creativity and perseverance. 
As with the previous reports in this series, we focus 
here narrowly on the threat of terrorism with nuclear 
explosives, and primarily on U.S.-sponsored efforts 
to counter that threat.  The report does not address 
dispersal of radioactive materials in a so-called “dirty 
bomb,” or attacks on nuclear energy facilities, or any 
of the many non-nuclear means by which terror-
ists might seek to do catastrophic harm.  Nor does it 
discuss the many important and useful cooperative 
threat reduction efforts focused on goals beyond 
controlling nuclear weapons and weapons-usable 
materials—from dismantling missiles and bombers to 
destroying chemical weapons to improving enforce-
ment of export controls.18  We concentrate largely 
on programs that have been funded by the United 
States, which has been the preeminent, but not the 
only, sponsor of threat reduction programs to date. 
This report also does not address a wide range of in-
ternational efforts aimed at controlling nuclear arms 
that are not focused on the threat of theft and smug-
gling of nuclear materials, from negotiated nuclear 
18 Effective export controls are crucially important to preventing transfers of technologies that states could use to produce nuclear 
weapons, and may have some modest beneﬁt in restraining terrorists’ ability to acquire some technologies that would be useful 
to their efforts to cobble together an improvised bomb.  For an excellent discussion of al Qaeda’s nuclear weapons potential that 
includes a mention of export controls as one element of an effort to keep nuclear weapons out of terrorist hands, see David Al-
bright, “Al Qaeda’s Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents,” Special Forum 47 (2002; available at http://www.
nautilus.org/archives/fora/Special-Policy-Forum/47_Albright.html as of 11 April 2005).  For recent treatments of the broader threat 
reduction agenda, see the following: James E. Goodby et al., Cooperative Threat Reduction for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: Center 
for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, September 2004; available at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/
CTR%20for%20a%20New%20Era.pdf as of 21 March 2005); George Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Se-
curity (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2005; available at http://www.carnegieendowment.
org/ﬁles/UC2.FINAL3.pdf as of 21 March 2005); Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade 
(Washington, D.C.: Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002; 
available at http://www.ceip.org/ﬁles/pdf/Reshaping.Threat.Reduction.pdf as of 3 February 2005); Michael Barletta, ed., After 9/11: 
Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation, Occasional Paper No. 8 (Monterey, Cal.: Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 2002; available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op8/op8.pdf as of 3 
February 2005); Robert J. Einhorn and Michele A. Flournoy, eds., Protecting against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical 
Weapons: An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Janu-
ary 2003; available at http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/publications_index.html as of 3 February 2005).  While we point out 
in this report that much of the work needed to prevent nuclear weapons terrorism has not yet been done, a careful reading of the 
works just cited makes clear that the fraction of the job of controlling the chemical and biological complexes of the former Soviet 
Union (and the world) that is already accomplished is far less.  
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arms reductions and restraints, to IAEA safeguards, to 
international nuclear export control arrangements, to 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).19 
In the end, facing up to the threat of nuclear terror-
ism will be essential to the homeland security of the 
United States—and of nations throughout the world. 
Against the threat of terrorists with a demonstrated 
ability to ﬁnd and strike weak spots on a global basis, 
an insecure cache of potential nuclear bomb mate-
rial anywhere is a threat to everyone, everywhere.  As 
Senator Richard Lugar, the Republican chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has said, the 
war on terrorism will not be won until every nuclear 
stockpile, wherever it may be in the world, is secured 
and accounted for to stringent and transparent stan-
dards.20  The tragedy the world witnessed in Beslan, 
like similar tragedies the world has seen in recent 
years, must therefore be more than another sad re-
minder of the existence of people and groups who 
will use any weapon they can lay their hands on to 
destroy lives.  These tragedies must also be a call to 
action to do everything in our power to ensure that 
terrorists never lay their hands on the fearful destruc-
tive power of nuclear weapons.
19 A strong IAEA safeguards system does make a contribution to preventing nuclear terrorism.  It does so by ensuring that nuclear 
material is accounted for on an international basis; requiring that states meet reasonable standards in accounting for their own 
nuclear material; identifying sites where accounting may be a problem; putting in place a cadre of inspectors, who sometimes take 
note if there appear to be serious security problems at a particular site; and encouraging states to ﬁx potentially embarrassing 
problems before inspectors arrive.  Moreover, some of the measures included in the Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements, 
if widely adopted, might help identify sites where terrorist activity using nuclear materials was taking place.  See the brief discussion 
in Albright, “Al Qaeda’s Nuclear Program.”
20 Richard G. Lugar, “NATO after 9/11: Crisis or Opportunity?” (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002; available at http://
www.cfr.org/pub4379/richard_g_lugar/nato_after_911_crisis_or_opportunity.php as of 2 February 2005).

Evidence from the last year makes clear that the elimi-
nation of al Qaeda’s Taliban-led Afghanistan sanctuary 
did not end the group’s decade-long nuclear ambi-
tions—or those of the global jihadist network al 
Qaeda has spawned.  In Russia, security for the many 
thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons 
of potential bomb material left over from the Cold 
War—still dispersed in hundreds of buildings and 
bunkers throughout Russia—has improved signiﬁ-
cantly, but broken alarms often still do not get ﬁxed, 
security forces often go without adequate body ar-
mor and communications equipment, and more.  In 
addition, security culture remains a serious problem, 
with continuing reports of guards patrolling without 
ammunition in their guns, workers propping open se-
curity doors for convenience, and guards turning off 
intrusion detectors when they become annoyed by 
the false alarms.1  Yet these security systems and the 
people who are central to their effectiveness must 
be prepared to defeat outsider threats on the scale 
of the Beslan attack, or insider threats that have in-
cluded multiple insiders (including guards) working 
together to steal valuable items at many types of fa-
cilities, including, in some cases, military facilities and 
nuclear power facilities. 
Elsewhere, some 130 civilian research reactors around 
the world still use HEU as their fuel, yet many have no 
more security than a night watchman and a chain-
link fence.  The nuclear stockpile in Pakistan is heavily 
guarded, but faces deadly threats from armed rem-
nants of al Qaeda in the country and senior nuclear 
insiders who have marketed nuclear bomb technol-
ogy around the globe.  All told, potential nuclear 
bomb material exists in some 40 countries, with secu-
rity that ranges from excellent to 
AL QAEDA’S PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In summarizing the global threat to U.S. interests in 
February 2005, the leaders of the U.S. intelligence 
community were unanimous in warning of the con-
tinuing desire for weapons of mass destruction on 
the part of al Qaeda and the global jihadist network, 
regardless of the disruption of al Qaeda’s sanctuary 
in Afghanistan by the United States and its allies.  CIA 
Director Porter Goss warned that “it may be only a 
matter of time before al Qaeda or another group 
attempts to use chemical, biological, radiological, 
or nuclear weapons.”  FBI Director Robert Mueller 
warned that the intelligence community is “extremely 
concerned with a growing body of sensitive report-
ing that continues to show al Qaeda’s clear intention 
to obtain and to ultimately use some form of chemi-
cal, biological, radiological, or nuclear material in its 
attacks against the United States.”3
Even without access to the classiﬁed reports referred 
to by Director Mueller, the quantity of publicly re-
ported incidents linking al Qaeda with interest in 
nuclear weapons or materials in the last year has 
been disturbing:
The commission appointed by President Bush 
to investigate U.S. intelligence capabilities and 
past conclusions regarding weapons of mass de-
struction revealed in March 2005 that in October 
2001 the U.S. intelligence community assessed 
•
2THE GLOBAL THREAT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM
1 For discussion, see Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action (Cambridge, Mass., and Wash-
ington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004; available at http://www.nti.
org/e_research/cnwm/overview/2004report.asp as of 1 February 2005), pp. 31-36.
2 See Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, pp. 36-38; Matthew Bunn, “The Global Threat,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative 
Research Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2002; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/threat/global.
asp as of 3 March 2005).
3 Mueller’s testimony is in Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, U.S. 
Senate, 109th Congress (16 February 2005).
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that al Qaeda was capable of fabricating at least 
a “crude” nuclear device if it could obtain the req-
uisite nuclear material—separated plutonium or 
highly enriched uranium (HEU).  The commission 
also reported that the CIA’s Weapons Intelligence, 
Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center and 
its Counterterrorist Center judged in November 
2001 that al Qaeda “probably had access to nu-
clear expertise and facilities and that there was a 
real possibility of the group developing a crude 
nuclear device.”  The commission also empha-
sized that the documents seized from al Qaeda 
safe houses in Afghanistan after the overthrow of 
the Taliban “brought to light detailed and reveal-
ing information about the direction and progress 
of al-Qa’ida’s radiological and nuclear ambitions,” 
which had not been available when those earlier 
judgments were made.4
According to press reports, al Qaeda operative 
Sharif al-Masri, captured in the Afghan-Pakistani 
border area in mid-2004, told interrogators that 
al Qaeda is looking to acquire nuclear materials in 
Europe and move them to Mexico and from there 
across the porous border into the United States.5
Two militants arrested in Germany in Janu-
ary 2005—one of whom was an Iraqi who had 
trained in al Qaeda’s Afghanistan camps and was 
associated with alleged 9/11 planner Ramzi Bin al-
Shibh—had reportedly tried to purchase uranium, 
•
•
and had been recorded by authorities discussing 
speciﬁc locations to obtain uranium.6  
News reports also revealed that the U.S. Defense 
Department believes that a Pakistani businessman 
being detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, met 
with Osama bin Laden and “recommended to an 
al Qaeda operative that nuclear weapons should 
be used against U.S. troops and suggested where 
these weapons might be obtained.”7
Just before and just after the November 2004 elec-
tions in the United States, Osama bin Laden and 
his deputy Ayman al Zawahiri each issued mes-
sages directed at the people of the West, giving 
them “one last piece of advice” that their security 
was “in their own hands,” and warning that jihad-
ists would attack if the United States and its allies 
did not change their policies.8  Some analysts saw 
this as a ﬁnal warning that in al Qaeda’s eyes would 
justify a large attack on civilians.  Al Qaeda had 
been criticized in some Islamic circles for not offer-
ing a warning before the 9/11 attacks that would 
have given the victims a chance to repent.9
Indeed, al Qaeda’s search for the bomb stretches back 
more than a decade.  Their ﬁrst well-documented at-
tempt to buy HEU for a nuclear bomb was in 1993.10 
In a 2004 letter to the House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees, former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer 
wrote that in mid- to late-1996, “CIA’s Bin Laden unit 
•
•
4 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President 
(Washington, D.C.: WMD Commission, 2005; available at http://www.wmd.gov/report/ as of 5 April 2005), pp. 267, 271, 292. 
5 Adam Zagorin, “Bordering on Nukes?” Time (22 November 2004).  A different report involving movement of nuclear or radiological 
materials from Mexico, involving claims that several individuals had entered the United States from Mexico with the intent of carry-
ing out a dirty bomb attack, possibly in Boston, has since been discredited.
6 Faye Bowers, “Eavesdropping on Terror Talk in Germany,” Christian Science Monitor, 28 January 2005; Craig Whitlock, “Germany Ar-
rests 2 Al Qaeda Suspects; Men Accused of Planning Attacks in Iraq,” Washington Post, 24 January 2005.
7 The businessman’s name is Saifullah Paracha.  He has been held since being captured on a June 2003 business trip to Thailand. 
The quote comes from a Department of Defense unclassiﬁed summary of evidence used during a tribunal to review his status, as 
reported in Frank Davies, “Authorities Say Pakistani Urged Al-Qaida to Get Nuclear Bomb,” Miami Herald, 11 February 2005.
8 “Bin-Ladin Addresses US People on ‘Real Reason’ for 11 Sep Attack: Transcript of Al-Jazeera Broadcast,” BBC Monitoring Newsﬁle, 
29 October 2004; “Al-Zawahiri Warns Other Arab ‘Regimes’ to Expect Iraq’s Fate: Transcript of Al-Jazeera Broadcast,” BBC Monitoring 
Newsﬁle, 29 November 2004.
9 See, for instance, former CIA bin Laden team head Michael Scheuer’s comments in Timothy J. Burger, “Bin Laden’s New Message,” 
Time (27 December 2004).
10 For a discussion, see Matthew Bunn, “The Demand for Black Market Fissile Material,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: 
Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2003; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/threat/demand.asp as of 22 
February 2005).
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acquired detailed information about the careful, pro-
fessional manner in which al-Qaeda was seeking to 
acquire nuclear weapons … there could be no doubt 
after this date that al-Qaeda was in deadly earnest 
in seeking nuclear weapons.”11  In 2003, Osama bin 
Laden sought and received a religious ruling or fatwa 
from a radical Saudi cleric authorizing the use of a 
nuclear bomb against U.S. civilians as permissible un-
der Islamic law.  The ruling concluded that their use 
would be mandatory if it were the only way to stop 
U.S. actions against Muslims.  “If a bomb that killed 
10 million of them and burned as much of their land 
as they have burned Muslims’ land were dropped 
on them, it would be permissible,” the ruling con-
cluded.12
At the same time, the limited evidence publicly avail-
able continues to suggest a broad gap between the 
capabilities that well-organized and capable terrorist 
groups could put together, and the capabilities they 
have demonstrated to date.  While a few of the docu-
ments recovered in Afghanistan do include some 
disturbing sophistication on nuclear subjects, many are 
extremely naïve.  The same is true of a number of other 
reported instances of al Qaeda pursuits of nuclear or 
radiological materials.  The summaries that have been 
released of the interrogations of José Padilla, for ex-
ample, indicate that he and his accomplice presented 
to top al Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah the absurd 
idea that the two of them could make a nuclear bomb 
using instructions downloaded from the Internet.13 
Zubaydah, according to this account, expressed skep-
ticism and suggested that a dirty bomb would be 
easier, but warned that this was not as easy as Padilla 
seemed to think either.  Strikingly, “senior al Qaeda 
detainee #1” (apparently  Zubaydah himself, since his 
statements describe Zubaydah’s thinking) reports that 
Zubaydah, in discussing a dirty bomb, spoke of “explo-
sives wrapped in uranium,” again suggesting a rather 
low level of nuclear expertise, since uranium, which is 
not very radioactive, would be among the least deadly 
materials to use in a radiological dirty bomb.  None-
theless, Zubaydah gave Padilla and his accomplice 
money to travel to meet Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, 
another very senior al Qaeda operative, in order for 
Mohammed to evaluate the plan.  Mohammed also 
thought the plan was impractical, and suggested that 
they focus on simpler attacks (such as bombing apart-
ment buildings by turning on the gas in an apartment 
and detonating it with a bomb on a timer).  Thus, both 
Zubaydah and Mohammed were immediately skepti-
cal of the feasibility of nuclear and radiological attacks. 
It may be, however, that Zubaydah and Mohammed’s 
skepticism was based on a low (and possibly accurate) 
assessment of the personal technological capabilities 
of Padilla and his accomplice, rather than on a view 
that nuclear and radiological attacks were impractical 
in general.
Similarly, in the case of the two al Qaeda operatives 
arrested in Germany in 2004 and charged with seek-
ing uranium, the sparse information that is publicly 
available suggests they wanted the uranium for dis-
persal in a dirty bomb, rather than for use in a nuclear 
weapon—and the choice of uranium for that purpose 
again suggests a very rudimentary level of nuclear 
knowledge.14  In short, more than a decade after al 
Qaeda’s pursuit of the bomb began, there is as yet no 
11 See Anonymous [Michael Scheuer], “How Not to Catch a Terrorist,” Atlantic Monthly (2004). Also see, Michael Scheuer, quoted in Eric 
Rosenberg, “Bin Laden after Nukes from Russia, CIA Expert Says,” Omaha World-Herald, 21 November 2004. Scheuer further discusses 
bin Laden’s nuclear ambitions in Steve Kroft, “Anonymous Revealed: Michael Scheuer, Former CIA Osama Bin Laden Unit Leader, Dis-
cusses Early Intelligence and Opportunities to Kill Osama Bin Laden” in 60 Minutes (CBS News, 2004).
12 The translated quote is from testimony by then-Attorney General John Ashcroft, in Committee on the Judiciary, United States 
Department of Justice: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 1st 
Session (5 June 2003; available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/108th/87536.PDF as of 23 February 2005). The au-
thor of the fatwa is Nasser bin Hamed al-Fahd.  He has since been arrested, and has publicly renounced some of his previous rulings, 
though whether this one is among them is not clear.
13 The following discussion is drawn from the extensive summary of the interrogations of Padilla and others that was released by the 
U.S. Department of Defense.  See U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of José Padilla’s Activities with Al Qaeda (Washington, D.C.: 
DOD, 2004; available at http://news.ﬁndlaw.com/nytimes/docs/padilla/pad52804dodsum5.html as of 26 March 2005).
14 Bowers, “Eavesdropping on Terror Talk in Germany”; Whitlock, “Germany Arrests 2 Al Qaeda Suspects; Men Accused of Planning 
Attacks in Iraq.”
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strong, publicly available evidence that the group or 
its followers have put together the capabilities that 
would be necessary to make a nuclear bomb.  But un-
fortunately, we simply cannot know what capabilities 
al Qaeda and its followers may have managed to keep 
hidden—or may acquire in the future. 
THE CONTINUING THREAT TO NUCLEAR STOCKPILES 
IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
Evidence in the last year also continued to suggest 
that nuclear stockpiles around the world remained 
vulnerable to theft or provision to terrorists, creating 
a danger that terrorists might be able to acquire the 
nuclear material without which they cannot make a 
bomb.
Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union de-
serve considerable credit for preventing the massive 
nuclear leakage that many feared in the years imme-
diately following the Soviet Union’s collapse—taking 
action in many cases under very difﬁcult circumstances. 
Nevertheless, while security for nuclear stockpiles in 
the former Soviet Union continues to improve, secu-
rity in many cases still falls far short of what is needed 
to be able to defeat the outsider and insider threats 
terrorists and criminals have shown they can pose—
despite claims by some senior U.S. and Russian ofﬁcials 
that the danger is past.15  As a CIA report summed it 
up in November 2004: “Russia’s nuclear security has 
been slowly improving over the last several years, but 
risks remain.”16  Even Alexander Rumiantsev, head of 
Russia’s Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (Rosatom, 
formerly Minatom), warned after the September 2004 
terrorist attacks in Russia that “today, we have to admit 
that we cannot fully rule out the possibility that ﬁssile 
materials, including highly-enriched uranium and 
plutonium, as well as technologies suitable for manu-
facturing nuclear weapons, may fall into the hands of 
international terrorists.”17 In a December 2003 directive, 
Russian President Putin acknowledged that the threat 
to Russia’s nuclear facilities from domestic and interna-
tional terrorists is increasing, and that past funding for 
nuclear safety and security had been inadequate.18  
Terrorists and criminal groups have already probed 
at least some of the vulnerabilities in Russia’s nuclear 
security.  Senior Russian ofﬁcials and the Russian state 
newspaper have conﬁrmed four incidents in 2001-
2002 of terrorist teams carrying out reconnaissance on 
Russian nuclear warheads—two on nuclear warhead 
storage facilities, and two on nuclear weapon transport 
trains.19  The locations of these facilities and the routes 
15 For an overview of nuclear security and accounting in Russia as it stands today, as opposed to a decade ago, see, for example, Bunn 
and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, pp. 31-36.  Remarkably, then-Undersecretary of State John Bolton argued in 2004, 
incorrectly, that there has been no “signiﬁcant risk of a Russian nuclear weapon getting into terrorist hands” for “some number of 
years.” See Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, “Unprecedented Peril Forces Tough Calls; President Faces a Multi-Front Battle against 
Threats Known, Unknown,” Washington Post, 26 October 2004.  There is also the oft-repeated but false claim by Russian Minister of 
Defense Sergei Ivanov that there has never been a theft of “even a single gram of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium” in Russia, 
quoted, for example, in “Nuclear Weapons in Russia Are Well Protected - Ivanov,” RIA Novosti, 14 January 2005.  For a longer discussion 
of several commonly held but demonstrably false beliefs about nuclear terrorism, see “Debunking Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism 
and Nuclear Theft,” in Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, pp. 10-30.
16 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces 
(Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2004; available at http://www.cia.gov/nic/special_russiannuke04.html as of 5 March 
2005).
17 “Top Russian Ofﬁcial Does Not Rule Out International Terrorists May Obtain Nuclear Materials,” Interfax News Service, 18 September 
2004.
18 Ocnovi Gosudarstvennoy Politiki V Oblast’i Obespecheniya Yadernoy I Padiatsionnoy Bezopasnost’i Rossiyskoy Federatsii Na Period Do 
2010 Goda I Dal’neyshuyu Perspectivu (Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Safety and Security and Radiation Protection in the Russian 
Federation for the Period through 2010 and Beyond), Presidential Decree 2196 (Moscow: Kremlin, 2003; available at http://www.scrf.
gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2003/2196.html as of 23 February 2005).
19 Original reporting of the incidents of reconnaissance on warhead transport trains is in Vladimir Bogdanov, “Propusk K Beogo-
lovkam Nashli U Terrorista (A Pass to Warheads Found on a Terrorist),” Rossiskaya Gazeta, 1 November 2002.  General Igor Valynkin, 
the commander of the force that guards Russia’s nuclear weapons, conﬁrmed the cases involving storage sites in October 2001.  See 
“Russia: Terror Groups Scoped Nuke Site,” Associated Press, 25 October 2001.  These incidents are also referred to in U.S. National Intel-
ligence Council, Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces.
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of these trains are state secrets in Russia—secrets the 
terrorists nevertheless apparently managed to pen-
etrate.  Also in 2003, proceedings in a Russian criminal 
case revealed that a Russian businessman had been 
offering $750,000 for stolen weapon-grade plutonium 
for sale to a foreign client, and had made contact with 
residents of the closed nuclear city of Sarov, home of 
one of Russia’s premier nuclear weapons laboratories, 
to try to close a deal.20
In early 2005, the Russian government approved a 
plan to respond to Putin’s nuclear safety and secu-
rity directive, but much of the plan was focused on 
preparations for action, such as drafting improved 
legislation, rather than on-the-ground upgrades 
of nuclear security. President Putin reportedly dis-
patched additional troops to guard critical nuclear 
facilities after the Beslan attacks—but there is little 
indication that more fundamental issues with nu-
clear security have yet been resolved.  Today, Russian 
government funding for nuclear security remains far 
short of what is needed.  Russian regulations still do 
not deﬁne the threat that nuclear facilities’ security 
systems must be able to defeat.  No systematic process 
for ﬁnding and ﬁxing the worst security vulnerabili-
ties appears to be in place.  The Russian government 
has made virtually no effort to consolidate HEU and 
separated plutonium in fewer locations.  And there 
continue to be serious problems of security culture, 
from guards patrolling with no ammunition in their 
guns to personnel propping open security doors for 
convenience.21  
For example, in March 2005, the commander of In-
terior Ministry troops for the Moscow district said 
that only 7 of the critical guarded facilities in the 
district had adequately maintained security equip-
ment, while 39 had “serious shortcomings.”  He also 
reported that over half the length of the perimeters 
of restricted access zones in the district were not pro-
tected by fences or other obstacles to stop intruders, 
while 30 kilometers of the fencing and obstacles that 
were in place were in need of repair.  He said that his 
troops had stopped 98 trespassers who tried to pen-
etrate the perimeters of restricted access facilities in 
2004.22  Similarly, the acting chief of Russia’s Federal 
Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Inspec-
tion Service told a March 2005 press conference 
that in 2004 there had been 31 reported incidents of 
trespassing at nuclear research institutes, 22 at HEU-
fueled icebreakers, and 29 at nuclear fuel projects. 
Though he offered assurances that all these incidents 
were minor trespasses that did not threaten the secu-
rity of the facility, in each of these cases the reported 
number of incidents was slightly higher than the pre-
vious year.23
Few nuclear facilities in Russia (or elsewhere, for that 
matter) could defend against an attack on the scale of 
Beslan—32 heavily armed, suicidal terrorists, launch-
ing a carefully planned attack with no warning.  Nor is 
that size of attack the upper limit:  the Beslan attack-
ers had acquired some of their weapons stockpile in 
a June 2004 raid on Russian Interior Ministry build-
ings and arms depots in the neighboring province 
of Ingushetia that involved at least 200 attackers and 
20 “Russian Court Sentences Men for Weapons-Grade Plutonium Scam,” trans. BBC Monitoring Service, RIA Novosti, 14 October 2003; 
“Russia: Criminals Indicted for Selling Mercury as Weapons-Grade Plutonium (Russian),” trans. U.S. Department of Commerce, Iz-
vestiya, 11 October 2003.
21 For an excellent discussion of the security culture issue, see Igor Khripunov and James Holmes, eds., Nuclear Security Culture: The 
Case of Russia (Athens, Georgia: Center for International Trade and Security, The University of Georgia, 2004; available at http://www.
uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/Security%20Culture%20Report%2020041118.pdf as of 18 February 2005). For a picture of a security 
gate left open, along with information about the reasons, see U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Se-
curity of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2001; available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01312.pdf as of 28 February 2005).  On the guards with no ammunition, see Igor Goloskokov, “Re-
fomirovanie Voisk MVD Po Okhrane Yadernikh Obektov Rossii (Reform of Ministry of Internal Affairs Detachments Guarding Russian 
Nuclear Facilities),” trans. Dmitry Kovchegin, Yaderny Kontrol 9, no. 4 (Winter 2003; available at http://www.pircenter.org/data/publi-
cations/yk4-2003.pdf as of 28 February 2005). 
22 “Over 4,000 Trespassers Detained at Moscow District Restricted Access Facilities,” Interfax-Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 18 March 
2005.
23 Tatiana Sinitsyna, “Russia: Fewer Trespasses Reported from Nuke Plants as Danger Persists in Coal Mines,” RIA Novosti, 30 March 
2005.
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left some 80 people dead.  In that raid, the attackers 
dressed in uniforms of the Russian Federal Security 
Service, Army intelligence, and other special police 
squads, and overwhelmed local forces, who did not 
receive reinforcements from federal security ser-
vice troops for several hours.24  (This is particularly 
distressing since the usual approach to security at 
nuclear facilities—including nuclear weapon storage 
sites—is to have a relatively modest defensive force 
on-site, and to rely on reinforcements arriving in a 
timely way.)
Such problems extend beyond Russia’s southern bor-
derlands.  Attackers have shown again and again that 
they can mass forces seemingly anywhere in Russia 
without warning, and that they can bribe or other-
wise collude with insiders.  For example, in the week 
before the Beslan attack, suicide bombers paid bribes 
and eluded lax airport security to get on two ﬂights 
out of Moscow, killing all 90 passengers aboard.25 
Also, in October 2004, a month after the Beslan attack, 
a force of 47 men identiﬁed as Dagestanis, armed 
with clubs and crowbars, seized complete control of 
a secret non-nuclear military research and develop-
ment facility in the town of Zelenograd, just north of 
Moscow, with all of its secret documents and arms 
prototypes.  When confronted by the facility staff, the 
attackers claimed to work for a ﬁrm that had bought 
the company’s stock, and identiﬁed one member of 
their group as the new deputy director of the facility. 
Local Interior Ministry forces had to retake the facil-
ity from the men in an action reportedly involving 
hand-to-hand struggle and police ﬁring automatic 
weapons into the air.26
The threat of insider theft at nuclear facilities and 
elsewhere in the former Soviet Union is also severe.  In 
October 2004, sources in the local and regional Minis-
try of Internal Affairs reported that thieves had stolen 
three valves, valued at 700,000 rubles (over $20,000), 
from the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant.  The plant, 
like all Russian nuclear power plants, is protected 
by armed guards, leading police to assume that the 
theft was probably an inside job.  Nor was this likely 
the ﬁrst time such a theft has occurred: the head of 
the local branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs told 
a reporter, “I don’t know why this crime has attracted 
so much attention...such thefts happen here often.”27 
Earlier in 2004, at the Rivne nuclear power plant in 
Ukraine, police broke up a ring that included four au-
thorized workers and a guard they bribed with $77 
in Ukrainian currency; the group had successfully 
stolen a large steam evaporator worth an estimated 
$154,000 from inside the guarded plant.28  It is ex-
traordinarily difﬁcult to design a nuclear security 
system that will be effective in preventing theft by 
conspiracies of ﬁve insiders, including a guard, work-
ing together—and the 2004 CIA report repeatedly 
highlighted the insider danger.29
Indeed, in his February 2005 testimony, CIA Director 
Goss warned that in Russia “there is sufﬁcient material 
unaccounted for so that it would be possible for those 
with know-how to construct a nuclear weapon,” and 
pointed out that because some material was unac-
counted for, he could not assure the American public 
24 Mark Deich, “The Ingushetia Knot,” Moskovskii Komsomolets, 6 August 2004; Boris Yamshanov, “Bribes Reeking of Explosives,” Ros-
siiskaya Gazeta, 16 September 2004.
25 Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, “Russian Plane Bombers Exploited Corrupt System,” Washington Post, 18 September 2004.
26 Sergey Ptchikin, “Needles of Patriots: Attempts Made to Privatize Unique System for Protection against Terrorists,” Rossiskaya Gaze-
ta, 21 December 2004.
27 Andrey Pankov, “S Atomnoy Elektrostantsii Vynesli Tri Dorogostoyashchikh Klapana (Three High-Priced Valves Carried Off from Nu-
clear Power Plant),” Novyye Izvestiya, October 2004.  This article is translated and summarized in “Three Pinch Valves Were Stolen from 
the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant, Abstract 20040380,” in NTI Research Library: NIS Trafﬁcking Database (Monterey, Cal.: Monterey In-
stitute for International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004; available at http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/2004/20040380.
htm as of 28 February 2005).
28 See, for example, “Rovenskuyu AES Obvorovali (Rivne NPP Was Robbed),” Infa News Agency, 5 April 2004; “Praporshchik Pomog 
Ukrast Agregat S Rovenskoy AES Za Vzyatku V 400 Griven (Warrant Ofﬁcer Assisted in Stealing a Device from the Rivne NPP for a 
Bribe of 400 Hryvnyas),” Interfax, 5 April 2004. These and other sources are summarized in Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Mon-
terey Institute for International Studies, “Thieves of Nuclear Plant Equipment Arrested in Ukraine,” NIS Export Control Observer  (May 
2004; available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/pdfs/ob_0405e.pdf as of 5 March 2005).
29 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces.
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that enough nuclear material for a bomb was not al-
ready in terrorist hands.30  Russia is still transitioning 
from a Soviet-era nuclear material accounting system 
that was designed not to detect nuclear theft but to 
monitor facilities’ performance in meeting their pro-
duction targets.  In essence, each facility measured its 
input and its output, and as long as the differences 
were small, they were written off as normal losses to 
waste—making it possible for careful thieves to steal 
nuclear material undetected day after day, as long as 
the individual thefts were small.  Over the decades of 
the Cold War, the few-percent uncertainties tolerated 
in this accounting system amount to many hundreds 
of bombs’ worth of material that cannot be reliably 
accounted for.  (To be fair, the U.S. nuclear material ac-
counting system was also not good enough during 
much of the Cold War to rule out the possibility that 
nuclear material had been stolen: when the United 
States published its plutonium inventory in the mid-
1990s, some two tons of plutonium was “material 
unaccounted for.” Probably this represents material 
plated out on pipes, plutonium lost to waste, and 
overestimates of how much was produced in the ﬁrst 
place, but no one can demonstrate conclusively that 
none of it was stolen.)
Today, at a number of sites in Russia where large 
quantities of nuclear material are processed every 
year, accounting has been much improved.  But at 
many sites, there are still vast numbers of containers 
of nuclear material built up over decades, and no one 
has yet had the time and resources to measure each 
one to make sure that it still contains the nuclear ma-
terial that the paper records say it should.
CONTINUING NUCLEAR SECURITY  
CONCERNS AROUND THE WORLD
The danger of nuclear theft is not just a Russia 
problem, it is a global problem.  Evidence of global 
vulnerabilities in nuclear security and accounting 
systems has continued to accumulate over the past 
year.  In November 2004, for example, the U.S. Gov-
ernment Accountability Ofﬁce reported the results 
of a Department of Energy study that concluded that 
there are 128 nuclear research reactors or associated 
facilities around the world with 20 kilograms of HEU 
or more—a larger number of facilities with enough 
material for a bomb than had previously been pub-
licly recognized.31  As noted in last year’s report, these 
facilities exist in dozens of countries around the 
world, and many have no more security than a night 
watchman and a chain-link fence.32
In Pakistan, investigations of the assassination at-
tempts against President Musharraf in late 2003 
suggest that military ofﬁcers in league with jihadi 
terrorists were behind them, raising disturbing possi-
bilities for the ofﬁcers charged with guarding nuclear 
stockpiles.33  Investigations of the global black-mar-
ket nuclear network led by Pakistan’s Abdul Qadeer 
Khan over the past year continued to reveal the ex-
tent to which the network had provided one-stop 
shopping for potential nuclear proliferators.  There 
remains a disturbing possibility that the design for a 
relatively simple but workable nuclear bomb that the 
network provided to Libya may also have been pro-
vided to terrorists—or might still be in the future.34 
The possibility that terrorists might gain access to 
30 See Goss’s testimony in Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States.
31 U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons-
Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the United States and Russia, GAO-05-57 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2004; available at http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d0557.pdf as of 2 February 2005).
32 Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, pp. 36-37.
33 “Escaped Musharraf Plotter Was Pakistan Air Force Man,” Agence France Presse, 12 January 2005; “Musharraf Al-Qaeda Revelation 
Underlines Vulnerability: Analysts,” Agence France Presse, 31 May 2004.
34 Good summaries of the Khan network can be found in David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Fu-
ture Proliferation Networks,” Washington Quarterly 28, no. 2 (Spring 2005); Gellman and Linzer, “Unprecedented Peril Forces Tough 
Calls; President Faces a Multi-Front Battle against Threats Known, Unknown”; Bill Powell et al., “The Man Who Sold the Bomb,” Time 
(21 February 2005); Douglas Frantz, “A High-Risk Nuclear Stakeout: The U.S. Took Too Long to Act, Some Experts Say, Letting a Paki-
stani Scientist Sell Illicit Technology Well after It Knew of His Operation,” Los Angeles Times, 27 February 2005; William C. Rempel and 
Douglas Frantz, “Global Nuclear Inquiry Stalls: Authorities Fear That the Extent of a Pakistani Scientist’s Proliferation Ring Remains 
Unknown and That It Will Resume Work If Pressures Ease,” Los Angeles Times, 5 December 2004.
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a nuclear bomb design only heightens the impor-
tance of making sure they do not get their hands on 
the ingredients for that recipe.  At the same time, the 
two senior Pakistani nuclear scientists who acknowl-
edged meeting with bin Laden and Zawahiri and 
discussing nuclear weapons were never tried or im-
prisoned (though it appears that they remain under a 
loose form of house arrest).35
As additional states gain access to nuclear weapons 
or the materials needed to make them, the security 
of nuclear weapons, material, and expertise will be 
of increasing concern, and the possibilities for a con-
scious state decision to give or sell a nuclear bomb 
or nuclear materials may increase.  The past year 
saw virtually no progress in stopping or rolling back 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  After the 
United States tabled a proposal for veriﬁed North Ko-
rean disarmament at the six-party talks in June 2004, 
North Korea declined to return to the table.  Later, in 
February 2005, North Korea publicly announced that 
it had nuclear weapons and was withdrawing indeﬁ-
nitely from the six-party talks, citing the United States’ 
“hostile policy.”36  North Korea is now thought to have 
enough plutonium for six to eight nuclear bombs, 
has restarted its plutonium production reactor to 
make more, and is believed to be seeking the ability 
to produce HEU as well.  Given Pyongyang’s record of 
selling essentially every type of weapon it had avail-
able to anyone who would buy, and its desperation 
for hard-currency exports, this raises the troubling 
question of whether, once North Korea has what it 
considers a sufﬁcient nuclear deterrent for itself, it 
might be willing to sell nuclear weapons or nuclear 
materials.37  However large or small that danger is, 
there is little doubt that it grew in the past year.  
In Iran, by contrast, the known and declared facilities 
involved in the uranium enrichment program that 
has provoked international concerns remained frozen 
for much of the past year, while inspectors worked to 
unravel Iran’s nuclear past and Iran continued nego-
tiations with Europe over trade, political, and security 
beneﬁts in return for constraining its nuclear pro-
gram.  In early 2005, the United States agreed not to 
stand in the way of the limited economic incentives 
the European negotiators proposed to offer Iran (in 
return for European agreement that if Iran did not 
agree to a permanent end to its enrichment program 
it would be referred to the Security Council for possi-
ble sanctions).  The Bush administration, however, has 
so far declined to engage Iran directly or to address 
Iranian concerns over security and other issues.38  To 
date, Iran has rejected the permanent end to its ura-
nium enrichment program that European negotiators 
are seeking, insisting that the current pause will only 
be temporary:  “But as I have said before,” Hassan Ro-
hani, secretary of Iran’s security council, told Reuters in 
February 2005, “the period of suspension is deﬁnitely 
limited to some months, not a year.”39
SUMMARY OF THE THREAT
In short, a stream of indicators in the past year has 
added to the already substantial body of evidence 
that terrorists are pursuing a nuclear bomb, and that 
nuclear weapons and materials stockpiles around the 
world remains dangerously vulnerable to theft.  
35 Information on the two scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudhary Abdul Majid is available in:  David Albright and 
Holly Higgins, “A Bomb for the Ummah,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 2 (March/April 2003); Peter Baker, “Pakistani Scientist 
Who Met Bin Laden Failed Polygraphs, Renewing Suspicions,” Washington Post, 3 March 2002; Peter Baker and Kamran Khan, “Paki-
stan to Forgo Charges Against 2 Nuclear Scientists; Ties to Bin Laden Suspected,” Washington Post, 30 January 2002; Kathy Gannon, 
“Bin Laden and the Pakistani Scientist: Al-Qaida Leader Said to Have Sought A-Bomb Help,” Associated Press Newswires, 29 December 
2002.  The two remain on the U.S. government’s terrorism watch list, as does Mahmood’s charitable organization.  See U.S. Treasury, 
Ofﬁce of Foreign Assets Control, Terrorism: What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Treasury, 2005; avail-
able at http://www.treas.gov/ofﬁces/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/t11ter.pdf as of 28 February 2005).
36 DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “DPRK Statement,” Korean Central News Agency, 10 February 2005.
37 See “Keeping North Korean Bomb Material Out of Terrorist Hands,” in Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, pp. 
32-33.
38 Sonni Efron, “Bush Softens Stance on Iran,” Los Angeles Times, 12 March 2005. 
39 “Iran Vows Enrichment Freeze Will Be Short-Lived,” Agence France Press, 31 January 2005.
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The danger of a nuclear terrorist catastrophe remains 
frighteningly high.  As President Bush has said, “the 
nations of the world must do all we can to secure and 
eliminate” nuclear stockpiles around the globe.40 
40 President George W. Bush, “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD: Remarks by the President on Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Fort Lesley J. Mcnair - National Defense University” (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Ofﬁce 
of the Press Secretary, 2004; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html as of 12 April 2005).

The United States, other countries, and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have a wide 
range of efforts under way to secure, monitor, and re-
duce stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials in 
the former Soviet Union and around the world.  In this 
chapter we examine the key developments in efforts 
to reduce that threat in the past year, and then as-
sess in detail the progress U.S.-funded programs are 
making in reducing the threat posed by inadequate 
security for nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise 
in the former Soviet Union and around the world.  
The efforts by the United States and its global part-
ners to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism have 
had real, demonstrable successes, representing an 
excellent investment in American and world security. 
Enough nuclear material for thousands of nuclear 
weapons has been permanently destroyed.  (Indeed, 
half of the nuclear-generated electricity in the United 
States comes from blended-down highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) from dismantled Russian nuclear 
weapons.)  Security for scores of vulnerable nuclear 
sites has been demonstrably improved.  At least tem-
porary civilian employment has been provided for 
thousands of nuclear weapons scientists and workers 
who might otherwise have been driven by despera-
tion to seek to sell their knowledge or the materials 
to which they had access.
Yet in virtually every aspect of these efforts, much 
more remains to be done.  Progress in many areas of 
the response continued to be slow in 2004 by com-
parison to the urgency of the threat.  Despite the 
dedicated efforts of hundreds of U.S., Russian, and 
international ofﬁcials and experts, action was slowed 
by difﬁcult bureaucratic and political obstacles, rang-
ing from disagreements over access to sensitive sites, 
arcane disputes over provisions for liability in the 
event of an accident during threat-reduction coop-
eration, burdensome contracting approaches, and 
more.  As we discuss in detail below, by the end of 
ﬁscal year (FY) 2004, U.S.-funded security upgrades 
had been completed for roughly 56% of the build-
ings containing weapons-usable nuclear material in 
the former Soviet Union—but more than half of the 
potential bomb material is in other buildings where 
even the ﬁrst round of “rapid upgrades” has not been 
completed.1  Less than a ﬁfth of Russia’s stockpile of 
bomb uranium has been destroyed, and it will still be 
years before destruction of substantial quantities of 
U.S.  and Russian excess bomb plutonium even begins. 
Only a tiny fraction of Russia’s excess nuclear weap-
ons experts have yet received self-supporting civilian 
jobs (as opposed to short-term subsidized grants). 
Beyond the former Soviet Union, cooperative security 
upgrades are only just beginning, leaving many sites 
dangerously vulnerable.  In President Bush’s words: 
“We’ve got work to do.”2
REVIEW OF OVERARCHING  
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAST YEAR
The past year has seen a number of important devel-
opments that cut across the many elements of the 
U.S. and global response to the threat of nuclear ter-
rorism.  While on-the-ground progress in the last year 
remained a battle for inches, the last year was one of 
intense effort to lay the groundwork for faster prog-
ress in the future.  
UN Security Council Resolution 1540.  In April 2004, 
the United Nations Security Council unanimously 
passed Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, afﬁrming that the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
and their delivery systems is a threat to international 
3KEY DEVELOPMENTS AND PROGRESS IN THE PAST YEAR
1 The U.S. federal ﬁscal year runs from 1 October to 30 September of the year named, so FY 2004 is the ﬁscal year that ended on 30 
September 2004.
2 President George W. Bush, “President Holds Press Conference” (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary, 20 
December 2004; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/12/20041220-3.html as of 3 February 2005).
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peace and security and directing all states to take 
steps to prevent terrorists from getting WMD.  The 
resolution requires all states to pass laws criminaliz-
ing proliferation by non-state actors, and to establish 
“appropriate, effective” physical protection, account-
ing, export control, and illicit trafﬁcking prevention 
practices for WMD and related materials.  It also re-
quires countries to submit reports within six months 
on the actions they have taken to meet the directives 
of the resolution; as of early February 2005, over 100 
countries and the European Union had submitted 
their reports.3  
UNSCR 1540 has the potential to provide the founda-
tion for binding global standards of nuclear security, 
and for a global effort to both assess where improve-
ments are needed and help states to make them, but 
only modest progress has been made in implement-
ing the resolution’s requirements.  As of early 2005, 
neither the U.S. government nor international orga-
nizations such as the IAEA had detailed what they 
believed the essential elements of a nuclear security 
system that would meet the “appropriate effective” 
standard would be, and few steps had been taken 
to help countries put in place improved systems to 
meet their new obligations.4
Global Threat Reduction Initiative.  Passage of 
UNSCR 1540 was followed in May 2004 by the an-
nouncement by then-Secretary of Energy Spencer 
Abraham of a Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) 
to consolidate and accelerate several Department of 
Energy (DOE) programs to remove nuclear material 
from vulnerable sites worldwide, and to secure mate-
rials in sites where they remain.5  Secretary Abraham 
set targets for GTRI of returning all fresh Soviet-sup-
plied HEU fuel to Russia by the end of 2005, returning 
all irradiated Soviet-supplied HEU to Russia by the 
end of 2010, and converting all HEU-fueled research 
reactors within the United States by 2013.  A GTRI 
Partners Conference was held in September 2004, to 
build international support for the effort.6  In the fall 
of 2004, Congress provided an extra $30 million for re-
moving nuclear material from vulnerable sites around 
the world, and new legal authority to offer ﬂexible in-
centives to convince each site to give up their nuclear 
material.7  
The launch of GTRI, with the substantial congressional 
and international support it received, can and should 
make a major difference in accelerating efforts to 
remove potential nuclear bomb material from vul-
nerable sites around the world.  
G8 Summit.  In June 2004, at their summit at Sea Is-
land, Georgia, the leaders of the Group of Eight (G8) 
leading industrialized democracies offered an ac-
tion plan to “prevent, contain, and roll back” WMD 
proliferation.  The action plan called for prompt and 
complete implementation of UNSCR 1540, with the 
3 For more information and for copies of the country reports, see United Nations, “1540 Committee” (New York: UN, 2005; available at 
http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/meeting.html as of 25 February 2005).
4 Interviews with U.S. State Department and International Atomic Energy Agency ofﬁcials, January 2005; interviews with U.S. State 
Department and DOE ofﬁcials, as well as staff of the UNSC 1540 Committee, March 2005.
5 Spencer Abraham, “International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna: Remarks Prepared for Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham” (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 26 May 2004; available at http://www.energy.gov as of 18 March 2005); “Department of 
Energy Launches New Global Threat Reduction Initiative: Will Accelerate and Expand the Security and Removal of Proliferation-
Sensitive Materials” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 26 May 2004; available at http://www.energy.gov as of 2 February 
2005).
6 International Atomic Energy Agency, Global Threat Reduction Initiative: International Partners’ Conference: Summary of the Proceed-
ings and Findings of the Conference (IAEA, 2004; available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/PDFplus/2004/cn139proc.
pdf as of 25 February 2005).
7 For updates on congressional action regarding controlling nuclear weapons and materials, see Anthony Wier, “Legislative Up-
date,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2004; available at http://www.nti.
org/e_research/cnwm/overview/legislative.asp as of 2 February 2005).  The funding is found in Division C of Omnibus Appropria-
tions Bill for Fiscal Year 2005, Public Law 108-447, 108th Congress, 2nd Session (8 December 2004; available at http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:h.r.04818: as of 2 February 2005).  The authorization is in Section 3132 of National Defense Authori-
zation Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Public Law 108-375, 108th Congress, 2nd Session (28 October 2004; available at http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:h.r.4200: as of 2 February 2005).
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G8 members pledging that they are prepared to assist 
countries in meeting the requirements of Resolution 
1540—a commitment that could lead to cooperative 
nuclear security improvements in countries around 
the world.  The G8 members recommitted themselves 
to meeting the $20 billion funding target set at the 
2002 Kananaskis summit, and announced that seven 
more countries had pledged to adhere to the Global 
Partnership principles and would contribute funding 
to projects.8  While the Global Partnership action plan 
included some ﬁnancial contributions focused on 
implementing nuclear security upgrades, the sum-
mit did not agree on expanding the effort to securing 
nuclear stockpiles worldwide, keeping the partner-
ship focused on Russia and a couple of other former 
Soviet states.9 
Russian Action Plan for Nuclear Safety and Se-
curity.  In February 2005, Russia adopted a nuclear 
safety and security action plan.  The plan details a 
set of speciﬁc legislative and regulatory actions gov-
erning nuclear energy, materials, and weapons, and 
delineates the responsible government bodies and 
deadlines for each task.  The multiple tasks include, 
among other things, establishing the standard threats 
and intruder proﬁles to be used in vulnerability anal-
yses (apparently what would be called a “design basis 
threat” in the United States), developing proposals to 
address issues of conducting inventories at nuclear 
facilities, and assigning air defense forces to protect 
certain nuclear sites.10  
Even coming in the aftermath of Beslan, however, 
the plan does not include many of the actions that 
the United States took after the 9/11 attacks—such 
as substantially increased nuclear security budgets, 
rapid vulnerability assessments at nuclear facilities to 
ﬁnd and ﬁx security problems, efforts to consolidate 
nuclear material at fewer locations, consideration of 
destroying larger quantities of nuclear material that 
are no longer needed, or providing more authority 
and resources to those who set and enforce nuclear 
security rules.
Bush-Putin Summit.  Declaring that nuclear terror-
ism was “one of the gravest threats our two countries 
face” and that the United States and Russia had a “spe-
cial responsibility for the security of nuclear weapons 
and ﬁssile material,” Presidents Bush and Putin is-
sued a statement from their February 2005 summit 
in Bratislava, Slovakia that called for expanded and 
accelerated cooperation on nuclear security in their 
two countries and around the globe.  They agreed 
that nuclear security in both their countries already 
met “current requirements,” but had to be “constantly 
enhanced” to meet changing threats; as a result, they 
pledged to develop a joint plan of work for security 
enhancements through 2008, after which the two 
sides would assess “avenues for further coopera-
tion” in light of the “constantly evolving” threat.  They 
agreed to have U.S. and Russian experts share nuclear 
facility security “best practices” not only with one an-
other but also with other countries, and announced 
that their countries would convene a senior-level bi-
lateral meeting on improving the security culture at 
nuclear facilities.  The two presidents called for full 
implementation of UNSCR 1540, and rapid adoption 
of the proposed international convention on nuclear 
terrorism and the proposed amendments to the 
physical protection convention (discussed below). 
They also pledged to help convert research reactors 
using HEU in “third countries” to use low-enriched 
fuel, and to take back HEU the United States and Rus-
sia had supplied.  The two presidents also announced 
8 “G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation” (Sea Island, Georgia, United States: G8 Summit, 9 June 2004; available at http://www.g8usa.
gov/d_060904d.htm as of 25 February 2005); G8 Senior Group, “G8 Global Partnership Annual Report” (Sea Island, Georgia, United 
States: G8 Summit, June 2004; available at http://www.g8usa.gov/d_060904i.htm as of 25 February 2005).
9 “G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation.”
10 Plan Meropriyatii, Cvyazannykh S Vypolneniem Pervogo Etapa Realizatsii ‘Osnov Gosudarstvennoi Politiki V Oblast’i Obespecheniya 
Yadernoi I Radiatsionnoi Bezopasnost’i Rossiskoi Federatsii Na Period Do 2010 Goda I Dal’neishuyu Perspektivu’ (Action Plan for Phase 
One of the Implementation of ‘Foundations of Government Policy in the Area of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection within the Rus-
sian Federation for the Period to 2010 and Beyond’), trans. U.S. Department of Energy, Order No. 117-r (Moscow: Government of the 
Russian Federation, 2005; available at http://www.government.ru/data/news_text.html?he_id=103&news_id=16586 as of 25 Febru-
ary 2005).
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the formation of a senior interagency bilateral group 
to implement the summit commitments, led by U.S. 
Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman and Rosatom Di-
rector Alexander Rumiantsev.  The interagency group 
is required to report to the two presidents by the end 
of June 2005, and on a regular basis thereafter.11  
The summit statement was extremely promising, in 
that it put the personal stamp of both presidents on 
a call for rapid action, highlighted several of the key 
steps that need to be taken, and established a mech-
anism for following up the accord.  But the summit 
statement was also disappointing, in that it did not 
resolve any of the major obstacles to accelerated 
progress, did not set any particular milestones to 
which either government could be held accountable, 
and did not include any explicit Russian commitment 
to provide more Russian resources for nuclear secu-
rity or to sustain security with Russian resources after 
international assistance phases out.  The Bratislava 
summit could prove to be a transforming event, 
shifting this effort from a program of U.S. assistance 
for Russia into a genuine bilateral partnership to 
upgrade nuclear security in Russia and around the 
world, with Russian and U.S. experts each playing key 
roles in the conception, design, and implementation 
of the effort—but fulﬁlling the statement’s promise 
will require sustained presidential follow-through on 
both sides.
Summit Aftermath.  In the weeks following the 
Bratislava summit, the United States moved quickly 
to attempt to build on what had been achieved, es-
tablishing a series of working groups on particular 
subjects addressed in the summit statement, from 
nuclear security upgrades to security culture and best 
practices—and by three weeks after the summit, had 
proposed to Russia a list of speciﬁc steps that might 
be taken in each of the areas identiﬁed in the sum-
mit, with proposed meetings to discuss them.12  In 
Russia, there were both encouraging and discourag-
ing signs.  On the one hand, statements from ofﬁcials 
leading some of the agencies most resistant to coop-
eration emphasized the urgency of the danger that 
terrorists might get weapons of mass destruction. 
In early March 2005, for instance, both Nikolai Patru-
shev, head of the Federal Security Service (successor 
to the KGB), and Gen. Yuri Baluyevskiy, chief of the 
Russian General Staff, issued statements warning of 
the danger that terrorists could get weapons of mass 
destruction and calling for international cooperation 
to reduce the threat.13  
On the other hand, the negative political reaction in 
Russia to revelations that a draft of the summit state-
ment had included pledges to allow U.S. access at 
both nuclear material and nuclear warhead sites may 
make ﬁnally resolving the access issue even more dif-
ﬁcult.  The Kremlin brieﬂy posted on the Internet an 
earlier draft, which had included a paragraph under 
which Russia committed to provide lists of nuclear 
facilities subordinate to both the Rosatom and the 
Ministry of Defense that required security upgrades, 
and to allow U.S. visits to these facilities beginning by 
the end of 2005.14  When this was reported in the Rus-
sian press, it provoked a range of wild charges that 
somehow the United States was going to “seize con-
trol” of Russia’s nuclear stockpiles.15  Indeed, within a 
month after the Bratislava summit, Russia’s Minister 
of Defense Sergei Ivanov was personally and publicly 
11 “Joint Statement by President Bush and President Putin on Nuclear Security Cooperation” (Bratislava, Slovakia: The White House, 
Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary, 24 February 2005; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050224-8.html 
as of 25 February 2005).
12 Interviews with DOE and National Security Council ofﬁcials, April 2005.
13 See Vladimir Ivanov and Mikail Tollegin, “Myagkiy Yaderny Kontrol’ (Soft Nuclear Inspection),” trans. Russian Press Digest, Neza-
vizimaya Gazeta, 2 March 2005.
14  See “The Kremlin Web-Site Displayed Remarkable Openness in the Nuclear Sphere,” Kommersant, 28 February 2005; Nabi Abdul-
laev, “A Bush Deal and a Missing Paragraph,” Moscow Times, 1 March 2005.  
15  A wide range of Russian media have spread false rumors that the summit discussions meant that the United States would take 
control of Russia’s nuclear stockpiles, to the extent that a group of Russian Orthodox and Cossack nationalists organized a protest in 
the center of Moscow against any such transfer of control; see “Moscow Rally Calls to Prevent US Control over Russian Nuclear Facili-
ties,” Interfax News Service, 20 February 2005.
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saying “we are not discussing any possible inspec-
tions of Russian nuclear facilities by US experts.”16
Similarly, the summit does not appear to have made 
much progress in solving U.S.-Russian disputes over 
liability in the event of an accident during threat 
reduction cooperation, despite pre-summit hopes 
of a breakthrough.  For years, the United States had 
been insisting that Russia accept, in all new or ex-
tended threat reduction agreements, the language 
contained in the original Cooperative Threat Reduc-
tion (CTR) umbrella agreement, under which Russia 
would bear all of the liability even in the event of an 
accident caused by intentional sabotage by U.S. per-
sonnel.  Russia has been unwilling to agree to accept 
this language again, and the U.S. unwillingness to ex-
tend agreements without the CTR umbrella language 
had led to the expiration of agreements on both 
disposition of excess weapons plutonium and the Nu-
clear Cities Initiative.  In the weeks leading up to the 
Bratislava summit, the United States offered a liability 
compromise for plutonium disposition—where the 
liability problem has delayed the destruction of thou-
sands of bombs’ worth of plutonium for years—but 
the two sides did not reach agreement on the matter 
in time for the summit.17  A resolution of this issue not 
only for plutonium disposition but for the CTR um-
brella agreement will be needed by June 2006, when 
the current extension of the umbrella agreement ex-
pires, or nearly all U.S.-Russian cooperative programs 
to secure and dismantle Cold War arsenals will come 
to a halt.18  
Changing Environment in Russia.  The Russia of 
2005 is not the Russia of the mid-1990s.  Russia’s econ-
omy has stabilized; nuclear workers are now being 
paid a living wage, on time; the central government 
has asserted stronger control, and has clamped down 
on dissent; and the Russian security services are more 
omnipresent than before, particularly with respect to 
sensitive issues relating to Russia’s nuclear stockpiles. 
With Russia’s new strength, the Russian government 
has taken a more assertive line in negotiations over 
nuclear security cooperation, in many cases making 
obstacles to cooperation more difﬁcult to overcome. 
This trend continued over the past year.
Changing U.S.-Russian Security Relations.  While 
President Bush and President Putin have a good rela-
tionship, and there has been far-reaching U.S.-Russian 
cooperation in the war on terrorism, substantial parts 
of the U.S. and Russian security establishments have 
grown increasingly suspicious of each other in recent 
years—and this trend has intensiﬁed over the past 
year.  In Russia, the U.S.-led attack on Iraq, the U.S. with-
drawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the 
expansion of NATO (including some countries of the 
former Soviet Union), the U.S. bases in former Soviet 
states on Russia’s borders, and the uprisings against 
pro-Russian governments in Ukraine, Georgia, and 
Kyrgyzstan have combined to reignite Cold War-era 
suspicions, exacerbated by Russia’s military weakness, 
that the United States is seeking to encircle and dom-
inate Russia. Within Russia’s nuclear establishment 
speciﬁcally, the U.S. refusal to cooperate in areas such 
as Generation IV civilian nuclear technology develop-
ment, or in negotiating a civilian nuclear cooperation 
agreement that would allow Russia to store U.S.-ori-
gin spent fuel from other countries (both of which 
have been held up because of U.S. concerns over 
Russian cooperation with Iran), coupled with the U.S. 
ban on imports of any Russian enrichment services 
except those from blended HEU, has convinced many 
that the United States is attempting to freeze Russia 
out of world markets, and is not willing to engage in 
a genuine partnership.  Indeed, some Russian ofﬁcials 
have argued that U.S. expressions of concern over 
nuclear security are just an effort to discredit Russia’s 
nuclear industry, in order to weaken Russia’s position 
in international nuclear markets.  In the United States, 
16 “Russian Defense Minister Says No Plans to Allow US Experts to Inspect Nuclear Arsenal,” Interfax-Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 
22 March 2005.
17 Peter Baker and Walter Pincus, “U.S.-Russia Pact Aimed at Nuclear Terrorism; Bush, Putin to Announce Plan to Counter Threat,” 
Washington Post, 24 February 2005; “Sen. Domenici Has Secretary Rice’s Commitment to Advance U.S.-Russia Plutonium Disposition 
Program” (Washington, D.C.: US Fed News, 2005). 
18 Kenneth Luongo and William Hoehn, “An Ounce of Prevention,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 61, no. 2 (March/April 2005; available at 
http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ma05luongo as of 7 March 2005).
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Russia is increasingly seen by many as sliding back 
toward authoritarianism, waging a brutal civil war 
in Chechnya, seeking to dominate its neighbors, and 
opposing the United States on matters ranging from 
the Iraq war to cooperation with Iran.
Such suspicions inevitably make sensitive nuclear 
cooperation more difﬁcult, and strengthen the hand 
of those on both sides who raise arguments against 
nuclear security cooperation.  Although such coopera-
tion has been remarkably resilient through the darkest 
periods of U.S.-Russian relations over the last decade, 
there is little doubt that disputes over issues ranging 
from access to sensitive sites to liability in the event 
of an accident are more difﬁcult to resolve today than 
they were a few years ago, and that the Russian security 
services in particular have been posing more obstacles 
to cooperation than before. In this atmosphere, deep 
structural incentives limit both side’s willingness to 
compromise on sensitive nuclear security issues.  In 
Moscow, there is little chance that a Russian security 
ofﬁcial will be penalized for saying “no” to a sensitive 
new step in nuclear security cooperation, and every 
risk that he could be penalized for saying “yes” if some-
thing were later judged to have gone wrong; similarly, 
in Washington, a manager faces little penalty for mak-
ing one more demand in negotiations of a contract or 
agreement with Russia, but a substantial career risk if 
something goes through that is later judged not to ad-
equately protect U.S. taxpayers’ resources. 
TRACKING DETAILED PROGRESS IN CONTROLLING 
NUCLEAR WARHEADS, MATERIALS, AND EXPERTISE
This section reviews progress and key develop-
ments of the past year in each of six categories of 
effort needed to keep nuclear weapons, materials, 
and expertise out of terrorist hands: securing nuclear 
warheads and materials; interdicting nuclear smug-
gling; stabilizing employment for nuclear personnel; 
monitoring nuclear stockpiles; ending further pro-
duction; and reducing nuclear stockpiles.  For each 
of these categories, this section provides an updated 
assessment of the fraction of the job that U.S.-funded 
programs have accomplished, and the current pace 
of progress, using a set of rough metrics developed 
in previous reports (with some modiﬁcations intro-
duced this year).19  
Fundamentally, we are asking four questions:
What is the problem, or part of the problem, that a 
particular program is designed to address?
What is the total scope of the work that would 
have to be done for this problem or part of the 
problem to be resolved?
What fraction of that total scope of work has been 
done so far?
How fast is what is left to be done being ﬁnished, 
and in particular, how much has been ﬁnished in 
the year since our last report?
The measures used in this section provide only rough 
summary estimates of the rate of progress.  We have 
relied on ofﬁcial government measures and data 
where possible, but in many cases these are not avail-
able.  The administration, led by the Department of 
Energy (DOE), has improved the availability and trans-
parency of measures of performance for its programs 
to control nuclear warheads, materials, and expertise 
worldwide.20  But the fact remains that although the 
•
•
•
•
19 Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (Cam-
bridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2003; available 
at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/report.asp as of 1 February 2005), pp. 61-83; Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, 
Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard Univer-
sity, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/2004report.asp as of 1 February 
2005), pp. 39-82.
20 The detailed justiﬁcations of their budget proposal supplied by the agencies to the Congress contain performance information 
and targets for each major activity; for instance, see U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Request: National 
Nuclear Security Administration—Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, vol. 1, DOE/ME-0046 (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2005; available at 
http://www.mbe.doe.gov/Budgets/06Budgets/Content/Programs/Vol_1_NNSA_3.pdf as of 14 February 2005).  See the perfor-
mance assessments of the Energy and State Departments:  U.S. Department of Energy, Performance and Accountability Report: FY 
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U.S. government has plans for individual pieces of this 
problem, it has no comprehensive plan for addressing 
this threat, and has not put forward a comprehen-
sive set of milestones that would allow the Congress 
and the public to fully understand both how much 
progress is being made and where prolonged delays 
suggest the need for a change in approach.21  Un-
til that occurs, we will continue to provide the best 
measurable assessments we can from outside the 
government.
Such measures to track progress are crucial to the 
effectiveness of almost any government program. 
Only by understanding which efforts are showing 
real results and which efforts are not can mid-course 
corrections be made, and ineffective efforts be im-
proved.  But such measures are inevitably imperfect. 
As Albert Einstein is once said to have remarked, 
“Not everything that counts can be counted—and 
not everything that can be counted, counts.”  Undue 
reliance on particular progress metrics can be mis-
leading.  Any particular measure of progress reﬂects 
one deﬁnition of the problem to be addressed, and 
one idea of the best method for solving that problem, 
excluding others.  A manager focused exclusively on 
racking up more progress by that measure is likely to 
miss opportunities for different approaches to taking 
on the problem—and thus managing to a particular 
metric can breed complacency.
It is impossible to directly measure the danger of nu-
clear theft and terrorism, and whether it is increasing 
or decreasing.  Hence, all the measures of progress 
the U.S. government uses to track progress in these 
efforts, and all the measures we discuss in this chap-
ter, are intended as partial substitutes for such a di-
rect measure, reﬂecting progress in implementing 
some particular approach to addressing one part of 
this multi-faceted problem.  But relying on such mea-
sures can be problematic if they leave out key parts 
of the problem, or of the part of the solution that a 
particular program is attempting to address.  If,  for 
example, a key part of the overall problem is posed as 
“there are too many civilian research reactors using 
HEU,” and the proposed solution is to convert those 
research reactors to use low-enriched fuel that can-
not be used in nuclear weapons, then it would be 
logical to track progress by how many reactors have 
been converted—as DOE has long done, and does 
today.22  But if program managers’ bonuses are linked 
to that metric and not others, attention will inevitably 
be directed away from (a) other tactics, such as giv-
ing aging HEU-fueled research reactors incentives to 
shut down, rather than trying to convert them (many 
more HEU-fueled reactors have shut down since the 
conversion effort began in 1978 than have converted, 
even in the absence of explicit shut-down incentives); 
(b) other facilities that may have HEU, besides operat-
ing civilian research reactors that might be converted 
(such as shut-down research reactors that still have 
HEU, facilities that may have large quantities of HEU 
but no research reactor, military research reactors, 
naval reactors, icebreaker reactors, and more); and (c) 
those research reactors that are impractical to convert 
(at least 56 of which are not included in DOE’s assess-
ment of the fraction of the job it has accomplished, 
because they are not on the list slated for conver-
sion).23  This is intended only as an example of the 
dangers of relying too heavily on particular metrics, 
2004, DOE//ME0044 (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2004; available at http://www.mbe.doe.gov/progliaison/doe04par.pdf as of 18 February 
2005); U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, “Strategic Goal 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction” in 
FY 2006 Performance Summary (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2005; available at http://www.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/41605.pdf as of 14 February 2005).  A handful of relevant programs have been examined using the White House Ofﬁce of 
Management and Budget’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART):  see U.S. Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, “Program Assess-
ment Rating Tool” in Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 2006 (Washington, D.C.: OMB, 2005; available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/part.html as of 18 February 2005).
21 For a discussion on the absence of a government-wide strategic plan, see U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration, GAO-05-157 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2005; available at http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d05157.pdf as of 31 January 2005), pp. 8-17.
22 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 544.
23 U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-
Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, GAO-04-807 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2004; available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d04807.pdf as of 2 February 2005), p. 10.
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not as a criticism of current efforts—the manage-
ment of the GTRI effort is aware of all of these issues, 
and is moving to ensure, to the extent possible, that 
they have a comprehensive understanding of all the 
facilities they need to address, not just the operating 
and potentially convertible HEU-fueled civilian re-
search reactors.
Similarly, many of the measures addressed in this 
chapter focus on what fraction of facilities of certain 
types have had modern security and accounting 
equipment installed.  But installing such equipment 
is far from the only essential element of an effective 
nuclear security system.  Ensuring that the people 
who are essential to effective nuclear security take 
nuclear security seriously, understand the security 
rules and follow them, and use whatever equipment 
they have effectively—rather than turning off intru-
sion detectors if they send too many annoying false 
alarms—is at least as crucial to good nuclear security, 
and progress toward strong nuclear security cultures 
is far more difﬁcult to measure.  Similarly, it is crucial 
to put in place the resources, organizations, and in-
centives necessary to ensure that nuclear security will 
be sustained for the long haul—long after particular 
U.S. programs come to an end—but assessing how 
much progress is being made in meeting that objec-
tive is quite difﬁcult to do.
Hence, we believe that for many of these programs, al-
locating more resources to analysis—to probing what 
all the elements of the problem to be addressed really 
are, what all the plausible approaches to addressing 
those elements of the problem are, what approaches 
might offer the most potential for rapid progress, 
and what the best indicators for assessing progress 
might be—could strengthen the overall effort.  De-
voting a small fraction of total program resources to 
fund these kinds of analyses might make it possible 
to identify ways to get these missions done faster, and 
more cheaply—“more thinking, less muscle,” as the 
saying goes.
In some cases, it may be necessary for programs to in-
vest in collecting additional information on which to 
base better metrics.  For example, at one time in the 
1990s, the Customs Service had a serious problem 
with what was called “port-running” on the U.S.-Mexi-
can border.  A port-runner was a truck loaded with 
drugs which, when it reached the inspection station, 
would just gun the engine and drive through, seeking 
to lose pursuers, if any, in crowded urban streets be-
yond the crossing.  A special project team was pulled 
together to come up with ways to deal with the 
problem.  The team quickly recognized that while a 
reduction in reported “port-running” incidents was an 
important measure of their success, it should not be 
the only one—because such a reduction could actu-
ally be a sign of failure, if customs inspectors became 
so intimidated or corrupted that they simply did not 
report these incidents.  The team realized that if steps 
to prevent port-running were successful, it ought to 
become more expensive to hire some one to drive a 
truckload of drugs into the United States.  And so cus-
toms intelligence agents were dispatched to ﬁnd out 
what the typical cost to hire some one for that job was 
($5,000 when the project started), and then to track 
how that ﬁgure changed over time.24  Nuclear smug-
gling is too rare an occurrence for there to be a similar 
“going rate” that can be easily determined.  But for a 
program to interdict nuclear smuggling, data might 
be collected on the fraction of the time that govern-
ment testers managed to smuggle nuclear material 
through a particular border area without detection.
It is extraordinarily difﬁcult, in the midst of the inces-
sant day-to-day challenges of managing a program 
of this kind, to draw back and think strategically 
about what the program might be missing.  It may 
be,  therefore,  that portions of the kind of analysis and 
evaluation of metrics that we are advocating should 
be contracted out to entities outside the program it-
self, whether companies, laboratories, or universities. 
Already, for example, both DOE’s International Nuclear 
Material Protection and Cooperation program and its 
Russia Transition Initiatives program have contracted 
for re-analyses of the threats they are addressing by 
the RAND Corporation.  The material protection pro-
gram has also contracted, for example, with a group 
24 Malcolm K. Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving Problems, and Managing Compliance (Washington, D.C.: Brook-
ings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 124-129.
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of experts on smuggling for a re-examination of the 
nuclear smuggling problem, and with a group of ex-
perts on organized crime for analyses of the possible 
role of organized crime in the former Soviet Union in 
stealing or smuggling nuclear or radiological mate-
rial.  Similarly, the State Department’s Export Control 
and Related Border Security Assistance program has 
worked with the University of Georgia’s Center for In-
ternational Trade and Security to evaluate countries’ 
progress in developing export control systems.  In 
general, we believe that all of these programs could 
beneﬁt from additional in-depth analyses of the prob-
lems they are addressing and best ways to solve those 
problems.
Because each of the measures we discuss in this chap-
ter has its own strengths and weaknesses, in each 
section we also offer a discussion (necessarily pre-
liminary) of other measures that might offer a more 
complete picture of progress in reducing the threat 
of nuclear theft and terrorism, but for which data is 
not yet publicly available.
TRACKING PROGRESS: SECURING  
NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND MATERIALS
The overall goal in this category is simple: every 
nuclear weapon and every kilogram of nuclear ma-
terial anywhere in the world must be secured and 
accounted for, to stringent standards.  Key develop-
ments in this area in the last year not already noted 
above included:
The effort to amend the international convention 
on physical protection to cover nuclear materi-
•
als in domestic use, and to cover not only theft of 
nuclear material but sabotage of nuclear facilities, 
moved toward fruition.  By mid-January 2005, the 
required majority of the parties had requested a 
diplomatic conference to amend the treaty, which 
is scheduled for early July 2005, and the proposed 
amendment is expected to be approved.25  Each 
party to the treaty will have to ratify the amend-
ment before it takes force for them, and that is 
likely to take years.  Unfortunately, however, the 
amendment will not create any binding global 
nuclear security standards with enough speciﬁcs 
to be effective—though it does offer a number of 
generally worded principles that should help in 
convincing states to strengthen nuclear security.
In April 2005, the United Nations General Assembly 
approved the draft of a new convention on nuclear 
terrorism, requiring countries that join the conven-
tion to put in place criminal laws forbidding a list 
of speciﬁed nuclear terrorist offenses, and to arrest 
and prosecute those who commit such offenses 
who are found on their soil.  The convention does 
not require, however, that states take any particu-
lar measures related to securing nuclear stockpiles 
or interdicting nuclear smuggling.26
During FY 2004, comprehensive security and 
accounting upgrades were completed on an ad-
ditional 4% of the estimated 600 tons of nuclear 
material outside of nuclear weapons in the for-
mer Soviet Union.27  In December 2004, the United 
States and Russia announced the completion 
of nuclear security and accounting upgrades at 
Novouralsk, Zelenogorsk, and Novosibirsk—fa-
cilities that process tens of tons of potentially 
•
•
25 Interview with U.S. State Department ofﬁcial, February 2005.  An experts’ group convened by the IAEA had drafted a proposed 
amendment which was forwarded to governments for consideration in 2003, but had failed to reach ﬁnal agreement on sever-
al bracketed points.  Austria broke the deadlock by circulating a complete draft amendment with the versions of each disputed 
point that had the broadest support.  The Austrian text is described in detail in Patricia A. Comella, “Revising the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material—Chapter V” (paper presented to 45th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials 
Management, Orlando, Fla., 2004).
26 United Nations General Assembly, “International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism” (New York, NY: UN, 
2005; available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/unga040405_csant.pdf as of 18 April 2005); Evelyn 
Leopold, “U.N. Approves New Treaty against Nuclear Terrorism,” Reuters News, 13 April 2005.
27 The total fraction of material covered by comprehensive upgrades increased to 26% from 22%.  As discussed in detail below, the 
fractions of sites or buildings secured are higher.  See U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget 
Request, p. 485.
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vulnerable HEU every year, and two of which (No-
vouralsk and Zelenogorsk) represent the ﬁrst fully 
completed sites in Russia’s closed nuclear cities.28
Programs sponsored by both the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and DOE made progress in im-
plementing security upgrades at some Russian 
nuclear warhead sites.  By the end of FY 2004, DOE 
had completed upgrades at 34 of 39 Russian Navy 
sites where it had been working, and 2 of the 25 
Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) warhead sites where 
it had been working.29  The DOD effort, which only 
recently gained access to key facilities for the ﬁrst 
time, completed designs for comprehensive up-
grades for its ﬁrst 10 sites by the end of FY 2004; 
upgrades based on these designs will be com-
pleted in FY 2005 and FY 2006.30
Signiﬁcant progress was made in addressing 
the long-troublesome issue of access to sensi-
tive nuclear sites.  In a pilot project at a sensitive 
Russian nuclear facility, the two sides successfully 
demonstrated new approaches to the access is-
sue—including procedures designed to allow the 
United States to conﬁrm that U.S. taxpayers’ dollars 
were appropriately spent on security upgrades 
without requiring direct access by U.S. personnel 
to the most sensitive areas.  The two sides agreed 
on access arrangements to allow U.S.-funded up-
grades to proceed at nearly all of the buildings 
in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex containing 
•
•
weapons-usable nuclear material except those at 
Russia’s two remaining major nuclear weapons 
assembly-disassembly facilities.  Russia also ex-
panded the number of nuclear warhead storage 
sites where U.S. teams were permitted limited ac-
cess.  In late 2004, the United States allowed an 
unprecedented visit by Rosatom’s top security of-
ﬁcials to the U.S. nuclear warhead assembly and 
disassembly at Pantex, in Amarillo, Texas, bringing 
them to all the areas that U.S. experts would like 
to be able to visit at comparable Russian facilities 
to implement security and accounting upgrades.31 
In December 2004, President Bush offered Russia 
“equal access” to U.S. nuclear sites, “to build con-
ﬁdence between our two governments.”32  While 
the access issue was not addressed in the ﬁnal 
Bratislava summit statement, it was discussed in 
the lead-up to the summit.33
During 2004, potentially vulnerable HEU was re-
moved from facilities in Libya, the Czech Republic, 
and Uzbekistan.34  The United States and Russia 
also signed an agreement establishing a standard 
framework to speed future cooperative opera-
tions to return fresh and spent HEU fuel to Russia.35 
Substantial progress was made in resolving bu-
reaucratic obstacles in Russia that had prevented 
removals of irradiated Soviet-supplied HEU, and as 
of early 2005, the ﬁrst return of irradiated HEU to 
Russia was expected by the end of 2005.36
•
28 “Security Upgrades Completed at Three Russian Nuclear Facilities” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 10 December 
2004; available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/PR_NA-04-33_Security_upgrades_completed_(12-04).pdf as of 28 February 
2005).
29 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 485; U.S. Department of Energy, Performance 
and Accountability Report: FY 2004, p. 135.  As noted in last year’s report, however, for 21 of the 34 sites considered “completed,” only 
rapid upgrades were done, as these were considered all that was required at those sites.  See Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An 
Agenda for Action, p. 54.
30 U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. De-
partment of Defense, 2005), p. 41.
31 See Jim Nesbitt, “Russian Atomic Ofﬁcials Tour Aiken, S.C.-Area Nuclear Reservation,” Augusta (Ga.) Chronicle, 18 November 2004. 
This information was supplemented by interviews with DOE ofﬁcials, December 2004 and January 2005.
32 Bush, “President Holds Press Conference.”
33 Yuri Tretyakov, “Interview with Military Expert Major General Vladimir Dvorkin on Russia-USA Nuclear Safety Cooperation (Rus-
sian),” trans. Federal News Service, Trud Daily, 3 March 2005; Abdullaev, “A Bush Deal and a Missing Paragraph.”
34 C. J. Chivers, “Chechen Rebel Grimly Vows More Attacks,” New York Times, 18 September 2004; “Beslan Hostage-Taking Death Toll Is 
330 - Deputy Prosecutor General,” Interfax News Service, 30 December 2004; 
35 “United States and Russian Federation Cooperate on Return of Russian-Origin Research Reactor Fuel to Russia” (Moscow: U.S. De-
partment of Energy, 27 May 2004; available at http://www.energy.gov as of 16 February 2005).
36 Interviews with DOE ofﬁcials, January 2005.
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The United States extended the deadline for its ef-
fort to take back HEU it had exported to countries 
around the world by a decade, from 2009 to 2019.37 
Almost two-thirds of the HEU the United States ex-
ported, however, remained outside the scope of 
the take-back offer, though DOE began consider-
ing approaches to expanding the offer.
The completed Mayak Fissile Material Storage Fa-
cility remained empty, as preparations to load the 
ﬁrst material into the facility continued.  U.S.-Rus-
sian negotiations over transparency arrangements 
for the facility continued, but did not reach agree-
ment.38  Moreover, unless current U.S. and Russian 
policies constraining the use of this facility are 
changed, Russia only expects to load 25 tons of 
excess plutonium into the facility, leaving three-
quarters of its storage space empty.39
The United States continued to press for coopera-
tion in securing nuclear facilities in key nuclear 
weapon states outside the former Soviet Union. 
For example, some important initial progress is 
now being made with China, with a major secu-
rity and accounting upgrade at one civilian facility 
with weapons-usable nuclear material scheduled 
for completion this year.40  Bilateral and IAEA-led 
efforts to review security and recommend im-
provements in states with more modest nuclear 
programs continued.
•
•
•
Data is simply not available—publicly or other-
wise—on how great the overall security risk at 
different nuclear facilities around the world is, or 
on how well nuclear security systems at different 
sites around the world actually perform.  We have 
therefore relied in this report on metrics very similar 
(in most cases) to those the U.S. government uses 
to report the progress of its efforts in these areas. 
These focus, in particular, on (a) sites,  materials, or 
buildings that have two deﬁned levels of security 
and accounting equipment upgrades installed with 
U.S. assistance—”rapid” upgrades and “comprehen-
sive” upgrades—and (b) buildings or sites where the 
potential nuclear bomb material has been removed 
entirely, eliminating the theft risk from that loca-
tion.41
By its nature, however, the ﬁrst category of measure 
does not include the progress Russia or other poten-
tial recipient states have made in upgrading security 
on their own, without U.S. or other foreign assistance 
(though, of course, designs for U.S.-sponsored up-
grades take into account improvements that have 
already been made at a site).  Moreover, measuring 
which sites have modern security and accounting 
equipment installed does not capture whether the 
people at these sites are following effective security 
procedures and using the equipment in a way that in 
fact provides high levels of security.42  DOE is spon-
soring harder-to-measure but crucial progress in 
areas such as providing training, improving security 
37 “Energy Department Extends Acceptance Policy for Spent Nuclear Fuel from Foreign Research Reactors” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Energy, 6 December 2004; available at http://www.doe.gov/engine/content.do?PUBLIC_ID=16940&BT_CODE=PR_
PRESSRELEASES&TT_CODE=PRESSRELEASE as of 28 February 2005); U.S. Department of Energy, “Revision of the Record of Decision 
for a Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel,” Federal Register 69, no. 230 
(1 December 2004).  To be eligible for the original 2009 deadline, the fuel had to have been removed from the reactor before 13 May 
2006; that deadline has now been moved to May 2016.
38 U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006, p. 46.
39 Matthew Bunn, “Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads 
and Materials (2004; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/securing/mayak.asp as of 14 February 2005).  
40 Interviews with DOE ofﬁcials, December 2004 and April 2005.
41 Rapid upgrades include items such as installing nuclear material detectors at the doors, putting material in steel cages that would 
take a considerable time to cut through, bricking over windows, and counting how many items of nuclear material are present. 
“Comprehensive” upgrades represent the installation of complete modern security and accounting systems, designed to be able to 
protect the facility against at least modest insider and outsider theft threats.
42 For an extensive recent discussion of the importance of the “human factor” in security, in Russia in particular, see Igor Khripunov 
and James Holmes, eds., Nuclear Security Culture: The Case of Russia (Athens, Georgia: Center for International Trade and Security, The 
University of Georgia, 2004; available at http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/Security%20Culture%20Report%2020041118.
pdf as of 18 February 2005).
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culture, and strengthening independent regulation 
of nuclear security and accounting, and these efforts 
presumably have beneﬁts for securing and account-
ing for all nuclear materials in recipient countries, not 
just those for which U.S.-funded equipment is being 
installed.  Hence, it is quite possible for some material 
counted as “completed” by this measure to be inse-
cure.  It is equally possible for material counted as 
“not completed” to be secure, because the recipient 
state has already taken action to secure it effectively.
Securing Metric 1: Security Upgrades on  
Former Soviet Nuclear Material
Fraction accomplished.  Within the former Soviet 
Union, as of the end of FY 2004, some 26% of the 
potentially vulnerable nuclear material outside of nu-
clear weapons—estimated to amount to roughly 600 
tons—had U.S.-funded comprehensive security and 
accounting upgrades installed.43  An additional 20% 
of the material had initial “rapid” upgrades installed, 
for a total of 46% with either rapid or comprehensive 
U.S.-funded upgrades completed.44  Upgrades are un-
derway on a signiﬁcant additional amount of material. 
As discussed below, because most of the material not 
yet covered is located at a small number of massive 
sites, the fraction of sites completed, and the fraction 
of buildings completed, are both substantially higher 
than the fraction of materials completed.  Figure 3-1 
shows the amount of material with comprehensive 
or rapid upgrades completed as a fraction of the total 
amount of potentially vulnerable nuclear material.
Comprehensive upgrades have been completed for 
all of the nuclear material in Russia’s naval nuclear 
complex, all of the nuclear material in the non-Rus-
sian states of the former Soviet Union, and nearly all 
of the nuclear material at Russia’s civilian sites.  Nearly 
all the remaining material awaiting U.S.-funded se-
curity upgrades is in the defense complex of Russia’s 
Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (Rosatom, formerly 
the Ministry of Atomic Energy, or Minatom), for which 
the access issue has been the most difﬁcult to resolve. 
Indeed, some 500 tons of the estimated 600 tons of 
potentially vulnerable weapons-usable nuclear mate-
rial outside of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet 
Union is in Rosatom’s defense complex, and as of the 
end of FY 2004, comprehensive upgrades had been 
completed on no more than 12% of this material.45
It should be noted that the precision in these ﬁgures 
is illusory.  The DOE estimate of 600 tons of material 
43 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 485. 
44 Interviews with DOE ofﬁcials, January 2005.  For a more detailed discussion of the MPC&A program, see Matthew Bunn, “Materials 
Protection, Control and Accounting,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2003; 
available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/securing/mpca.asp as of 3 March 2005).
45 Through FY 2004, comprehensive upgrades had been completed on 100% of the Navy sites housing nuclear material (approxi-
mately 60 tons) and no more than 95% of the former Soviet civilian nuclear complex (approx. 40 tons).  Combining this ﬁgure with 
the ﬁgure of 26% completed for all material allows one to calculate the percentage of comprehensive upgrades completed on the 
remaining 500 tons of nuclear material estimated in the Russian weapons complex.  For the Navy and civilian complex ﬁgures, see 
U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, pp. 486-488.
Figure 3-1 
How Much Securing Work Have U.S.-Funded Programs Completed?
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outside of warheads is extremely uncertain; in fact, 
new internal, unofﬁcial estimates, not yet reﬂected in 
DOE’s ofﬁcial progress assessments, have revised the 
600-ton ﬁgure downward.  The breakdowns of how 
much material is in particular buildings and sites—
from which the estimates of the percentage covered 
to date are drawn—are little more than guesses in 
some cases.  Russia has never formally declared how 
much HEU or separated plutonium it has, how much 
of those stockpiles are in warheads, or how much ma-
terial is in each of its many different facilities.  In some 
cases this information is still considered a state secret 
in Russia.
Rate of progress.  During FY 2004, comprehensive 
upgrades were completed on an additional 4% of the 
weapons-usable nuclear material outside of nuclear 
weapons in the former Soviet Union (roughly 24 tons 
of additional material), increasing the fraction with 
comprehensive upgrades from 22% to 26%.46  This 
represents a signiﬁcant slowing compared to the pre-
vious year, when DOE reports that 35 tons of nuclear 
material received comprehensive upgrades.47
DOE plans to complete comprehensive upgrades 
on the remaining 74% of the material in Russia in 
just four more years, by the end of 2008.  This will 
require a dramatic acceleration of current progress, 
if measured by the percentage of material secured 
each year; if the current rate remained unchanged, it 
would take several times that long to complete the 
effort.  DOE argues that if appropriate agreements 
can be reached to enable nuclear security upgrades 
to take place at those few places where access is 
still a serious problem (particularly the two nuclear 
weapons assembly and disassembly facilities, where 
huge amounts of nuclear material are believed to 
be stored), the needed acceleration will occur, as a 
result of shifting from completing work at buildings 
with small quantities of nuclear material to complet-
ing work at buildings that contain massive quantities 
of nuclear material.  Indeed, DOE hopes to complete 
comprehensive upgrades for 11% of the potentially 
vulnerable nuclear material in Russia during FY 2005 
(nearly three times the FY 2004 pace), 13% in FY 2006, 
23% in FY 2007, and 27% in FY 2008.48  Under this plan 
fully half of all the potentially vulnerable nuclear ma-
terial in Russia would have comprehensive upgrades 
installed in the last two years of the effort.  (This rep-
resents primarily the material believed to be located 
at the last large Rosatom weapons complex sites 
scheduled to be completed, particularly the weap-
ons assembly and disassembly facilities.)  Achieving 
this level of acceleration is likely to require sustained 
leadership from both the secretary of energy and the 
president, focused on overcoming the obstacles to 
progress as they arise.
Although DOE argued in a 2004 press release that 
security upgrades in the former Soviet Union were 
“ahead of schedule,”49 in fact the current level of up-
grades is behind the planned schedule set after the 
9/11 attacks—the schedule that ﬁrst set a 2008 target 
date.  Under that original post–9/11 plan, by the end 
of FY 2004, comprehensive upgrades were to have 
been completed for 27% of the potentially vulnerable 
nuclear material in Russia, and initial rapid upgrades 
were to have been completed for an additional 50% 
of this material.50  As noted above, by the end of FY 
2004, comprehensive security upgrades had been 
completed on 26% of the potentially vulnerable nu-
clear material, nearly matching the earlier target, but 
rapid upgrades had been completed for only another 
20%, far short of the earlier goal.
In last year’s report, we noted, based on the most 
current data available at that time, that the quantity 
of nuclear material that received comprehensive 
security upgrades in the two years following the Sep-
tember 11 attacks was actually less than the quantity 
46 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 485.
47 For discussion of the previous year’s progress, with references, see Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, pp. 46-
47.
48 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 485.
49 “NNSA Security Upgrades at Russian Sites Are Ahead of Schedule” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, October 2004; 
available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/NA-04-FS02.pdf as of 28 February 2005).
50 Kenneth Sheely, “MPC&A Program Overview – Initiatives for Acceleration and Expansion” (paper presented at the 43rd Annual 
Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Orlando, Florida, 24 June 2002).
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that had received comprehensive upgrades in the 
two years before.  DOE has since revised its estimates 
of the amount secured each year; under the new es-
timates, the amounts secured in the two years before 
and the two years after the September 11 attacks is 
roughly the same.51  If DOE’s hopes for FY 2005 and 
beyond are achieved, however, the resulting accelera-
tion will be substantial.
Securing Metric 2: Security Upgrades on Former 
Soviet Buildings Containing Nuclear Material
U.S.-funded cooperative nuclear security upgrade 
efforts concentrated ﬁrst on upgrading particularly 
vulnerable sites with small quantities of nuclear 
material—though still enough for a bomb, if stolen. 
While completing security upgrades at these sites re-
duced proliferation risks substantially, they covered 
only a small percentage of the total nuclear mate-
rial, and as a result, the fraction of materials covered 
does not fully reﬂect the fraction of the work that 
has been accomplished or the fraction of the pro-
liferation threat that has been reduced.  Hence, DOE 
often prefers to emphasize the fraction of sites com-
pleted, which is much more impressive.  By the end 
of FY 2004, approximately 75% of the sites in the 
former Soviet Union where weapons-usable nuclear 
material was located had been completed.52 “Com-
pleted” means that either comprehensive upgrades 
had been ﬁnished, or DOE had determined that only 
the ﬁrst round of rapid upgrades were needed at 
that site (if, for example, the material at the site was 
of low attractiveness for use in a nuclear weapon).
The fraction of the buildings completed is a somewhat 
better measure both of how much the proliferation 
risk has been reduced, and of how much of the total 
work has been accomplished, than either the frac-
tion of materials or the fraction of sites completed. 
Building-level data is more representative than ma-
terials-level data because a single building with a 
given level of security that has enough nuclear ma-
terial for 1,000 nuclear weapons may pose only a 
modestly greater theft risk than a building with sim-
ilar security arrangements and only enough nuclear 
material for one or two nuclear bombs.  Improving 
security at a building with a massive amount of 
nuclear material involves more work, but not dra-
matically more, so the total amount of work is more 
closely related to the number of buildings than the 
amount of material.  Building-level data is more rep-
resentative than site-level data because a large site 
with dozens of buildings containing nuclear mate-
rial may have dozens of different groups that have 
access to that material, and because the work of 
improving security at such a huge and multifaceted 
site is much more time-consuming, complex, and 
expensive than the work of improving security at a 
small site with only one building.  We have not pre-
viously used building-level data because such data 
was not publicly available, but DOE has now pro-
vided building-level data.  
As of the end of FY 2004, U.S.-funded security up-
grades had been completed for roughly 56% of the 
just over 200 buildings housing weapons-usable 
nuclear material in the former Soviet Union (Figure 
51 “NNSA Security Upgrades at Russian Sites Are Ahead of Schedule.”  DOE has not released its new year-by-year estimates, making it 
impossible to compare, for example, the three years before the 9/11 attacks to the three years after those attacks; but given that the 
amount of material that received comprehensive upgrades in FY 2004 was less than the amount in FY 2003, it seems unlikely that 
such a comparison would indicate that a substantial acceleration had yet been achieved.
52 Ofﬁcially, DOE estimates that 75 of 121 sites where cooperation to upgrade security and accounting for nuclear materials was 
underway were complete as of the end of FY 2004, or approximately 62% of the total.  But 70 of the 121 are nuclear warhead sites, 
treated below, and two of the sites outside Russia are sites where upgrades were performed for a combination of political reasons 
and desire to reduce risks of nuclear sabotage, not because there was weapons-usable nuclear material there (the South Ukraine 
nuclear power plant and the Ignalina nuclear power plant in Lithuania).  Therefore there are approximately 49 sites with weapons-
usable nuclear material included in the program, of which 37 are completed, or 75%.  Calculations based on unpublished data 
provided by DOE, February 2005.  The 75% ﬁgure may be a modest overstatement, as there are believed to be a few sites with weap-
ons-usable nuclear material which Russia has not previously agreed to include in the cooperative program and which have not 
been included in the program’s past site lists.  The OKBM design institute in Nizhny Novgorod, for example, has several HEU-fueled 
critical assemblies, but has only recently been added to the sites scheduled for security and accounting upgrades. 
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3-2 compares the different measures of progress in 
completing security upgrades).53
Rate of progress.  Security and accounting upgrades 
were completed at 38 buildings in FY 2004, a pace 
more than a third better than had been planned, as 
the availability of both supplemental funding and 
needed cooperation at particular sites allowed the 
completion of some buildings more rapidly than 
originally planned.54  Publicly available data is insuf-
ﬁcient, however, to determine how many of these 
38 buildings were warhead buildings, as opposed to 
nuclear material buildings.  If, as appears to be the 
case, roughly two-thirds of these 38 buildings were 
buildings containing nuclear material, then during FY 
2004 the total fraction of nuclear-material buildings 
completed increased from 43% to 56% in a single 
year, a substantial pace of completion.55 DOE hopes 
to achieve a substantial further acceleration of that 
pace in FY 2005, completing upgrades on 61 addi-
tional buildings containing weapons-usable nuclear 
material.56  If that target is achieved, by the end of FY 
53 As with the sites ﬁgure, this percentage differs somewhat from DOE’s ofﬁcial estimate (in this case, DOE’s estimate is 59% of build-
ings completed as of end of FY 2004), because we include in this measure only those buildings containing nuclear material, treating 
nuclear warheads separately below, while DOE includes those containing nuclear material and warheads in one buildings measure. 
Of the estimated 275 buildings in the former Soviet Union containing nuclear warheads or nuclear materials where the MPC&A 
program is working, it appears that roughly 205 are buildings containing nuclear material, as 12 are warhead facilities under the 12th 
Main Directorate of Russia’s Ministry of Defense, 19 are warhead facilities of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, and we assume that the 
39 Navy warhead sites similarly constitute 39 of the 60 Navy buildings.  Calculations based on unpublished data provided by DOE, 
February 2005.
54 U.S. Department of Energy, Performance and Accountability Report: FY 2004, p. 138.
55 Nine of the buildings listed as completed by the end of FY 2004 were Strategic Rocket Forces buildings, which were almost cer-
tainly completed during FY 2004; we are assuming that a modest number of the 39 Navy warhead buildings were also completed 
during FY 2004.
56 Calculations based on unpublished data provided by DOE, February 2005.
FIgure 3-2 
Status of Security Upgrades on Sites and Buildings in the Former Soviet Union  
Containing Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material
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Note:  The percentages for buildings and sites completed differ somewhat from DOE’s ofﬁcial estimate because we include only 
those buildings and sites containing nuclear material, treating nuclear warheads separately.
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2005, some 85% of the buildings containing weap-
ons-usable nuclear material in the former Soviet 
Union will have had U.S.-sponsored security and ac-
counting upgrades completed.  Hence, focusing on 
the buildings-level data makes achieving the 2008 
target for completing upgrades appear signiﬁcantly 
more plausible than it looks when focusing only on 
the materials-level data. 
Securing Metric 3: Security Upgrades on 
Russian Sites Containing Warheads
Fraction accomplished.  For nuclear warhead sites, 
the numbers are inevitably murkier, as neither the 
U.S. government nor the Russian government has 
published current, detailed estimates of how many 
nuclear warheads exist in Russia, at how many sites. 
Even the basic question of what fraction of Russia’s 
warhead sites are covered by current U.S. plans for 
warhead security upgrades can only be partially an-
swered from publicly available ofﬁcial data.
While Russia has never declared how many warheads 
it has, and there are large uncertainties in both of-
ﬁcial and unofﬁcial U.S. estimates, the most recent 
unclassiﬁed estimates suggest that Russia still has 
roughly 16,000 warheads in assembled form (with 
just under half that number operational, including 
both strategic and tactical weapons).57  By some un-
classiﬁed estimates, these warheads exist at some 
150-210 sites (counting each individually secured 
perimeter, whether it be a ﬁxed bunker or a location 
where warheads are temporarily stored, as a separate 
site)—50-70 of which are national stockpile sites, 60-
80 of which are deployed, service-level storage sites, 
and 40-60 of which are temporary sites (such as rail 
transfer points and warhead handling areas at opera-
tional bases).58
DOD and DOE are both working with Russian coun-
terparts to install modern security systems at many of 
these sites.59  It is important to understand, however, 
that as of early 2005, there is no plan to upgrade secu-
rity for all the warhead sites in Russia: in January 2003, 
the administration took an interagency decision not 
to provide support for upgrading warhead handling 
areas in most cases,60 and from the beginning of the 
cooperation, there have been some sites that Russian 
ofﬁcials have not put on the table as subjects for coop-
eration—particularly some forward-deployed tactical 
nuclear warhead sites.61  Thus, unless there are policy 
changes in Washington and Moscow, even when cur-
rent programs are “completed,” there will remain a 
signiﬁcant number of nuclear warhead sites in Russia 
that have not had U.S.-funded security upgrades.
Of the 150-210 total sites, DOE currently plans to 
perform some level of upgrade on 39 Navy sites, 19 
Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) sites, and 12 sites man-
aged by the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of 
Defense (known by its Russian acronym as the 12th 
GUMO, the organization charged with the nuclear war-
head management and security in Russia), for a total of 
70 sites.62 DOD currently plans to upgrade security at 
57 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces, 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61, 
no. 2 (March/April 2005; available at http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=ma05norris as of 1 March 2005).
58 Charles Thornton, presentation, Harvard University, October 24, 2003.  These ﬁgures are higher than most available government 
ﬁgures related to the number of warhead sites, because ofﬁcial ﬁgures usually do not include all the temporary sites, and because 
some ofﬁcial ﬁgures are based only on the sites where threat reduction assistance is planned, while a number of sites (including 
most deployed, service-level sites for tactical nuclear weapons) have not been the subject of threat reduction discussions.
59 For a more detailed account of these warhead security programs, see Matthew Bunn, “Nuclear Warhead Security Upgrades,” in 
Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2002; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/
cnwm/securing/warhead.asp as of 2 March 2005).
60 U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts 
to Improve Security at Russian Sites, GAO-03-482 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2003; available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03482.
pdf as of 4 March 2005), pp. 33-34.
61 Interview with U.S. defense contractor expert, February 2004.
62 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 485.  Of the 39 Navy warhead sites, 21 are 
sites where DOE completed initial “rapid” upgrades, and then did not pursue further upgrades after the interagency decision that 
in most cases support would not be provided for upgrading warhead-handling sites.  DOE’s budget justiﬁcations used to refer to 42 
naval warhead sites; DOE has declined to offer assistance for three of these (apparently because there should not be warheads there 
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an additional 42 sites, for a total of 112 sites to be up-
graded by either DOE or DOD programs—although in 
some cases the departments may be using the word 
“sites” differently.63  This ﬁgure, signiﬁcantly below the 
estimate of 150-210 total sites, suggests that the set of 
sites that will not be covered under current U.S. gov-
ernment plans may be signiﬁcant.64  (Ultimately, more 
security could be purchased, probably at lower costs, 
through consolidating this vast warhead infrastruc-
ture into just a few facilities, but U.S. ofﬁcials have so 
far made little progress with Russia on the warhead 
consolidation issue.65)
To date, rapid upgrades have been completed for 
all 39 of the Navy sites where DOE is working; rapid 
upgrade contracts have been signed for all 19 of the 
if Russia is fulﬁlling its pledges under the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives), leaving the remaining total for which upgrades 
are planned at 39.  Russian requests for assistance at sites of which that was true provoked considerable concern and suspicion 
within the U.S. government.  Interviews with DOE, DOD, and national laboratory ofﬁcials, 2003 and February–March 2004.  Similarly, 
DOE’s budget justiﬁcation for FY 2005 stated a goal of upgrading 25 SRF sites rather than the current 19; see U.S. Department of 
Energy, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security Administration—Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (Washing-
ton, D.C.: DOE, 2004; available at http://www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/05budget/content/defnn/nn.pdf as of 17 February 2005), p. 446. 
The 19 sites are now described as those that “have been approved by the U.S. government for MPC&A upgrades.” U.S. Department 
of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 485.  This suggests that six of the original 25 have not been 
approved for upgrades; part of the reason is likely to be that some SRF sites are closing as a result of ongoing arms reductions as-
sociated with the Moscow Treaty and previous accords.
63 For the 42-site plan, see U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2005 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: DOD, 2004; available at http://armedservices.house.gov/issues/FY05CTR.pdf as of 2 March 2005), p. 41.  The 150-210 
sites estimate, for example, counts each individually secured perimeter, whether it is a ﬁxed bunker or a location where warheads 
are temporarily stored, as a separate site.  
64  DOD’s initial workplan called for upgrades at 123 sites, matching the Russian request for 123 sets of “quick ﬁx” equipment.  (Each 
set represents 1 kilometer of multiple-layer fencing, with sensors—there is no precise one-to-one correspondence between sets 
and sites, but it was expected that the number of sites would be similar to the number of sets requested.)  Five of the Navy sites 
where DOE is upgrading security are within the original DOD list, as are the 19 SRF sites and the 12 12th GUMO sites; if these are sub-
tracted from 123, this leaves 87 from the original list not covered by DOE, much more than the 42 sites DOD plans to upgrade.  The 
difference could include: sites that have been closed or will soon be closed (Russia has indicated that reductions under the Moscow 
Treaty will lead to the closure of several sites); sites that the United States has decided not to offer assistance for; sites the Russian 
government has not requested assistance for; and varying deﬁnitions of “sites.”  The magnitude of the difference, however, does sug-
gest that even when current DOE and DOD plans are completed, a signiﬁcant number of the original list of 123 sites will not have 
received U.S.-sponsored security upgrades.  In its FY 2004 report to Congress on threat reduction, DOD indicated that the Russian 
Ministry of Defense had provided a list of 52 nuclear weapon facilities where U.S.-provided equipment had been or would be used, 
including 15 large facilities with an average of 5 bunkers each (for a total of 75 bunkers at large facilities), and 37 smaller facilities 
with 1-2 bunkers each; hence the total for this database is in the range 112-149 sites.  (This is merely sites that have received or are 
slated to receive equipment the United States provided to Russia, not a comprehensive list of all sites—but it is very consistent 
with the original 123-site plan.) See U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 
2004 (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2003), p. 27.  In the following year’s report, DOD indicated that of the 52 storage facilities, when one 
subtracted out the Navy and SRF facilities that DOE will address, the sites that will not be upgraded because of the interagency deci-
sion on warhead-handling sites, and sites that were no longer in use because of Russian consolidation efforts, the latest DOD plan 
included only 32 facilities. See U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2005, 
p. 57. In the report released in early 2005, this total number of nuclear weapon storage areas to receive upgrades had declined fur-
ther, to 30 of the 52 areas identiﬁed by the Russian 12th GUMO. See U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual 
Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006, pp. 82-83. The further subtraction of two facilities may be the result of closure of some facilities, 
or of the new expectation that DOE will address some 12 12th GUMO sites (which may be located at only a couple of facilities).
65 For analyses of the warhead consolidation issue, see Harold P. Smith, Jr., “Consolidating Threat Reduction,” Arms Control Today (No-
vember 2003; available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_11/Smith.asp as of 22 March 2005); Gunnar Arbman and Charles 
Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part II: Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations, FOI-R-1588-SE (Stockholm: Swedish 
Defense Research Agency, 2005; available at http://www.foi.se/upload/pdf/FOI-RussiasTacticalNuclearWeapons.pdf as of 12 April 
2005).  The Arbman and Thornton paper provides an excellent up-to-date overview of policy issues related to Russia’s tactical nu-
clear warhead stockpile and its security in general.  On that topic, see also Anatoli Diakov, Eugene Miasnikov, and Timur Kadyshev, 
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Problems of Control and Reduction (Moscow: Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental 
Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, 2004; available at http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/NSNW_en_v1b.pdf as 
of 17 March 2005); Joshua Handler, “The September 1991 PNIs and the Elimination, Storing, and Security Aspects of TNWs” in Time 
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SRF sites where DOE is working (two of which have 
rapid upgrades installed); and upgrades have not 
yet begun for the 12th GUMO sites incorporated in 
DOE’s plans.66  In the DOD program, teams have vis-
ited 10 sites, and both vulnerability assessments and 
designs for comprehensive security upgrades have 
been completed for those sites.  A large fraction of 
the equipment needed to upgrade those 10 sites has 
been ordered, but there has been no public statement 
that rapid upgrades (or initial “quick ﬁx” equipment, 
as the ﬁrst round of upgrades are usually described 
in the DOD program) have yet been installed at these 
sites.67  In addition, Russia’s Ministry of Defense has 
used its own funds to install U.S.-provided “quick ﬁx” 
sets of security equipment—similar in some respects 
to what DOE calls “rapid upgrades”—at several dozen 
additional sites.  The total number of sites with rapid 
upgrades or “quick ﬁx” sets installed may be as high 
as 90-110.68  This would represent roughly 50-60% of 
the total number of warhead sites.69
More elaborate comprehensive upgrades have been 
completed for thirteen Russian Navy sites, but no 
other warhead sites70—representing 6-9% of the total 
number of warhead sites.71  There are 21 other naval 
sites where the U.S. government has concluded that 
only rapid upgrades are required, and those rapid 
upgrades are completed, so DOE counts these sites 
under its total of 34 completed Navy warhead sites.72 
If those are counted toward the total number of sites 
to Control Tactical Nuclear Weapons (New York: United Nations, 2001; available at http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/
pdf/untalk.pdf as of 29 March 2005); Allistair Millar, “The Pressing Need for Tactical Nuclear Weapons Control,” Arms Control Today 
(May 2002; available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_05/millarmay02.asp as of 29 March 2005); William Potter et al., Tactical 
Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000); William Potter and Nikolai 
Sokov, “Practical Measures to Reduce the Risks Presented by Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons” (paper presented to the Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Commission, Stockholm, 2005; available at http://www.wmdcommission.org/ﬁles/No8.pdf as of 18 April 2005). 
66 Navy site information is from personal communication from DOE program ofﬁcial, February 2004.  SRF and 12th GUMO data is 
from U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, pp. 483-487.
67 U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006, p. 41.
68 As of late 2003, the Russian Ministry of Defense had ofﬁcially certiﬁed that 47 quick ﬁx sets were installed, but had informally indi-
cated that roughly half of the 123 sets of quick ﬁx equipment had been installed.  After discussions of U.S. support for installations of 
these sets began, the Russian Ministry of Defense largely stopped providing its own funds to install them. (Personal communication 
with DTRA ofﬁcial, February 2004.) Any additional sets that have been installed since then, therefore, would have been installed by 
the teams funded by the DOE and DOD programs. If it is still true that half are installed, this would be 61-62 sets, ﬁve of which were 
for Navy sites already covered in the 39 ﬁgure mentioned in the text.  Hence this suggests that these quick ﬁx sets were installed for 
roughly 50-60 non-Navy sites as of late 2003.  It appears likely that in the DOE-funded work at SRF sites, or in the DOD-funded work 
at their initial sites, some number of additional sets—perhaps in the range of 10—have been installed since then, for a total that 
may now be in the range of 50-70 non-Navy sites with rapid or “quick ﬁx” upgrades installed, along with 39 Navy sites.
69 Some temporary warhead storage sites might not require permanent, ﬁxed security equipment equivalent to the equipment pro-
vided in the “quick ﬁx” sets, much less more elaborate comprehensive upgrades; other, rapidly deployable but temporary security 
measures may be appropriate for such sites.  Hence an argument could be made that if these sites are excluded, the fraction of the 
remaining sites that really require the kind of upgrades represented by the “quick ﬁx” sets which are already covered is higher than 
estimated here.  But temporary sites certainly require some security upgrades, and there is currently no publicly available informa-
tion suggesting that such temporary security measures have been provided for these types of temporary sites; thus the fraction of 
the total number of sites that have not yet been equipped with some type of upgrades is in the range described here.  Only a few 
temporary sites outside DOE’s Navy program have been a focus of attention to date, and all of the Navy sites are included within our 
estimates of the total sites upgraded.
70 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 485.  While the DOE ﬁgures refer to 34 Navy 
sites as completed, 21 of these were judged only to require rapid upgrades, and hence did not receive comprehensive upgrades. 
Personal communication from DOE program ofﬁcial, February 2004.  Similarly, the two SRF sites listed as completed in 2004 were 
judged only to require rapid upgrades, and hence did not receive comprehensive upgrades.   Data provided by DOE, April 2005.
71 As noted earlier in the discussion of rapid upgrades, some temporary sites may not be suitable for the kinds of ﬁxed security up-
grades envisioned in the “comprehensive upgrades” package for ﬁxed warhead storage sites.  If all of the estimated 40-60 temporary 
sites were considered unsuitable for comprehensive upgrades and subtracted from the estimated total of 150-210 sites, the 15 sites 
at which comprehensive upgrades have been completed would be 10-13% of the total where comprehensive upgrades are needed, 
rather than 7-10% of the total.  It is unlikely, however, that 100% of the temporary sites are unsuitable for comprehensive upgrades.
72 Personal communication from DOE program ofﬁcial, February 2004.
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that have received all the upgrades they require, then 
that total is in the range of 15-25% of the total num-
ber of sites.
Rate of progress.  During FY 2004, comprehensive 
upgrades were completed on four additional Navy 
sites.73  DOD completed designs for comprehen-
sive upgrades for 10 sites, and ordered much of the 
equipment that will be installed.  It appears, in addi-
tion, that Russia has identiﬁed, and agreed to provide 
DOD teams access to, an additional six sites beyond 
the ﬁrst ten.74  There were substantial delays in the 
DOD program in the ﬁrst half of 2004 because of lim-
its on the funds that could be spent until agreement 
was reached on an amended agreement covering 
the work.  Before signing an amended implementing 
agreement that would allow the expenditure of ad-
ditional funds, DOD insisted that Russia agree that no 
U.S.-funded security upgrades would be provided for 
facilities that will close within the next few years; the 
United States and Russia did not sign an accord to 
that effect until July 2004.75  Ironically, the new agree-
ment—which the United States sought to avoid 
wasting money securing sites that were no longer 
going to be used—effectively prohibits Russia from 
consolidating warheads at a smaller number of sites 
(which it would be very much in the U.S. interest for 
Russia to do, to achieve more security at lower cost), 
at least if that involves removing them from sites that 
have received U.S.-funded security upgrades.76
Our estimate of the fraction of sites covered by rapid 
upgrades has increased modestly in the last year, 
from 50% to something in the range of 50-60%.  For 
comprehensive upgrades, the six additional sites 
completed in FY 2004 represent an additional 3-4% 
of the total.
The pace for completing upgrades during FY 2005 
is expected to be signiﬁcantly higher.  DOE plans to 
complete upgrades at 11 more sites (3 Navy and 8 
SRF),77 and it is reasonable to hope that some or all 
of the ﬁrst 10 DOD sites will be completed as well. 
Overall, though, the timelines for completion remain 
long: DOE projects that it will take through FY 2007 to 
complete upgrades at the 19 SRF sites, and through 
FY 2012 to complete the 12 sites of the 12th GUMO 
where it expects to sponsor security upgrades—the 
latter pace largely determined by funding constraints. 
It appears that DOD’s timeline is similar.78  A sub-
stantial acceleration would be needed to complete 
upgrades at these sites by the end of 2008, as seemed 
to be envisioned in the Bratislava summit statement. 
To achieve such an acceleration would require rapid 
resolution of remaining access issues, more funding, 
and a sustained effort to overcome other constraints 
on the pace of work.  As noted earlier, unless addi-
tional sites are added to current plans, even when 
those plans are complete there will still be a signiﬁ-
cant number of nuclear warhead sites in Russia that 
have not received U.S.-sponsored upgrades.
Securing Metric 4: Vulnerable Non-Russian 
Sites with Material Removed
Fraction accomplished.  The problem of nuclear war-
heads and materials that may be vulnerable to theft, 
given today’s terrorist and criminal threats, is not just 
73 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 485.  As noted earlier, only rapid upgrades 
were completed on two SRF sites in 2004.
74 DOD reports that of the 42 sites where it plans to support upgrades, 26 are still dependent on Russia identifying and providing 
access to the sites, suggesting that Russia has so far identiﬁed and agreed to provide access to 16 sites. U.S. Department of Defense, 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006, p. 41.
75 For a mention of the signature of this agreement, see U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to 
Congress: Fiscal Year 2006, p. 38. Information on delays is from interviews with DTRA ofﬁcial, April and June 2004.
76 For more discussion on Russian warhead consolidation, see Arbman and Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part II: Techni-
cal Issues and Policy Recommendations, pp. 63-72.
77 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 485.
78 DOE estimates are from U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 485, supplemented 
with data provided by DOE, April 2005.  This represents a signiﬁcantly more pessimistic projection than the previous year, when DOE 
was not yet expecting to be working at 12th GUMO sites, but expected to ﬁnish all 25 SRF sites by the end of 2008.  DOD’s funding 
plans for the site security enhancements project appear to stretch to FY 2011.  See U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006, p. 51.
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a former Soviet Union problem, it is a global problem. 
The essential ingredients of nuclear weapons exist in 
more than 40 countries around the world.  In some 
cases they are well secured, in other cases (such as at 
civilian research reactors fueled with HEU) they may 
have no more security than a night watchman and a 
chain-link fence.79  Given that the world community is 
dealing with terrorists who have demonstrated global 
reach, and an ability to ﬁnd and strike weak points on 
a global basis, the goal should be to make sure that 
every nuclear warhead and every kilogram of nuclear 
material worldwide is secure and accounted for, to a 
level adequate to defeat demonstrated terrorist and 
criminal capabilities.
There has been no global assessment of how much 
work would need to be done, and where, to reach that 
goal.  With the size of the overall task undeﬁned, it is 
particularly difﬁcult to develop metrics for assessing 
progress in completing the task.  Moreover, facilities 
outside the former Soviet Union are being addressed 
by a wide range of separate programs, some of which 
focus on reviewing and if necessary upgrading secu-
rity at such facilities, while others focus on removing 
nuclear material from them entirely.  Some countries 
have been very open to U.S. or international assis-
tance in improving security for their facilities, while 
some key countries—particularly those with nuclear 
weapons programs shrouded in substantial secrecy, 
such as Pakistan, India, and Israel—have not been en-
thusiastic about intensive cooperation in this area.80
One metric that may be useful is the fraction of the 
sites identiﬁed by the U.S. government as high priori-
ties for removing nuclear material entirely, from which 
the material has in fact been removed.  In 2002, after 
the removal of 48 kilograms of 80% enriched HEU 
fuel from the Vinca facility in Yugoslavia, the U.S. State 
Department indicated that there were two dozen 
other sites around the world from which similar re-
moval operations were planned.81  Later discussions 
clariﬁed that these were not necessarily the highest-
priority sites in the world, but simply the sites with 
HEU that was Soviet-supplied, for which Russia, the 
United States, and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) had established a tripartite initiative 
to move the material back to Russia for secure stor-
age and destruction.82  It appears that as of the early 
1990s, there were approximately 20-22 Soviet-sup-
plied sites with HEU outside of Russia.83  Since then, 
U.S.-funded efforts have removed all the HEU from 
two of these facilities (the Ulba facility in Kazakhstan, 
from which nearly 600 kilograms of HEU was airlifted 
in 1994, and a facility in Tbilisi, Georgia, whose HEU 
was airlifted to the United Kingdom in 1998), and all 
the fresh, unirradiated HEU has been removed from 
six more (Vinca, in Yugoslavia, in 2002; Romania and 
Bulgaria in 2003; and Libya, the Czech Republic, and 
Uzbekistan in 2004).84  For these recent six sites, how-
ever, substantial quantities of irradiated HEU (most of 
it not sufﬁciently radioactive to pose any signiﬁcant 
deterrent to theft) still remain.
79 For a discussion, see Matthew Bunn, “The Global Threat,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads 
and Materials (2002; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/threat/global.asp as of 3 March 2005).
80 See discussions in Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, “Removing Material from Vulnerable Sites,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research 
Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2004; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/securing/vulnerable.
asp as of 2 February 2005); Matthew Bunn, “International Nuclear Material Security Upgrades,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research 
Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2002; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/securing/secure.asp as 
of 4 March 2005).
81 Robert Schlesinger, “24 Sites Eyed for Uranium Seizure,” Boston Globe, 24 August 2002.
82 Interviews with U.S. State Department and IAEA ofﬁcials, 2003.
83 These include four sites at that time in Kazakhstan, three in Ukraine, and one each in Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Georgia, 
Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Libya, North Korea, Poland, Romania, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.  (We are not counting, here, 
the Sukhumi I. Vekhua Institute of Physics and Technology in Sukhumi, Abkhazia, from which HEU was apparently stolen some time 
after the Georgian civil war broke out in the 1990s.  Since HEU is no longer located at that facility, it should not be counted against 
the total number for judging the fraction of facilities that have been addressed.)  Some variations in ﬁgures may result from differ-
ing deﬁnitions of “sites” or “facilities” (in Libya, for example, there is both a research reactor and a critical assembly fueled with HEU 
at a single research institute, so they are counted by some as two facilities and by others as one site); other variations in ﬁgures may 
be caused by differing cutoff times for data.
84 See discussion of these cases in Bunn and Wier, “Removing Material from Vulnerable Sites.”
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If, over-generously,  all six of the recent sites are con-
sidered to have been fully addressed, then material 
has been removed from 8 of the original 20-22 sites, 
or 35-40% of the total.  If, on the other hand, only 
those sites are counted where all HEU that poses a 
signiﬁcant proliferation threat has been removed, 
only two sites have been completed, roughly 10% of 
the original total.
Of course, the Soviet-supplied sites are not the only 
sites in the world where there is dangerously vulner-
able HEU.  DOE’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
(GTRI), launched in the spring of 2004 to accelerate 
the global effort to remove nuclear material from vul-
nerable sites (as well as securing material that cannot 
be removed, and reducing the risks from radiological 
sources around the world), has compiled data that in-
dicates that worldwide, there are 128 research reactors 
or associated facilities where 20 kilograms or more of 
HEU is located.85  Of these, 41 are fuel facilities rather 
than research reactors themselves.86  If all facilities with 
at least ﬁve kilograms of U-235 contained in HEU were 
included (the international standard for the quantity 
requiring the highest levels of security), the total num-
ber of facilities worldwide would presumably be larger, 
but data on how much larger it would be has not been 
made public.  It may be that the total would be only 
modestly larger than 128 (perhaps in the range of 
140-160), as there would be no additional fuel facilities 
added by lowering the threshold, and most research 
reactors that have as much as ﬁve kilograms of HEU 
would be either higher-power facilities likely to have 
a total of more than 20 kilograms when irradiated fuel 
is included, or pulse reactors and critical assemblies 
that often also have more than 20 kilograms.  A sub-
stantial fraction of the total, however, are facilities in 
the United States (where removals are usually counted 
in a separate category from international threat reduc-
tion efforts) or in Russia (where removals and security 
upgrades are already counted in the metrics relating 
to buildings and materials secured, described above); 
these two countries may account for half or more of 
the total.
During the period since U.S.-funded threat reduc-
tion efforts began, in addition to the removals from 
Soviet-supplied sites, there have been about a dozen 
U.S.-supplied sites from which all HEU has been re-
moved, in addition to the two Soviet-supplied sites 
from which all HEU has been removed.  Thus, we esti-
mate that over the last decade and a half, all the HEU 
has been removed from approximately 10% of the 
total number of research reactors and associated fa-
cilities with dangerous quantities of HEU worldwide. 
The metrics that DOE itself is using so far to judge 
GTRI’s progress in removing HEU from vulnerable 
sites around the world are somewhat different.  First, 
DOE tracks how many of a targeted list of HEU-fueled 
reactors have been converted to LEU (as of the end 
of FY 2004, 39 were listed as converted, but roughly 8 
of these were actually still in the conversion process 
and therefore still had HEU in their core).87  There are 
91 reactors currently targeted for conversion in for-
eign countries, along with a number in the United 
States itself, for a total of 105 reactors that DOE hopes 
to convert by 2014—so the 39 converted or partially 
converted to date (stretching back to the origins of 
the conversion program in 1978) represent some 
37% of the target group.88  Of the converted reactors, 
31 are fully converted, representing 30% of the tar-
geted group.
DOE has not spelled out what incentives will be of-
fered to convince the remaining reactors to convert to 
LEU, when many of them already have enough HEU to 
run for the lifetime of the reactor.  As noted earlier, this 
focus on converting reactors tends to direct attention 
away from removing HEU from reactors that are already 
shut down; from difﬁcult-to-convert reactors (some 56 
HEU-fueled reactors worldwide are simply not on the 
list for conversion, and are rarely mentioned);89 from 
85 U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium, p. 28.
86 Interviews with Argonne National Laboratory and DOE ofﬁcials, February 2005.
87 Data provided by DOE, April 2005.
88 For the ﬁgure of 91 foreign reactors to be converted by 2014, see U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Budget Request, p. 544. For 105 total reactors targeted, see, for example, U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, DOE Needs to 
Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium.
89 U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium, p. 10.
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encouraging reactors to shut down; and from remov-
ing HEU from non-reactor facilities.
Second, DOE tracks progress in returning Soviet-
supplied HEU to Russia by the number of kilograms 
of HEU returned.  By the end of 2004, 99 kilograms 
of HEU fuel had been returned to Russia, 7% of the 
1,320 kilograms of Soviet-supplied HEU that DOE be-
lieves exist outside of Russia.90  While the number of 
kilograms of HEU returned is a valuable number, it 
does not provide any insight into whether, for exam-
ple, particular sites have had all the HEU that could 
readily be used for a bomb removed, or only a part 
of it, leaving enough behind to pose a serious prolif-
eration risk; that is why we emphasize the number of 
sites with HEU removed.
Third, DOE tracks the progress of the effort to take 
back U.S.-supplied HEU by the total number of fuel 
assemblies returned to the United States.  By the 
end of 2004, this ﬁgure stood at 6,344 assemblies re-
turned since the take-back program was restarted in 
1996, some 28% of the 22,743 assemblies DOE hopes 
to return to the United States by the extended dead-
line of 2019.91  These include both LEU assemblies 
(from reactors that agreed to convert to HEU in the 
past or were designed from the outset to avoid the 
use of HEU) and HEU assemblies; indeed, the majority 
are LEU assemblies.  By not distinguishing between 
HEU and LEU, this metric makes it difﬁcult to discern 
how much of the proliferation threat has been re-
duced, and like the metric for the Russian take-back 
effort, it obscures the issue of how many sites have 
had all of their HEU removed.  As of the end of FY 
2004, the assemblies that had been returned con-
tained approximately 1.2 tons of HEU, some 7% of 
the 17.5 tons of U.S.-supplied HEU abroad when the 
take-back effort restarted in 1996.92  Two-thirds of 
that 17.5 tons is not even covered by the U.S. offer to 
take back U.S.-supplied HEU, though DOE is currently 
considering expanding the offer to cover some or all 
of this material.  Independent studies have indicated 
that unless DOE offers greater incentives for facilities 
to return their HEU to the United States, roughly half 
the material this is covered by the take-back offer is 
not likely to be returned.93 DOE has not yet spelled 
out what additional incentives it may be prepared to 
offer.   
Rate of progress.  During 2004, all of the fresh, 
unirradiated HEU was removed from three Soviet-
supplied sites—Libya, the Czech Republic, and 
Uzbekistan.  Hence, more than a third of all the re-
movals of HEU from Soviet-supplied sites in the past 
15 years occurred during 2004.  With the establish-
ment of GTRI, DOE hopes to further accelerate such 
removals.  DOE has publicly indicated that it plans to 
complete removals of all fresh, unirradiated Soviet-
supplied HEU from countries outside of Russia by the 
end of 2005.94  This very challenging deadline is ex-
tremely unlikely to be achieved.  A variety of groups 
in Ukraine and Belarus appear to be opposed to giv-
ing up the HEU at these countries’ facilities under 
present circumstances—despite studies underway 
that demonstrate that proposed new facilities to use 
these materials at some sites could use LEU instead, 
and despite considerable U.S. efforts to arrange for 
the removal of the HEU at these facilities.95  Studies 
now underway on the feasibility of converting Ka-
zakh research reactors to LEU may help convince 
Kazakhstan that its HEU is not required for future 
90 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 544.
91 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 544.
92 Interview with Argonne National Laboratory expert, February 2005.  For the 17.5 tons ﬁgure, see, for example, U.S. Department 
of Energy, Ofﬁce of the Inspector General, Audit Report: Recovery of Highly Enriched Uranium Provided to Foreign Countries, DOE/IG-
0638 (Washington, D.C.:  2004; available at http://www.ig.doe.gov/pdf/ig-0638.pdf as of 3 March 2005). See also U.S. Government 
Accountability Ofﬁce, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons-Usable Uranium 
from Other Countries to the United States and Russia, GAO-05-57 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2004; available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d0557.pdf as of 2 February 2005).  These ﬁgures on tons of HEU refer to the tons of HEU the fuel contained when it was origi-
nally shipped from the United States; after irradiation, the number of tons of HEU remaining is signiﬁcantly less.
93 U.S. Department of Energy, Audit Report: Recovery of Highly Enriched Uranium Provided to Foreign Countries. See also U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability Ofﬁce, DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons-Usable Uranium.
94 Abraham, “International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna: Remarks Prepared for Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham.”
95 Interviews with DOE ofﬁcials, and personal communication from William Potter, both April 2005.
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research reactor fuel, but removal of the HEU from 
Kazakhstan is not likely to occur by the end of 2005 
either.96  Nevertheless, removals of fresh Soviet-sup-
plied HEU from facilities in several countries are 
planned during 2005.97  Substantial packages of 
positive and negative incentives, pursued at high 
levels with considerable creativity and perseverance, 
are likely to be necessary to achieve the goal of re-
moving all fresh HEU from Soviet-supplied facilities 
within the next few years.
Substantial quantities of irradiated HEU remain in 
each of the three Soviet-supplied countries whose 
fresh HEU was removed in 2004.  But 2004 also saw 
substantial progress in resolving the bureaucratic 
obstacles within Russia that have so far prevented 
shipments of irradiated HEU back to Russia.  The 
ﬁrst shipment of irradiated HEU back to Russia is 
expected by the end of 2005 (although this expecta-
tion may slip, as it has several times before), and after 
that shipment DOE hopes that it will be possible to 
carry out subsequent shipments relatively rapidly.98 
DOE has stated that it plans to return all irradiated 
Soviet-supplied HEU to Russia by 2010.  Achieving 
that objective will require Russia to work quickly 
through the bureaucratic procedures for each ship-
ment, and may require additional transport casks.     
In the U.S. take-back effort, DOE expects to return 
fewer than 400 fuel assemblies to the United States 
in FY 2005.  The U.S. HEU take-back is not expected 
to be completed until 2019, 99 and it remains unclear 
how much of the U.S.-supplied HEU still abroad will 
be returned by then.  DOE expects to convert ﬁve 
additional HEU-fueled reactors in FY 2005 (none 
were converted in FY 2004), 100 but this goal appears 
challenging.  The effort to convert the 105 targeted 
reactors is not expected to be completed until 
2014.101
Improved Securing Metrics for the Future
In essence, there are three goals that programs to im-
prove nuclear security must achieve:
Security must be improved fast enough, so that the 
security improvements get there before thieves 
and terrorists do.
Security must be raised to a high enough level, to 
make sure that the threats terrorists and criminals 
have shown they can pose to such sites can be de-
feated.
Security must be improved in a way that will last, 
including after foreign assistance phases out, so 
that these sites do not become vulnerable again in 
a few years’ time.
There are clearly tensions among these three goals: 
putting in place security systems to defeat larger 
threats, and security systems that will stand the test 
of time, inevitably takes longer than slapping to-
gether less capable and long-lasting systems.  Yet 
meeting all three goals is essential if the objective of 
keeping nuclear weapons and materials out of terror-
ist hands is to be met.  The metrics discussed in this 
section really focus only on the ﬁrst goal, and hence 
are inevitably incomplete.  Moreover, the metrics in 
this section do not reﬂect a great deal of other crucial 
work that is now underway, including an extensive 
training program to provide qualiﬁed personnel for 
all aspects of nuclear material security, control, and 
accounting (including in the key elements of security 
culture); work with Russian regulators to put in place 
an effective regulatory program that will give facility 
managers strong incentives to provide good security; 
investments to ensure that nuclear material is secure 
during transport; new computerized national-level 
•
•
•
96 Interviews with State Department and DOE ofﬁcials, January 2005.
97 Interviews with DOE ofﬁcials, April 2005.
98 Rosatom and its contractors completed the legally required environmental assessment and project plans in late 2004, and submit-
ted them to Russian regulators; as of the spring of 2005, these documents are still being reviewed. The ﬁrst shipment of irradiated 
HEU should be possible to organize within a very few months of the regulators’ approval.  Interviews with DOE ofﬁcials, January and 
April 2005.
99 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 544.
100 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 544.
101 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 544.
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systems for real-time accounting for nuclear war-
heads and materials; programs to improve personnel 
reliability checks for people involved in managing or 
guarding nuclear warheads and materials; and more.
Moreover, even for assessing whether security is im-
proving fast enough, looking only at how many sites, 
or how much material, is equipped with modern se-
curity and accounting equipment tells only part of 
the story.  General Eugene Habiger, former “security 
czar” at DOE’s nuclear weapons complex and former 
commander of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, has said: 
“good security is 20% equipment and 80% culture.”102 
Assessing how well programs are doing in changing 
the crucial “security culture” at these facilities—that is, 
the degree to which all of the personnel at the site are 
trained and motivated to maintain high security at all 
times—is extremely difﬁcult to do, but extremely im-
portant.
Ultimately, a balance of a variety of different measures 
will be needed to get a realistic picture of how much 
nuclear security is improving. For assessing progress 
toward sustainable security over time, plausible met-
rics might include:
The fraction of sites with nuclear security and 
accounting systems that are performing effec-
tively. The best single such measure would be one 
that was performance-based: the fraction of the 
buildings containing warheads or nuclear material 
that had demonstrated, in realistic performance 
tests, the ability to defend against a speciﬁed 
threat.  Unfortunately, for nuclear warheads and 
materials in the former Soviet Union, such data 
does not yet exist (and even less data of this kind 
is available for nuclear stockpiles in much of the 
rest of the world).  Another indicator of effective 
performance—if nuclear regulatory authorities 
have set effective nuclear security rules, and have 
effective inspection approaches in place—would 
be the fraction of facilities that receive high nu-
clear security marks in regulatory inspections.103 
•
An even more ambitious approach would be to at-
tempt to assess the overall risk of theft at each site, 
and then track whether these risks were increasing 
or decreasing, and by how much.  At DOE’s own 
facilities, each facility is required to perform such 
estimates of overall risk, based on the security sys-
tem’s assessed ability to defeat a speciﬁed design 
basis threat, and on the quantity and quality of 
nuclear material at the site.  If recipient countries 
undertook similar approaches (possibly with U.S. 
assistance in doing so), it might be possible to col-
lect at least partial data on whether these overall 
assessments of risk were increasing or decreas-
ing, and how substantially.  Yet another approach 
would be to assess, for each site, performance in 
a broad range of areas important to nuclear secu-
rity and accounting, and then use some form of 
weighting (based on expert judgment) to provide 
an overall performance rating—and then track 
changes in the overall performance rating at dif-
ferent sites.104
The priority the recipient state’s government 
assigns to nuclear security and accounting.  This 
could be assessed by senior leadership attention 
and resources assigned to the effort, along with 
statements of priority, decisions to step up nuclear 
security requirements, and the like.
The presence of stringent material protection, 
control, and accounting (MPC&A) regulations 
that were effectively enforced. The effectiveness 
of regulation of nuclear security and accounting 
could be judged by whether (a) rules have been 
set which, if followed, would result in effective 
nuclear security and accounting programs; and 
(b) approaches have been developed and imple-
mented that successfully convince facilities to 
abide by the rules to a degree sufﬁcient to achieve 
that objective.  This would have to be done by ex-
pert assessment, rather than objective counting of 
a speciﬁc number of regulations written, enforce-
•
•
102 Interview, April 2003.
103 DOE uses this metric to track the performance of its own nuclear security program.  See U.S. Department of Energy, Performance 
and Accountability Report: FY 2004, p. 116.
104 An approach of this kind was developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory some years ago for use in the MPC&A pro-
gram, but was never accepted for broad implementation.
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ment actions taken, and the like, as such measures 
of the quantity of regulatory action are usually 
almost unrelated to the actual effectiveness of 
regulation.105  Surveys of managers and other per-
sonnel at nuclear sites about their experience with 
regulators and inspectors, and with enforcement 
and other approaches to encouraging compliance, 
could also be helpful in assessing the effectiveness 
of regulations.
The fraction of sites with long-term plans in 
place for sustaining their MPC&A systems, and 
resources budgeted to fulﬁll those plans.  DOE’s 
MPC&A program has been contracting with fa-
cilities to develop cost estimates and plans for 
maintaining and operating their nuclear security 
and accounting systems. This metric would as-
sess the fraction of sites that have completed that 
task, and which appear to have a realistic plan for 
funding those costs without international assis-
tance, once international assistance comes to an 
end.  A simple metric along the same lines would 
be the total amount of money a particular country 
(or facility) is investing in nuclear security and ac-
counting, compared with an assessment of overall 
needs.  (Similar estimates could be made for per-
sonnel resources as well as ﬁnancial resources.)
The presence of strong “security cultures.”  Ef-
fective organizational cultures are notoriously 
difﬁcult to assess, but critically important.  Ideally, 
nuclear security culture should be measured by 
actual day-in, day-out behavior—but developing 
effective indicators of day-to-day security perfor-
mance has proved difﬁcult.  Potential measures 
of attitudes that presumably inﬂuence behavior 
include the fraction of security-critical personnel 
who believe there is a genuine threat of nuclear 
theft (both by outsiders and by insiders), who 
understand well what they have to do to achieve 
high levels of security, who believe that it is impor-
•
•
tant that they and everyone else at their site act 
to achieve high levels of security, who understand 
the security rules well, and who believe it is impor-
tant to follow the security rules.  Such attitudes 
could be assessed through surveys, as is often 
done to assess safety culture—though enormous 
care has to be taken in designing the speciﬁcs of 
the approach, to avoid employees simply saying 
what they think they are supposed to say.106
The presence of an effective infrastructure of 
personnel, equipment, organizations, and in-
centives to sustain MPC&A.  Each of these areas 
would likely have to be addressed by expert re-
views, given the difﬁculty of quantiﬁcation. 
In 2001, DOE’s MPC&A program took a ﬁrst cut at 
the complex task of developing appropriate metrics 
to assess the real state of progress toward achiev-
ing sustainable security at these sites for the long 
term.107 The program is now putting a substantial fo-
cus on progress toward strong security cultures and 
long-term sustainability as part of developing a new 
strategic plan.  But there is still more to be done to 
develop performance measures that adequately re-
ﬂect the real state of progress, but are simple enough 
to be useful to policymakers.
TRACKING PROGRESS:  
INTERDICTING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING
Key developments related to interdicting nuclear 
smuggling in the year since our previous report in-
cluded:
Building on the publicized cooperative intercep-
tion of a shipment of centrifuge parts to Libya that 
helped expose the proliferation network of Paki-
stan’s Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI) took several more important steps 
•
•
105 Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving Problems, and Managing Compliance.
106 For a brief discussion of such safety culture surveys, see International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Culture in Nuclear Installations:
Guidance for Use in the Enhancement of Safety Culture, IAEA-TECDOC-1329 (Vienna: IAEA, 2002; available at http://www-pub.iaea.
org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1329_web.pdf as of 28 March 2005).
107 U.S. Department of Energy, MPC&A Program Strategic Plan (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2001; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/
ofﬁcial_docs/doe/mpca2001.pdf as of 7 March 2005), pp. 26-28. 
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forward.  On top of a February 2004 agreement 
with Liberia, the United States added ship-boarding 
agreements with two other countries commonly 
used by shippers as ﬂags of convenience, Panama 
(May 2004) and the Marshall Islands (August 2004). 
The agreements allow the United States, or a PSI 
partner-state through the United States, to quickly 
request permission from these countries to stop 
and search suspect shipments.  PSI nations collabo-
rated in several exercises to practice and improve 
interdiction capabilities at sea, in the air, and over 
land.  Sixty countries have expressed their formal 
diplomatic support for the Initiative and have partic-
ipated in some way in PSI activities.108  In early 2005, 
UN Secretary-General Koﬁ Annan said “I applaud 
the efforts of the Proliferation Security Initiative to 
ﬁll a gap in our defenses,” reﬂecting the growing in-
ternational support for the effort.109
By early 2005, U.S. ofﬁcials testiﬁed that all inter-
national mail entry points in the United States 
had equipment to detect nuclear and radiological 
materials in place, along with most of the major 
crossings on the U.S.-Canada border.  In the FY 
2006 budget request released in February 2005, 
the Bush administration asked for $227 million for 
a new Domestic Nuclear Detection Ofﬁce (DNDO) 
in the Department of Homeland Security, to con-
solidate efforts focused on nuclear detection at 
U.S. borders and within the country.110
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 included a le-
gal obligation for every UN member state to put 
•
•
in place “appropriate effective border controls and 
law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent 
and combat” illicit trafﬁcking in nuclear mate-
rial and other items related to weapons of mass 
destruction, along with effective controls on trans-
shipment of such items through each country.111 
As in the case of nuclear security, however, no 
government or international organization has yet 
outlined speciﬁcally what the essential elements 
of an effective border control system to prevent 
such illicit trafﬁcking are, or launched a major ef-
fort to help states implement this portion of the 
resolution.
As part of the Megaports Initiative, the United 
States signed new agreements with Sri Lanka (Co-
lombo), Belgium (Antwerp), Spain (Algeciras), the 
Bahamas (Freeport), and Singapore to install nu-
clear material detection equipment at major ports 
to inspect containers being shipped to the United 
States.112
A 2005 Government Accountability Ofﬁce report 
concluded that any overlap in the provision of 
radiation detection equipment that GAO aired 
in a 2002 report had largely been resolved by a 
new arrangement that  made the Department of 
Energy’s Second Line of Defense program primar-
ily responsible for portal monitor installation and 
maintenance.  The report nevertheless expressed 
concern that there was still no government-wide 
strategic plan delineating the roles or responsi-
bilities of the various agencies working to interdict 
•
•
108 See U.S. Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, no date; available at 
http://www.state.gov/t/np/c10390.htm as of 1 March 2005).
109 Koﬁ Annan, “A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism: Keynote Address to the Closing Plenary” in International Summit on 
Democracy, Terrorism and Security (Madrid: Club de Madrid, 10 March 2005; available at http://english.safe-democracy.org/keynotes/
a-global-strategy-for-ﬁghting-terrorism.html as of 10 March 2005).
110 On radiation portal monitors, see Committee on Appropriations, Homeland Security Subcommittee, Chairman Holds a Hearing on 
Fiscal Year 2006 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs En-
forcement Appropriations - Committee Hearing, United States Senate, 109th Congress, 1st Session (2 March 2005). On the DNDO, see 
Committee on Science, U.S. Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert (R-NY) Holds Hearing on Fiscal Year 2006 Federal Research and Develop-
ment Budget - Committee Hearing, United States House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 1st Session (16 February 2005).
111 United Security Council Resolution 1540 can be found at United Nations, “1540 Committee.”
112 “Nuclear Snoopers to Protect Algeciras,” Lloyd’s List (23 December 2004); “U.S. And Belgian Governments Launch Initiative to De-
tect Illicit Trafﬁcking of Nuclear Material” (Brussels, Belgium: U.S. Newswire, 24 November 2004); Neelam Mathews, “Sri Lankan Port 
to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment,” Homeland Security & Defense (1 September 2004); Brian Reyes, “Bahamas Signs US Anti-
Nuclear Treaty,” Lloyd’s List, 20 January 2005; David Boey, “Radiation Detectors for Singapore Port,” Straits Times, 11 March 2005. 
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nuclear smuggling, and that interagency coordi-
nation and oversight was still lacking.113
Developing metrics for the goal of interdicting 
nuclear smuggling is difﬁcult, as many different ele-
ments are essential to accomplishing the overall goal. 
These include, among other steps, providing ade-
quate capabilities to detect nuclear materials being 
smuggled across borders; establishing appropriate 
police and intelligence units in the relevant countries 
that are trained and equipped to deal with nuclear 
smuggling cases; creating stronger legal infrastruc-
tures so that nuclear thieves and smugglers face a 
greater chance of a larger punishment; expanding 
international intelligence and police cooperation 
focused on ﬁnding and arresting those involved in 
nuclear smuggling; and carrying out stings and other 
operations designed to break up nuclear smuggling 
rings and make it more difﬁcult for thieves and buy-
ers to reliably connect with each other.114
Two steps that are necessary but not sufﬁcient to ac-
complishing the goal are to ensure that:
at least the most critical border crossings in the 
key source and transit states for nuclear material 
have personnel trained, and equipment designed, 
to detect smuggled nuclear materials; and
•
major ports and other locations shipping cargo to 
the United States, and major ports and other entry 
points into the United States, are equipped to be 
able to detect smuggled nuclear weapons or ma-
terials.
Measuring progress in these two areas provides a 
rough guide as to how much of at least the initial 
steps in addressing nuclear smuggling has been ac-
complished (see Figure 3-3).
Interdicting Metric 1: Key Border Posts Trained 
and Equipped to Detect Nuclear Smuggling
Fraction accomplished.  Understanding how many 
sites should be considered high priorities for installing 
nuclear detection equipment is itself a difﬁcult task. 
Originally, DOE’s Second Line of Defense program tar-
geted nearly 60 border crossings in Russia alone. The 
Departments of Defense and State were providing 
funding for installation of similar equipment in other 
countries judged to be key source or transit states 
for nuclear smuggling.115 When the Second Line of 
Defense effort expanded geographically, and went 
further down the priority list, they concluded that 
393 sites in Russia and 21 nearby countries would ul-
timately require installation of equipment to detect 
nuclear smuggling; as DOE reﬁned its threat assess-
ment and plans, that ﬁgure was later reduced to 293, 
•
113 U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration.  For the 2002 report, see U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability Ofﬁce, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Assistance Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need 
Strengthened Coordination and Planning, GAO-02-426 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2002; available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d02426.pdf as of 1 March 2005).
114 For a discussion, see, for example, Anthony Wier, “Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: 
Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2002; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/interdicting/index.asp as of 1 
March 2005).
115 U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, U.S. Assistance Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened 
Coordination and Planning, p. 6.
Figure 3-3 
How Much Interdicting Work Have U.S.-Funded Programs Completed?
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and then increased back to 330.116  By the end of FY 
2004, DOE had completed providing equipment and 
training for 64 “core” Second Line of Defense program 
sites (excluding two megaports, which are noted 
below).117  DOE has also taken over maintenance 
of equipment installed in State Department-spon-
sored efforts at an unknown number of sites in 22 
countries.  The Department of Defense’s Interna-
tional Counterproliferation Program and Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative 
are also providing equipment to improve prolifera-
tion controls at borders at an unknown number of 
sites in Uzbekistan and Ukraine, in cooperation with 
DOE’s Second Line of Defense.118  All told, it appears 
likely that the fraction of the identiﬁed set of priority 
border crossings that have been provided with ap-
propriate equipment and trained personnel is in the 
range of 25%.119  
Rate of progress.  In most cases, U.S. nuclear smug-
gling interdiction programs generally have had 
excellent cooperation with recipient states, though 
DOE reported that during FY 2004, Second Line of 
Defense work was delayed by difﬁculties reaching 
implementing agreements with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
and Slovenia.  DOE’s Second Line of Defense pro-
gram had intended to complete 32 sites in FY 2004, 
a substantial increase in pace over the 19 installed 
the previous year.  By the end of FY 2004, however, 
DOE only managed to install equipment at 25 bor-
der crossing sites (20 in Russia, 1 in Lithuania, and 4 
in Greece).120  DOE expects to complete installation at 
the 330 currently targeted sites by 2012.121  It appears 
that the State Department is no longer separately 
installing radiation portal monitors at borders, and 
that the number of sites where installation will be 
funded by DOD will be small compared to the num-
ber of sites the DOE program plans to cover.  
As with securing weapons or materials, just because 
a site has U.S.-provided equipment and training 
does not mean that it is necessarily invulnerable to 
nuclear smuggling.  Equipment must be maintained 
and used effectively, and border ofﬁcials must be 
honest and alert, for illicit nuclear shipments to be 
stopped.  In many countries, for example, corrup-
tion among customs ofﬁcials is widespread (though 
many nuclear detector installations attempt to 
address this problem, for example by having the sen-
sors give their readings not only to an on-site ofﬁcial 
who might be easily bribed, but to a central station 
as well).
It is also important to remember that just because a site 
does not yet have U.S.-supplied equipment and train-
ing does not necessarily mean it has no equipment 
and training.  A number of countries around the world 
are initiating nuclear smuggling interdiction efforts of 
116 This ﬁgure represents the total set of sites that are to be equipped with radiation detection equipment—though there are some 
additional border crossings in these key countries that are not included.  Interviews with DOE ofﬁcials, February 2003, and data 
provided by DOE, April 2005.  The ﬁrst ﬁgure (393) is from U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2004 Congressional Budget Request: National 
Nuclear Security Administration—Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2003; available at http://www.cfo.doe.
gov/budget/04budget/content/defnn/nn.pdf as of 1 March 2005), p. 658.  The second (293) is from U.S. Department of Energy, FY 
2005 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security Administration—Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.  The most recent re-
vision is from U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 485. The recent revisions do not 
specify the number of countries where these sites exist.
117 U.S. Department of Energy, Performance and Accountability Report: FY 2004, p. 137.
118 For the International Counterproliferation program in Uzbekistan, see Strategic Plan for Nonproliferation Export Control and Re-
lated Border Security Assistance in Eurasia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, unpublished, 2003).  For the Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI) programs in Ukraine and Uzbekistan, see U.S. Department of Defense, 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006, pp. 60-62.  The CTR Annual Report mentions ten locations 
receiving assistance in Uzbekistan and three in Ukraine from WMD-PPI.  DOD will not install any portal monitors in Ukraine (leaving 
that to DOE), and any portal monitors installed in Uzbekistan will be maintained by DOE beginning in FY 2006.  Data provided by 
DOE, April 2005.
 119 This estimate assumes that the 330 ﬁgure represents a good estimate of the total number of sites to be covered by all agencies, 
not just the number to be covered by DOE.
120 U.S. Department of Energy, Performance and Accountability Report: FY 2004, p. 137.
121 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request.
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their own, and donors other than the United States are 
funding at least limited assistance programs.
Interdicting Metric 2: Major Ports Shipping 
to the United States Trained and Equipped to 
Detect Nuclear Smuggling
Fraction accomplished.  The United States, in the af-
termath of the September 11 attacks, has attempted 
to “push the borders out” with programs designed to 
make sure that cargo is examined appropriately be-
fore it ever reaches U.S. shores.122  This is particularly 
important in the case of possible smuggling of a 
crude nuclear bomb: inspections after the ship hold-
ing the bomb has already arrived at the port in New 
York or Los Angeles or other U.S. cities could be too 
late, with the bomb detonating before the inspection 
occurred and causing horrifying damage.  Hence, the 
U.S. government has launched a “Megaports Initia-
tive,” in support of the broader “Container Security 
Initiative,” to equip with radiation detection equip-
ment those ports that generate particularly large 
volumes of shipping headed for the United States or 
that DOE believes might otherwise be particularly at-
tractive for nuclear smugglers (the current DOE target 
is 24 ports).123  In 2004, DOE completed installation of 
radiation detection equipment at the ﬁrst two ports: 
Rotterdam in the Netherlands and Piraeus in Greece, 
representing some 8% of the total number of mega-
ports planned to be covered.124
Rate of progress. DOE expected to have nuclear 
detection at 3 of the 24 megaports targeted opera-
tional by the end of FY 2004, but it was only able to 
complete installation at 2 ports.  DOE explained that 
commitments by foreign governments to speciﬁc 
agreements to complete the work were taking longer 
than anticipated, though implementing agreements 
have now been signed to work with ﬁve other ports: 
Colombo (Sri Lanka), Antwerp (Belgium), Algeciras 
(Spain), Freeport (Bahamas), and Singapore.125  DOE 
now expects to complete installations at another 
three ports in FY 2005, and ﬁve more in FY 2006, 
bringing the total by that date to ten ports.  Barring 
any expansion of the number of targeted sites, DOE 
anticipates completing radiation detection equip-
ment installations at the 24 targeted ports by 2012.126
Of course, there are far more than 24 ports that ship 
cargo to the United States, and some of these other 
sites may also pose signiﬁcant risks.  Radiation detec-
tion equipment and procedures are not invisible, and 
intelligent smugglers can be expected to take note 
of which sites are and are not searching most cargo 
for radiation.  As before, sites with such equipment 
and training provided are also not necessarily proof 
against nuclear smuggling.  And again, sites without 
U.S.-funded equipment and training may well have at 
least a modest level of equipment and training already 
available (for example hand-held detectors that can be 
used in searching a container identiﬁed as suspicious 
for other reasons).  Ultimately, a full system of container 
security is needed, from where the containers are ﬁrst 
loaded to when they reach customers in the United 
States—and even with such a system in place, there 
are many other pathways into the United States that 
may be even more difﬁcult to address (as evidenced 
by the thousands of illegal aliens and thousands of 
tons of illegal drugs that cross U.S. borders every year).
Improved Interdicting Metrics for the Future
As noted above, interdicting nuclear smuggling re-
quires a broad complex of activities, many of which 
122 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, A National Cargo Security Strategy White Paper, Draft Version 1.8 (Washington, D.C.: DHS, 
2004; available at http://www.homelandsecurity.org/bulletin%2FImagesJC%2FDHS%20Conference%20Dec%202004/National_
Cargo_Security_Strategy_White_Paper.pdf as of 1 March 2005).
123 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 490.
124 U.S. Department of Energy, Performance and Accountability Report: FY 2004.  
125 U.S. Department of Energy, Performance and Accountability Report: FY 2004; “U.S. And Bahamian Governments to Cooperate on 
Detecting Illicit Shipments of Nuclear Material - Bahamas to Become First Caribbean Country to Use Detection Equipment” (Nas-
sau, Bahamas: U.S. Department of Energy, 11 January 2005; available at http://www.energy.gov as of 15 April 2005); Mathews, “Sri 
Lankan Port to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment”; “U.S. And Belgian Governments Launch Initiative to Detect Illicit Trafﬁcking 
of Nuclear Material”; “Nuclear Snoopers to Protect Algeciras,” Lloyd’s List; Boey, “Radiation Detectors for Singapore Port.” 
126 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 485.
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are not included in a metric focused on the fraction 
of key border sites trained and equipped to detect 
nuclear contraband.  In particular, ofﬁcial border 
crossings are only a tiny fraction of the thousands of 
miles of border across which nuclear material might 
be smuggled, and many seizures of stolen nuclear 
material have occurred within countries, not at bor-
ders, as a result of effective police and intelligence 
work.  Neither of these factors is captured in these 
metrics.  (U.S. programs do in some cases provide mo-
bile detection equipment and training with national 
applicability.)
Hence, we believe the U.S. government should also 
track measures including both the fraction of coun-
tries considered key source or transit countries that 
have at least one unit of the national police trained 
and equipped to deal with nuclear smuggling cases 
(and which have informed the rest of the nation’s 
law enforcement personnel about how to involve 
that unit when such a case arises), and the fraction 
of those key source or transit countries that have es-
tablished in-depth intelligence and law enforcement 
sharing on nuclear smuggling with the United States, 
with each other, and/or with international agencies. 
As with securing nuclear stockpiles, measures of 
actual effectiveness would be even more telling indi-
cators of how much real progress had been made.  In 
the United States, for example, security at airports is 
often checked by government testers attempting to 
smuggle knives, guns, or explosives through security 
checkpoints.  One could imagine contracting for tes-
ters to attempt to smuggle nuclear material through 
border crossings that had been equipped with radia-
tion detectors, and tracking the percentage of the 
time they were detected as one measure of prog-
ress.  At the national level, an interesting measure of 
effectiveness to track would be the percentage of 
nuclear or radiological smuggling cases in which all 
the conspirators were identiﬁed and brought to jus-
tice , though these cases, fortunately, are rare enough 
in any particular country that this percentage might 
vary randomly a great deal.
In a related vein of attempting to track overall effec-
tiveness at the national level, the State Department’s 
Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) As-
sistance program, beginning in FY 2003, has worked 
with the University of Georgia’s Center for Interna-
tional Trade and Security, a research group known 
for its focus on national export controls, to assess 
annually the export control systems of each govern-
ment receiving assistance from the EXBS program.127 
By the end of FY 2004, this exercise had judged that 
the export control systems in Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic met “international standards,” al-
lowing those countries to “graduate” from the State 
Department export assistance program.  By the end 
of FY 2005, the State Department expects that the ex-
port control systems of two more countries will reach 
the international level.  Two more are expected to 
do so by the close of FY 2006.128  DOE’s International 
Nonproliferation Export Control Program, whose ex-
port control assistance complements the EXBS effort, 
also prepares assessments of national export control 
capabilities.  
Given the many dimensions of an effective national 
export control system, these assessments are neces-
sarily complex, and appear to focus primarily on the 
degree to which various elements judged to be es-
sential to an effective overall system are present.129  It 
is unlikely that the data or the resources have been 
available to perform realistic evaluations of on-the-
ground effectiveness (for example, how often, when 
an exporter is approached about an export that 
would require a license or would be forbidden to 
export, the exporter is aware of the rules and abides 
by them, or how often illicit exports are successfully 
127 U.S. Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, “Department of State and International Assistance Programs,” in Budget of the United States 
Government: Fiscal Year 2006—Program Assessment Rating Tool (Washington, D.C.: OMB, 2005; available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pma/state.pdf as of 1 March 2005), pp. 116-125.
128 U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, “Strategic Goal 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction,” p. 106.
129 For a discussion of an early version of the University of Georgia’s approach to evaluating export control systems, see Gary Bertsch 
and Michael Beck, Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Global Evaluation (Athens, Georgia: Center for International Trade and Secu-
rity, The University of Georgia, 2000; available at http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/html/nat_eval_execsumm.htm as of 7 March 
2005).
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stopped).  Nevertheless, putting together such an 
overall assessment of national systems is a commend-
able step forward compared to simply counting the 
number of sites where particular types of equipment 
is deployed.
Systems to block nuclear smuggling are focused on 
the enforcement subset of the overall export con-
trol system.  Blocking nuclear smuggling focuses 
more on catching activity the perpetrators know is 
illegal than on making sure that legal exporters un-
derstand the rules and constraints under which they 
must operate.  Similar national assessments of coun-
tries’ ability to effectively enforce export control laws, 
particularly including the ability to interdict nuclear 
smuggling, should be an integral component of future 
assessments of national export control systems. Widely 
publicizing the full results of each year’s assessment 
might not be appropriate because it might highlight 
speciﬁc, exploitable deﬁciencies in particular coun-
tries’ systems, but  releasing summary evaluations of 
the performance of countries’ efforts to stop nuclear 
smuggling systems should not pose any signiﬁcant 
risk.  At an absolute minimum, relevant policymakers 
in the executive and legislative branches should have 
access to the assessments, and, as a management tool, 
should examine links between countries’ year-to-year 
performance on the assessment and the resources 
spent in those countries.
TRACKING PROGRESS: STABILIZING  
EMPLOYMENT FOR NUCLEAR PERSONNEL
Key developments in this area in the past year in-
cluded:
The Russian government decided to cut off federal 
subsidies for the administrative budgets of Rus-
sia’s closed nuclear cities beginning in 2006.  The 
•
move sparked protests by residents and munici-
pal workers in some of the closed cities, including 
Snezhinsk, home of one of Russia’s two principal 
nuclear weapons design laboratories, and Seversk, 
home of another large plutonium and HEU process-
ing site.  At Zheleznogorsk, a closed city housing a 
major plutonium production site, the federal sub-
sidies that will be ended amount to 60 percent of 
the city’s 1.8 billion ruble budget.  Zheleznogorsk’s 
mayor warned that “we have no idea at all how 
the budget will be ﬁlled…  A starving operator of 
a nuclear power unit is more dangerous than any 
terrorist.”130  Unless new policies are put in place to 
effectively replace the subsidies in a timely way, the 
move will certainly increase the challenges faced 
by programs working to stabilize the economic 
situation of experts housed in these cities.
The United States continued efforts to work with 
former WMD scientists in Iraq and Libya, out of fear 
that scientists might be recruited by other prolifer-
ating states or non-state groups.131  Both DOE and 
the State Department contributed to efforts to redi-
rect former weapons scientists to beneﬁcial civilian 
work and, particularly in Iraq, to provide a minimum 
level of subsistence to scientists who might other-
wise be tempted to sell their knowledge to other 
parties.  To reﬂect the program’s wider scope, DOE 
changed the name of its main weapons person-
nel redirection effort from the Russian Transition 
Initiatives—which housed both the Nuclear Cities 
Initiative (NCI) and the Initiatives for Proliferation 
Prevention (IPP) program—to the Global Initiatives 
for Proliferation Prevention.  The administration has 
estimated that in Iraq some 500 scientists and an 
additional number of skilled technicians with some 
WMD-related knowledge are worthy of assistance, 
while the administration is targeting assistance at 
about 150 key personnel and 1,500 support per-
sonnel in Libya.132  These efforts appear to have got 
•
130 “Protest Picket in Snezhinsk (Russian),” trans. A. Deyanov, Department of Energy, UralPressInform, 22 December 2004.
131 Paul Kerr, “Did Iraqi Materials, Experts Escape?” Arms Control Today (November 2004; available at http://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2004_11/Iraqi_Materials.asp as of 3 March 2005); Mark Trevelyan, “German Spy Chief Sounds Alarm on Iraq WMD Experts,” Re-
uters News, 7 October 2004.
132 State Department estimates are in U.S. Department of State, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Justiﬁcation for Foreign Operations 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2005; available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/42245.pdf as of 3 
March 2005), pp. 136-137.  DOE also discusses its cooperation in U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Budget Request, pp. 450,472.
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off to a delayed start, and the efforts in Iraq have 
struggled with security concerns for participants 
and program ofﬁcials.133
In Russia, despite the September 2003 expiration 
of the U.S.-Russian Nuclear Cities Initiative imple-
menting agreement, DOE continued to carry out 
NCI projects through the International Science 
and Technology Centers (ISTC) in Moscow and 
the Ukraine or the Civilian Research and Devel-
opment Foundation (CRDF).  The Nuclear Cities 
Initiative is planning to largely phase out its assis-
tance for projects in Sarov and Snezhinsk and shift 
attention to Seversk and Zheleznogorsk, particu-
larly to help the transition of these cities as the 
United States works to shutdown the plutonium 
production reactors in Seversk and Zheleznogo-
rsk.134  Estimates suggest that some 6,000 workers 
could be made excess through the shutdown of 
the ﬁnal plutonium production reactors and their 
associated reprocessing infrastructure.135
Programs focused on redirecting Russian nuclear 
and other WMD scientists received expanded 
support from others in the G8 Global Partner-
ship, including Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
the European Union.  Canada formally joined the 
governing board of the International Science and 
Technology Centers in Moscow and Ukraine; the 
United Kingdom, meanwhile, focused projects on 
the closed nuclear city of Seversk.136
As we have discussed in previous reports, develop-
ing metrics for assessing how much has been done 
•
•
to stabilize the personnel with access to nuclear 
weapons, materials, and expertise is complicated by 
the wide range of different conceptions of the threat 
such programs are designed to address, and there-
fore the speciﬁcs of the job to be done.137  Boiled 
down to their essence, there are four conceptions of 
the threat to be addressed: 
leakage of nuclear expertise and technologies by 
nuclear scientists, particularly by the estimated 
2,000-3,000 individuals from the former Soviet 
Union who could design a bomb or make a major 
contribution to doing so, and the roughly 10,000-
15,000 who have at least some knowledge that 
could be critical to the nuclear weapons program 
of a hostile state or terrorist group;138
nuclear theft or collaboration with attackers by 
the larger number of individuals at weapons and 
civilian nuclear facilities who have access to nu-
clear  weapons or materials, including guards at 
such facilities; 
decisions to leak nuclear technology or expertise 
by the facilities themselves; and
reconstruction of a Cold War–scale nuclear threat, 
by the return of large production facilities to mass 
production of nuclear weapons.139
Developing metrics in this area is particularly difﬁ-
cult given that there is little agreement on which of 
these four dangers is the most important to address. 
Indeed, the relation of these dangers may differ from 
•
•
•
•
133 Joseph B. Verrengia, “U.S. Squirrel Expert Is Unlikely Patron in Iraq, Paying Ex-Weapons Scientists to Resist Temptation,” Associated 
Press Newswires, 8 January 2005; Michael Roston, “Redirection of WMD Scientists in Iraq and Libya: A Status Report,” RANSAC Policy 
Update (April 2004; available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/npp/ransac_iraqlibya_scientists.pdf as of 3 March 2005); 
Richard Stone, “Coalition Throws 11th-Hour Lifeline to Iraqi Weaponeers,” Science 304, no. 5679 (2004).
134 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, pp. 493-497.
135 Oleg Bukharin, Russia’s Nuclear Complex: Surviving the End of the Cold War (Princeton, N.J.: Program on Science and Global Se-
curity, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, May 2004; available at http://www.ransac.
org/PDFFrameset.asp?PDF=bukharinminatomsurvivalmay2004.pdf as of 8 March 2005), p. 14.  DOE estimates even higher job loss-
es, in the range of 10,000 to 18,000, from the shutdown of these three reactors.  Data provided by DOE, April 2005.
136 G8 Senior Group, “Annex: G8 Consolidated Report of Global Partnership Projects” (Sea Island, Georgia, United States: G8 Summit, 
2004; available at http://www.g8usa.gov/pdfs/GPConsolidatedReportofGPProjectsJune2004.pdf as of 25 February 2005).
137 Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, pp. 75-78; Bunn, Wier, and Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Ma-
terials: A Report Card and Action Plan, pp. 64-72.
138 Estimates provided by Oleg Bukharin, Princeton University, personal communication, March 2004.
139 See a longer discussion on this topic in Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, pp. 65-67.
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one situation to another.  Addressing the problem 
of intellectual proliferation in the vast nuclear com-
plex left to the former Soviet states, after a decade 
of economic transition and government-to-govern-
ment collaboration, is certainly a different task than 
targeting the relatively limited number of scientists 
with critical proliferation knowledge who are trying 
to adjust to a dangerous, uncertain future in post-
Saddam Iraq.140  
Russia is a very different country than it was in the 
early to mid-1990s, when programs like ISTC and IPP 
were ﬁrst established.  Initially, the idea was to fund 
useful civilian research with short-term grants to keep 
key weapons scientists from becoming desperate 
enough to sell their knowledge before the Russian 
economy recovered.  Although it took some time for 
key programs such as the ISTC to get up and running 
on a large scale, they played a critical role for many 
nuclear facilities and scientists.  For example, even be-
fore the worst of the 1998 Russian ﬁnancial crisis, ISTC 
funding was covering at least a quarter of the salary 
funds available at the nuclear weapons design insti-
tute in the closed nuclear city of Sarov.141  
After several years of Russian government surpluses 
driven by high oil prices, and a stabilizing economy, 
nuclear scientists and technicians—at least those 
who are still working in their institutes—appear to be 
doing better ﬁnancially.  Nuclear workers in Sarov, for 
instance, now appear to be earning wages well above 
the Russian average.142  (Nevertheless, a 2002 survey 
of Russian scientists, most of whom had received ISTC 
assistance, did ﬁnd that their average income from 
grants nearly equaled the income from their regular 
salary.143)  The remaining dangers appear to be less 
from desperate scientists still in place who would be 
willing to provide sustained help to another state 
trying set up a complete nuclear weapons program, 
and more from those scientists, technicians, and se-
curity personnel who have lost their jobs or see they 
are about to, who still might have access to nuclear 
material, and who might provide assistance to a state 
or non-state group trying to acquire a single bomb.144 
(Of course, the international proliferation network 
led by Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan, who had a very comfort-
able lifestyle and was nationally revered, shows that 
there may always be those who are not desperate 
but would still seize opportunities for greater wealth 
through illicit collaboration.)  
These changed circumstances require a rethinking 
of approaches to these programs, and this is taking 
place.  Overall, in the former Soviet Union there is an 
increasing shift away from short-term grants to tide 
individuals over until better times, toward efforts to 
build sustainable commercial employment for for-
mer nuclear weapons scientists and workers.  Yet the 
creation of sustainable commercial jobs remains a 
difﬁcult and slow enterprise, particularly in locations 
as remote, and with as little experience competing 
in the global economy, as Russia’s closed nuclear cit-
ies.  At the same time, relatively short-term grants 
supporting useful scientiﬁc investigation can be an 
important tool to keep former Soviet scientists con-
nected to Western scientists and scientiﬁc activity, 
and to open up facilities to Western access and inter-
action.  Indeed, such relationships may well help to 
reduce the willingness of former Soviet scientists to 
collaboration with proliferation-sensitive states or 
non-state groups for reasons other than the mon-
etary value of the assistance.145
140 The original philosophy in coping with Russia, namely, tiding over scientists to stave off desperation, has largely driven the open-
ing phase of interaction with Iraqi former WMD scientists; see U.S. Department of State, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Justiﬁcation for 
Foreign Operations, p. 136.
141 Bukharin, Surviving the End of the Cold War, p. 18.
142 Bukharin, Surviving the End of the Cold War, p. 19.
143 Deborah Yarsike Ball and Theodore P. Gerber, “A Survey of Russian Scientists: Will They Go Rogue or Can Western Assistance Help 
Keep Them Home?” International Security  (forthcoming).
144 Laura S. H. Holgate, “New Approaches to Managing Nuclear Expertise” (paper presented at the 4th International Working Group 
Meeting, Brussels, Belgium, September 2004).
145 Ball and Gerber, “A Survey of Russian Scientists.”  The authors suggest this may be the case because they ﬁnd that attitudes among 
Russian nuclear, chemical, and biological scientists about collaborating with foreign authoritarian regimes differ depending on 
whether the scientists have received foreign grant assistance or merely Russian grant assistance—foreign grant recipients are less 
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In the discussion below, we will focus on three simple 
measures: the fraction of the key nuclear weapon sci-
entists who received short-term grants to tide them 
over the worst times; the fraction of excess nuclear 
weapon scientists and workers provided with sus-
tainable civilian employment for the long haul; and 
the fraction of Russia’s nuclear weapons infrastruc-
ture eliminated.  (Our measures continue to focus 
exclusively on Russia, as the new programs focused 
on Iraq and Libya are still at such early stages that 
it is too early to begin to assess, with the informa-
tion that has been made public, what fraction of the 
nuclear scientists from those countries those efforts 
are successfully engaging.)  Here, as elsewhere, it is 
important to try to distinguish between what U.S.-
funded programs can take credit for, and what has 
been accomplished through Russia’s own efforts or 
those of others.
Stabilizing Metric 1: Key Nuclear Weapons 
Scientists Given Short-Term Grants
Fraction accomplished.  Because there is no accepted 
list of the former Soviet scientists and engineers 
with the most proliferation-sensitive knowledge, 
there is no data publicly available concerning how 
many of that group have received grant assistance. 
From the anecdotal information that is available, as 
we have discussed in our previous reports, it seems 
likely that in the nuclear sector at least, ISTC, IPP, or 
similar projects have provided grants to a very large 
fraction—perhaps 80% or more—of those nuclear 
scientists and technicians most in need and seeking 
assistance (see Figure 3-4).146  Our estimate this year 
is the same, as the programs focused on short-term 
grants are focusing less on expanding their reach to 
additional individuals than on helping grant recipi-
ents make the transition to long-term sustainability.
Such anecdotal evidence is backed up by a 2002 survey 
of Russian nuclear, chemical, and biological scientists 
that found that fewer than 20% of those scientists who 
had sought Western grant assistance had failed to re-
ceive any.147  These percentages are likely even lower 
for the nuclear ﬁeld, as the study’s authors were un-
able to include scientists at nuclear weapons research 
institutes—which have been heavily targeted by ISTC, 
IPP, and DOE’s Nuclear Cities Initiative—and because 
the survey’s results had been calibrated to reduce the 
over-representation of nuclear scientists, the ﬁeld re-
ceiving the most foreign attention thus far.  (Despite a 
heightened focus by U.S. programs in the last several 
years, the fraction reached by grant assistance is likely 
less in the chemical and, especially, biological areas, 
likely than Russian grant recipients to say that they would be willing to work for an authoritarian regime on weapons-related work. 
The authors suggest, therefore, that it is not merely the short-term cash support that reduces desperation and subsequent willing-
ness to work for a foreign weapons program.  They also point out that there is a difference in attitudes between those who have 
received foreign grant assistance, and those who applied for such assistance but were rejected, suggesting that it is not just those 
who would be inclined to seek foreign assistance who would also be more inclined to reject collaboration with foreign authoritar-
ian regimes.
146 Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, p. 68; Bunn, Wier, and Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: 
A Report Card and Action Plan, pp. 74-77.
147 There were also nearly 40% of the scientists surveyed who had never sought such assistance; see Ball and Gerber, “A Survey of 
Russian Scientists.”
Figure 3-4 
How Much Stabilizing Work Have U.S.-Funded Programs Completed?
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where security sensitivities still remain high.  For in-
stance, some key biological facilities have yet to open 
to foreign assistance programs, meaning scientists 
who still work at these facilities have not been eligible 
to participate in programs such as ISTC.)  
Positive results on this metric do not necessarily 
mean that the underlying problem has been mostly 
resolved.  For instance, if grant assistance and 
foreign engagement does in fact affect scientists’ at-
titudes towards working with other regimes, it is not 
clear whether that shift is permanent, or whether at-
titudes might revert to pre-engagement levels once 
opportunities for foreign collaboration dry up.  Also, 
those nuclear weapons experts who have already 
retired or who left their facilities for civilian jobs 
that have since disappeared are not readily cap-
tured by this metric, because current programs offer 
no formal mechanism for scientists unconnected 
with institutes to seek assistance.  These catego-
ries of experts could continue to pose a risk, as they 
likely retain much of the earlier nuclear weapons 
knowledge they acquired.  Finally, scientists and per-
sonnel at facilities that remain completely off-limits 
to foreigners—including Russia’s remaining nuclear 
weapons assembly and disassembly facilities—are 
not generally eligible for grant assistance, because 
the U.S. government requires the ability to access 
and at least partially audit the facility where the re-
cipients work.  
Instead of our measure of the percentage of scien-
tists addressed, the State Department and DOE use 
comparable, absolute performance measures listing 
the number of former Soviet weapons scientists, en-
gineers, and technicians, or their institutes, “engaged” 
by their programs.148  Their measures do not indicate 
how many scientists or institutes are targeted for en-
gagement, so it is not possible to see how much of 
the problem the government itself believes is still 
not solved.  In the case of the annual metric of indi-
viduals engaged, it is also not clear how the results 
reported count those scientists receiving a second or 
third round of grant assistance, or who are involved 
in multi-year grants.
Rate of progress.  On this metric (if not on others) 
the effort in the nuclear sector has more or less sta-
bilized, though U.S. programs have identiﬁed no clear 
target for ending grant assistance.  As noted above, 
it is not clear how many, if any, key former Soviet nu-
clear scientists have not yet been reached by foreign 
grant assistance, with the exception of those at the 
warhead assembly/disassembly facilities.  Regardless, 
the focus in recent years has been shifting towards 
transitioning scientists and their institutes to more 
sustainable positions.
Stabilizing Metric 2: Excess Nuclear Weapon 
Scientists and Workers Provided Sustainable 
Civilian Work
Fraction accomplished.  Total employment at the 
large nuclear facilities in Russia’s ten closed nuclear cit-
ies is estimated to be in the range of 120,000-130,000 
people, of whom approximately 75,000 (as of 2000) 
were employed directly in nuclear weapons-related 
work.149  In 1998, Russia’s Atomic Energy Ministry (now 
the federal agency Rosatom) announced that it was 
planning to shrink the number of defense employees 
148 DOE’s Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (formerly the Russian Transition Initiatives) reports that over 8,000 scientists 
were engaged by the program in FY 2004; see U.S. Department of Energy, Performance and Accountability Report: FY 2004, p. 132.  All 
told, DOE reports that nearly 16,000 scientists, engineers, and technicians have been engaged since 1994; “Initiatives for Proliferation 
Prevention (IPP)” (Washington, D.C.: National Nuclear Security Administration, no date; available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/
ipp.shtml as of 9 March 2005).  The Department of State reports that its Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise program, which includes 
support for the ISTC and other bilateral biological and chemical scientist redirection efforts, engaged 430 “proliferation-relevant” in-
stitutes through FY 2003; see U.S. Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, “Department of State and International Assistance Programs,” 
p. 216.
149 See Matthew Bunn, “Nuclear Cities Initiative,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Mate-
rials (2002; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/stabilizing/nci.asp as of 3 March 2005).  See also Oleg Bukharin, Frank 
von Hippel, and Sharon K. Weiner, Conversion and Job Creation in Russia’s Closed Nuclear Cities: An Update Based on a Workshop Held 
in Obninsk, Russia, June 27–29, 2000 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 2000; available at http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/
publications/pdf/obninsk1.pdf as of 3 March 2005).
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in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex by some 35,000 
employees by 2005.150  Reducing the active workers 
with access to nuclear secrets and materials is a highly 
desirable goal for the long term, but turning them 
out without any sustainable alternative employment 
could make those workers a dangerous proliferation 
risk.  As DOE put it, these “35,000 nuclear experts rep-
resent a knowledge base that terrorist groups and 
proliferant countries could target for clandestine nu-
clear programs.”151  If workers inside institutes with so 
little work or salary that the workers or the institutes 
are tempted to hire out their services are a prolifera-
tion concern, then surely so are workers who have lost 
their jobs (or are about to lose their jobs) and who 
have no other job prospects.  Job creation, therefore, 
remains an important measure of success.  
The goal for U.S.-funded job-creation programs is 
almost certainly not as high as this 35,000 ﬁgure, 
however.  Progress on the plan has been slow: 2005 
has arrived, and Rosatom’s 1998 downsizing goal has 
clearly not been met.  There has been some progress 
on consolidation, such as the end of warhead assem-
bly/disassembly work in the closed cities of Zarechnyy 
and Sarov in 2003, and the move of all weapons-re-
lated ﬁssile material processing to Ozersk, but in the 
words of one expert, “the Russian nuclear weapons 
complex remains far too large for its present and future 
missions.”152  Since the most difﬁcult years of the late 
1990s, increased central government support for the 
nuclear defense mission and expanded governmen-
tal revenue from high oil prices and nuclear fuel and 
services exports (including the U.S.-Russian HEU Pur-
chase Agreement) have eased the pressure for making 
difﬁcult downsizing decisions.  Nevertheless, the Rus-
sian nuclear weapons complex is oversized and real 
reductions cannot be delayed indeﬁnitely.  Just as one 
example, as noted above, the end of plutonium pro-
duction at Zheleznogorsk and Seversk will likely put 
approximately 6,000 people out of work on its own.153
Some of the reduction in the Russian nuclear weap-
ons complex will be achieved through retirement.  An 
estimated 25% of workers in Russia’s nuclear cities are 
ﬁfty or older, and nearing retirement (Russia’s ofﬁcial 
retirement age is 55 for men and 60 for women).154 
Signiﬁcant downsizing can thus occur simply by not 
replacing these workers, a process that appears to be 
already underway.  Though in the past many workers 
stayed on well after their retirement age—indeed, in 
1999 some 5% of nuclear weapons workers were over 
60155—the improving Russian economy has allowed 
the government to offer nuclear weapons workers a 
more attractive retirement package that many have 
accepted.  Indeed, the workers came to refer to the 
package as “Putin’s pension.”156
Nevertheless, the remainder of nuclear workers 
targeted for downsizing will need other civilian em-
ployment.  Thousands are likely to ﬁnd other work 
without help, and thousands more are likely to be 
re-employed in civilian nuclear projects or other 
conversion projects sponsored by Rosatom.  The re-
maining need may be in the range of 15,000-20,000 
jobs.157  Creating thousands of civilian jobs in Russia 
150 This reduction was included in the plan for restructuring the nuclear weapons complex approved in Russia in 1998.  See Bukharin, 
Hippel, and Weiner, Conversion and Job Creation in Russia’s Closed Nuclear Cities, p. 14.
151 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security Administration—Defense Nuclear Non-
proliferation, p. 459.
152 Bukharin, Surviving the End of the Cold War, p. 22.
153 For more on the oversized complex, see Bukharin, Surviving the End of the Cold War, pp. 28-30.  A less recent but more detailed 
discussion is in Bukharin, Hippel, and Weiner, Conversion and Job Creation in Russia’s Closed Nuclear Cities, pp. 60-71.
154 See Figure 2.5 in Valentin Tikhonov, Russia’s Nuclear and Missile Complex: The Human Factor in Proliferation (Washington D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001; available at http://www.ceip.org/ﬁles/Publications/NPPDemoStudy.asp as of 9 
March 2005), p. 36.
155 Tikhonov, Russia’s Nuclear and Missile Complex, p. 36.
156 Bukharin, Surviving the End of the Cold War, p. 21.
157 In 2004, the DOE program now known as the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention stated as a goal providing 15,000 ci-
vilian jobs outside the WMD complex (so presumably including chemical, biological, and missile workers as well) by 2030; see U.S. 
Department of Energy, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security Administration—Defense Nuclear Nonprolif-
eration, p. 459.  The next year, that target had been dropped, and DOE instead stated its hope of engaging 9,000 scientists annually 
by 2015; see U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request.
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is a daunting mission, as is accurately measuring how 
many jobs actually were created.  
As we have discussed at length in our previous 
reports, the employment gap left by necessary 
downsizing efforts is being addressed in a number 
of ways.158  DOE’s Global Initiatives for Proliferation 
Prevention (GIPP, the new name for the ofﬁce hous-
ing both the Nuclear Cities Initiative and the 
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention) and the State 
Department’s Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise 
program (particularly through support of the ISTC’s 
program to partner with foreign companies) have 
directly supported creating commercial operations 
based on technologies and expertise drawn from 
the weapons complex.  It is very difﬁcult to estimate 
how many of the jobs in these ﬁrms are in fact held 
by former nuclear complex personnel, but there are 
nonetheless a few useful data points.  NCI claims to 
have created over 1,600 jobs in the Russian nuclear 
cities of Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Zheleznogorsk, while 
IPP claims that it has created some 2,000 new jobs 
in Russia and Ukraine since 1994.159  Through the 
end of FY 2004, DOE estimates that 36 technologies 
have been commercialized or businesses created 
through GIPP programs, adding 16 since the end of 
FY 2003.160  A very limited, but unknown, number of 
ISTC projects have also been directly commercial-
ized, while the State Department–supported CRDF 
has also supported the creation of an unknown num-
ber of ventures.161  As we have noted in our previous 
reports, NCI also supplied seed money to set up Eu-
ropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) loan programs in Sarov, Snezhinsk, Zhelezno-
gorsk, and Seversk.162  These programs have made 
over a thousand small-business loans in these cities, 
presumably supporting the creation of thousands of 
new jobs in these towns, some of which may be held 
by former employees of the nuclear weapons com-
plex.  
Other U.S.-funded programs not directly focused on 
job creation have also led to the creation of large 
numbers of jobs.  The most important of these is the 
U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement, which has 
created signiﬁcant orders for Russian employees and 
enterprises to fulﬁll, and which has provided revenues 
for Rosatom to use in its own conversion program.163 
Other U.S.-funded programs, such as the MPC&A 
program and programs to develop new monitoring 
and detection technologies and procedures, are also 
employing hundreds, if not thousands, of Russian 
nuclear experts and workers.  Russian efforts to sus-
tain this work once international assistance phases 
out would help make some of these jobs sustainable, 
though how many jobs this might create is unknown. 
Other U.S.-supported efforts to improve the business 
climate and promote general economic development 
in Russia’s nuclear cities, such as the International De-
velopment Centers in Zheleznogorsk and Snezhinsk, 
might also help add to job growth that could absorb 
former nuclear weapons workers.  
Privately ﬁnanced initiatives have also created 
substantial numbers of jobs for former nuclear 
workers.164  In addition, other countries, through the 
G8 Global Partnership, help contribute to job cre-
ation.  The United Kingdom is spending £4-5 million 
158 The following discussion draws heavily from, and attempts to summarize, our two previous reports on measurement: Bunn and 
Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, pp. 68-72; Bunn, Wier, and Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Re-
port Card and Action Plan, pp. 74-77.
159 Data provided by DOE, April 2005.
160 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 495.
161 The ISTC annual report notes the ﬁrst direct agreement to commercialize a project came in 2003; see International Science and 
Technology Center, Annual Report: 2003 (Moscow: ISTC, 2004; available at http://www.istc.ru as of 9 March 2005), p. 13.  For anecdotal 
information on CRDF commercialization, see “Star Wars into Ploughshares - Science in the Former Soviet Union,” The Economist (5 
March 2005).
162 See also, Sharon K. Weiner, “Preventing Nuclear Entrepreneurship in Russia’s Nuclear Cities,” International Security 27, no. 2 (Spring 
2002), p. 156.
163 Beyond our discussion from last year’s report, see, for example, remarks by then-First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ry-
abev, quoted and discussed in Bukharin, Hippel, and Weiner, Conversion and Job Creation in Russia’s Closed Nuclear Cities.
164 These include independent ventures by private companies, as well as work supported by non-governmental operations such as 
the Nuclear Threat Initiative; see Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, p. 70.
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per year on its own Nuclear Cities Partnership in Sa-
rov, Snezhinsk, and Seversk, while EU, Japanese, and 
other contributions combined match about 80% 
of U.S. funding for the ISTC.165  Though there clearly 
has been some contribution, speciﬁc numbers of 
jobs created by these endeavors are unknown.  To 
the extent Russia’s own efforts create sustainable, 
long-term jobs, the total requirement for jobs to be 
created by U.S. or other internationally funded ef-
forts is also reduced.  
In last year’s report, we estimated that, including jobs 
created by the EBRD loans, these combined efforts 
may have created approximately 25% of the roughly 
15,000-20,000 jobs that may be needed to cope with 
nuclear complex’s downsizing.  With new EBRD loans 
being made and commercialization efforts continu-
ing, it is reasonable to estimate that this percentage 
has moved to 30% in the past year, through a com-
bination of jobs added by direct U.S. efforts and jobs 
created in some other manner (which reduce the total 
number of jobs that need to be provided to address 
the proliferation problem).  This is quite probably an 
overestimate, as the ﬁgures for jobs created probably 
include workers who are not coming directly from 
the nuclear weapons complex.
Rate of progress.  As just noted, the publicly avail-
able data on the total number of jobs provided for 
former nuclear weapons scientists and workers in the 
last year is very limited, but it appears unlikely to have 
been more than 5% of the total need per year.  In its 
efforts to commercialize technology and support the 
creation of new businesses, DOE did greatly exceed 
its expectations, nearly doubling its cumulative total, 
to 36 ventures, when it expected to add only one last 
year.166
Stabilizing Metric 3: Russian Nuclear  
Weapons Infrastructure Eliminated
Fraction accomplished.  Russia’s nuclear weapons 
complex remains far too large for its mission of sup-
porting Russia’s current nuclear stockpile (estimated 
at some 16,000 total warheads, including 7,200 active 
warheads), much less for a smaller stockpile of around 
5,000-6,000 strategic, tactical, and reserve warheads 
that would be consistent with Russia’s obligations un-
der the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.167 
A downsized complex would still need to carry out a 
number of functions: nuclear weapons research and 
development, including stockpile stewardship; war-
head assembly and disassembly; manufacture of HEU 
and plutonium components; production or recycling 
and processing of tritium; and production of non-nu-
clear components.  By consolidating work into a limited 
number of existing facilities, Russia could support a 
defense mission consistent with its security needs and 
international obligations while reducing the overall 
size of the weapons complex it would need to support. 
By one estimate of what facilities would still be needed 
were Russia to appropriately size its complex for such 
a smaller stockpile, we can form an appropriate target 
for downsizing that U.S. programs should support.  In 
this scenario, Russia’s nuclear weapons complex could 
be focused in four closed cities (and a few facilities in 
open cities) and would employ about 30,000 people (a 
difference of about 45,000 employees from 2000).168  
165 On the UK nuclear cities work, see “Donor Fact Sheets: Scientist Employment,” in Strengthening the Global Partnership Project 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004; available at http://www.sgpproject.org/Donor%20Factsheets/
ProjectAreas/SciEmploy.html as of 9 March 2005).  ISTC data is from International Science and Technology Center, Annual Report: 
2003.
166 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 495.
167 Estimates of the warhead stockpile size come from Norris and Kristensen, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces, 
2005.”  
168 See Oleg Bukharin’s discussion in Appendix II in Bukharin, Hippel, and Weiner, Conversion and Job Creation in Russia’s Closed Nucle-
ar Cities, pp. 60-71.  An updated version can be found in Bukharin, Surviving the End of the Cold War.  This would include consolidation 
of several functions into fewer facilities: HEU and plutonium component manufacture would be centered at Mayak in Ozersk (as has 
mostly already occurred), Lesnoy would handle warhead assembly and disassembly and some non-nuclear component manufac-
ture, and weapons R&D and other non-nuclear component work would take place at VNIIEF in Sarov, VNIITF in Snezhinsk, and the 
Institute of Automatics in Moscow.  Though the three plutonium production reactors at Zheleznogorsk and Seversk are no longer 
serving a speciﬁc military purpose, the connected workers are part of the 75,000 baseline used to establish the target for this metric, 
so the reactors’ eventual shutdown will contribute to progress on this metric.
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Only one U.S. program, NCI, is speciﬁcally focused 
on supporting Russia in closing down excess nu-
clear weapons-related facilities; indeed, an original 
rationale behind the program was to alleviate Rus-
sian reluctance to downsize facilities without viable 
local civilian alternatives to which the facility and 
its employees might turn.  Though the formal NCI 
intergovernmental agreement expired in 2003, the 
program has continued to support projects ap-
proved before the agreement expired, and has 
sought to direct money for new projects through 
the ISTC or CRDF.169  NCI has set nuclear weapons 
complex reduction targets for six Russian nuclear 
weapons complex sites, including two nuclear 
weapons assembly-disassembly facilities (Avangard 
in Sarov and Zarechnyy), two plutonium produc-
tion facilities (Seversk and Zheleznogorsk), and two 
weapons design institutes (VNIIEF at Sarov and VNI-
ITF at Snezhinsk).170  To date, NCI has focused work 
on projects at Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Zheleznogorsk 
but the program now plans to phase out most work 
in Sarov and Snezhinsk in the next one to two years: 
in Sarov, NCI believes the situation has improved 
enough to shift resources elsewhere, and in Sne-
zhinsk, Russia is refocusing the nuclear facility on its 
defense mission, reducing the need for defense con-
version efforts.171  NCI now plans to shift its attention 
to projects in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk, in part to 
help absorb the excess employees and infrastruc-
ture created as another U.S.-sponsored program 
works to shut down Russia’s remaining plutonium 
production reactors.172
NCI has met with moderate success in supporting 
Russian weapons complex downsizing.  The pro-
gram facilitated the transition of roughly 40% of the 
Avangard nuclear weapons assembly and disassem-
bly facility from weapons work to open civilian work, 
and Russia subsequently closed the entire Avan-
gard facility on its own.  The remaining employees 
at Avangard were absorbed into the VNIIEF weap-
ons-design institute also located in the city of Sarov. 
With roughly 2,700 employees in 2000, Avangard 
was thought to be the smallest of Russia’s four war-
head assembly/disassembly facilities.173  Without U.S. 
assistance, Russia has also closed its next-smallest 
nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facility, 
at Zarechnyy (though some non-nuclear weapons 
work may still be going on there).174  Only the two 
largest weapons assembly-disassembly plants—
Lesnoy and Trekhgorny—remain in operation.  In 
addition, Russia appears to have closed one of its 
two facilities for manufacturing HEU and plutonium 
components for nuclear weapons (at Seversk).  Most 
of the thousands of employees at Seversk who once 
worked manufacturing weapons components are 
reportedly now involved in dismantling these com-
ponents and blending the HEU down for sale to the 
United States as commercial reactor fuel,175 though 
as noted above, thousands of workers remain at the 
plutonium production reactors at Seversk who will 
be displaced by those reactors’ closure.
If one subtracts Zarechnyy from the total mission 
remaining to be accomplished (weighting it by its 
larger size of some 7,000-10,000 workers), then by 
contributing to the closure of Avangard (a smaller fa-
cility, with around 2,700 employees), NCI has helped 
shut down roughly 7-8% of Russia’s remaining ex-
cess nuclear weapons complex.176  (If the target is 
169 Personal communication with DOE ofﬁcials, October 2004.  
170 “Nuclear Cities Initiative” (Washington, D.C.: National Nuclear Security Administration, no date; available at http://www.nnsa.doe.
gov/na-20/nci/about_unprec.shtml as of 29 March 2005); U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Bud-
get Request, p. 496.
171 Personal communication with DOE ofﬁcials, October 2004.  See also, Bukharin, Surviving the End of the Cold War, p. 21.
172 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 496.
173 By comparison, Lesnoy (formerly Sverdlovsk-45) is thought to have had some 7,000-10,000 employees in 2000; Trekhgorny (for-
merly Zlatoust-36) probably had some 3,600; and Zarechnyy (formerly Penza-19) also had some 7,000-10,000 workers.  In all of these 
cases, some of these workers probably also performed some work related to non-physics nuclear weapons component manufactur-
ing.  Bukharin, Hippel, and Weiner, Conversion and Job Creation in Russia’s Closed Nuclear Cities, pp. 38-42, 57-59.
174 Interview with former First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Lev Ryabev, September 2003.
175 Personal communication from Oleg Bukharin, Princeton University, March 2004.
176 In last year’s report, we calculated that NCI had contributed to shutting down “roughly 11% of the non-Zarechnyy capacity of 
Russia’s warhead assembly-disassembly complex.”  The ﬁnal target in that metric focused on completely eliminating the Russian 
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the complete elimination of Russia’s nuclear weap-
ons complex, then the reduction would be about 
4% of the total.)
DOE’s newly named Global Initiatives for Proliferation 
Prevention program has reported that some 53% of 
the program’s internal “workforce reduction and fa-
cility closure” targets in six nuclear cities have been 
met through FY 2004.177  The speciﬁc targets have not 
been made public, making it difﬁcult to judge the de-
gree to which achieving these targets would meet 
the overall objective of reducing Russia’s ability to 
rapidly restart mass production of warheads should 
circumstances change.
Rate of progress.  There is still no agreement for 
the United States and Russia to cooperate on clos-
ing down more of Russia’s nuclear weapons complex 
(though Russia has downsized some of its complex 
without direct support), but NCI is shifting its focus to 
cooperation in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk.  Further 
reductions in the nuclear weapons labs at Sarov and 
Snezhinsk are unlikely.  In FY 2004 DOE stated that 
it had accomplished an additional 4% of its internal 
“nuclear complex reduction targets.”178  DOE’s most 
recent statement was that it did not plan to meet 
these goals until 2015, though it did not publish this 
target in its most recent congressional budget justiﬁ-
cation.179
Improved Stabilizing Metrics for the Future
We acknowledge that this discussion on how well the 
United States is doing in securing nuclear expertise in 
the former Soviet Union is not entirely satisfying.  Of the 
four fundamental questions on performance measure-
ment discussed earlier in this chapter, the information 
publicly available provides very little good data on the 
total scope of the problem being addressed, and on 
what fraction of that problem has been addressed by 
the work performed.  Thus it makes it very difﬁcult to 
judge from the outside how effectively current efforts 
are addressing the problem of uncontrolled nuclear 
expertise.  The measures that are readily available 
provide essential information on the outputs of the 
programs, such as the number of institutes engaged 
or the number of scientists receiving grants.  But to 
the policymaker or citizen outside the program, such 
output measures do not answer their essential ques-
tions: the situation may well be getting better, but how 
much better? If we spent more, then how much more 
quickly would the situation get better? 
Of course, if such measures were easy to come by, we 
would see them by now.  These programs have made 
commendable strides in providing more quantiﬁ-
able and more transparent data.  (Indeed, the White 
House’s Ofﬁce of Management and Budget gave the 
State Department’s Nonproliferation of WMD Exper-
tise program high marks for its program measures in 
its most recent assessment of that program.180)  Estab-
lishing the full scope of the problem by identifying 
and quantifying just who did and still does what in 
one of the most sensitive national security activi-
ties—the production of nuclear weapons—in the 
successor states of the Soviet Union is an extremely 
challenging task.  Given its sensitivity, much of that 
task can not be carried out in the public realm.  
In essence, more data is needed on the denominator 
of the problem, that is, the total scope of the problem 
to be addressed.  Different kinds of nuclear workers 
each pose a different type of concern.  There is the 
assembly-disassembly complex.  In contrast, as noted above, this year’s metric focuses on the entire weapons complex, but assumes 
that the complex will shrink enough to still maintain a reduced weapons stockpile.
177 U.S. Department of Energy, Performance and Accountability Report: FY 2004, p. 133.  Although the only major facility whose closure 
the United States has substantially contributed to is Avangard, DOE’s statement that 53% of the combined total of the reduction 
targets for the six sites have been accomplished suggests that the targets for the other ﬁve may be modest.
178 The FY 2003 performance level was 49%; see U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear 
Security Administration—Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, p. 458.
179 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security Administration—Defense Nuclear Non-
proliferation, p. 458.  In contrast, see U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 496.
180 OMB states that the program does “have a limited number of speciﬁc long-term performance measures that focus on outcomes 
and meaningfully reﬂect the purpose of the program.”  U.S. Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, “Department of State and Interna-
tional Assistance Programs,” p. 210.
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lead scientist who could design an entire weapon. 
There is the engineer who might be able to help an-
other state acquire an indigenous nuclear capability, 
for example by providing knowledge relevant to cen-
trifuge manufacture or machining of nuclear weapons 
components.  A production worker might be able to 
access HEU or plutonium, and might provide a ter-
rorist group with enough ﬁssile material for a bomb, 
while a security ofﬁcer might provide crucial help in 
getting others inside a facility.  The baseline question 
is, what is the employment distribution of these types 
of workers in the former Soviet nuclear complex to-
day?  How are these categories distributed among 
defense-related facilities, non-defense enterprises, 
retirees, or other jobs?  And how many could be ex-
pected to retire in the near future?
Then, in evaluating program performance, we would 
want to know how many workers from each of these 
categories have been redirected into sustainable civil-
ian employment where they no longer have access to 
nuclear material and where they are not in a desperate 
economic situation.  At the same time, Russian per-
formance in their efforts to create alternative civilian 
employment and to restructure their weapons com-
plex should also be tracked, to recalibrate as necessary 
the scope of the problem U.S. and other international 
programs would need to address.
We acknowledge that getting speciﬁc answers on all 
these questions is an ideal that will not be achieved 
in full.  But ﬁnding more detailed, more accurate infor-
mation will only serve to help these programs better 
articulate and execute their mission.  Better data on ex-
actly what these efforts have been able to achieve will 
also make it easier for these programs to ﬁnd support-
ers and fend off critics.  At the same time, continued 
efforts to assess the potential willingness of nuclear 
scientists and workers to contribute to proliferation 
activities—through polling, individual interviews, 
focus groups, and the like—can also help improve un-
derstanding of the threat, and of the extent to which 
these programs are in fact helping to convince these 
individuals not to sell their knowledge or the material 
to which they have access.181   
TRACKING PROGRESS: MONITORING  
NUCLEAR STOCKPILES AND REDUCTIONS
All non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the 
nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—that is, all but 
nine of the countries of the world—are required to 
declare all of their weapons-usable nuclear material 
and place it under international monitoring.182 Over 
time, putting in place at least limited declarations and 
monitoring for the nuclear stockpiles in the nuclear 
weapon states and the states outside the NPT could 
contribute substantially to ensuring that these stock-
piles remain safe and secure, and that international 
assistance intended to improve controls over them is 
spent appropriately—and could provide an important 
foundation for deep reductions in nuclear arms.183  Of 
the nuclear weapon states, the United Kingdom has 
gone furthest in building transparency with respect 
to its own current stockpiles, declaring precisely how 
much military and civilian plutonium it possesses, how 
much of these military stocks are now excess to its 
military needs, and the fact that in the future it plans 
to possess fewer than 200 operational nuclear war-
heads.184  The United States has also taken substantial 
181 For examples of such polling and interviews, see Ball and Gerber, “A Survey of Russian Scientists”; Tikhonov, Russia’s Nuclear and 
Missile Complex.
182 The NPT recognizes ﬁve nuclear weapon states (the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and China) which are not 
required to declare or accept monitoring of their nuclear stockpiles.  There are three states (India, Pakistan, and Israel) which have never 
been parties to the NPT, and so face no such obligations, and one state (North Korea) which violated and then withdrew from the NPT.
183 See discussion in Bunn, Wier, and Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, pp. 147-149. 
For an in-depth discussion of such measures in the context of deep nuclear arms reductions, see Nicholas Zarimpas, ed., Transpar-
ency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and Technical Dimensions (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, 2003).
184 See U.K. Ministry of Defence, Plutonium and Aldermaston: An Historical Account (London: British Ministry of Defence, 2000; available 
at http://www.mod.uk/publications/nuclear_weapons/aldermaston.htm as of 15 February 2005); U.K. Ministry of Defence, “Chapter 
4: Deterrence and Disarmament” in Strategic Defence Review (London: British Ministry of Defence, 1998; available at http://www.mod.
uk/issues/sdr/deterrence.htm as of 15 February 2005).
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steps toward increased transparency, declaring the 
size and detailed history of its plutonium stockpile, 
the number of nuclear weapons dismantled each year 
over a substantial period, some limited information 
on its HEU production, and other information.
Currently, however, while the U.S. government is 
working with Russia on a few initiatives focused on 
particular “islands of transparency” (such as transpar-
ency for the ongoing HEU Purchase Agreement), it 
is simply not pursuing a comprehensive regime to 
declare or monitor stockpiles of nuclear warheads 
and materials.  Hence it is not surprising that little 
progress toward such declarations and monitoring is 
being made.  
During 2004, the United States did propose a number 
of transparency measures focused on non-strategic 
nuclear weapons, to be implemented bilaterally be-
tween the United States and Russia.185  No progress 
has been reported, however, in reaching agreement 
on such measures.  Also during 2004, there was 
continued success in implementing transparency 
measures for the HEU purchase agreement; contin-
ued talks without ﬁnal agreement on transparency 
measures for the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Fa-
cility (though that facility had been completed the 
previous year); and continued efforts, not yet suc-
cessful, to reach agreement on implementing spe-
ciﬁc inspection approaches for the plutonium oxide 
in storage at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk, produced in 
Russia’s military plutonium production reactors after 
that material stopped being used in nuclear weap-
ons (though an agreement requiring measurements 
has been in force for several years).186  As metrics for 
judging progress in this area, we use the fraction of 
Russia’s nuclear warheads and materials that have 
been the subject of detailed declarations, and the 
fraction that are subject to actual monitoring (see 
Figure 3-5).
Monitoring Metric 1: Russian Nuclear Weapons 
and Materials Subject to Declarations
Fraction accomplished.  Remarkably, the United 
States and Russia have never told each other how 
many nuclear weapons or how many tons of plu-
tonium and HEU they have.  Nor has either country 
ever allowed the other to verify the dismantlement 
of a single nuclear warhead.  Therefore the fraction 
of nuclear warheads subject to detailed declara-
tions is zero.  In the case of nuclear materials, every 
year another 30 tons of HEU is blended down, and 
becomes subject to declarations (and monitoring, 
as described below) as part of that process (while 
also removing that HEU from the total of material 
remaining to declare or monitor).  In addition, Rus-
sia makes declarations every year on its stockpiles of 
185 This is mentioned, for example, in U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, “Strategic Goal 4: 
Weapons of Mass Destruction.”
186 For a discussion of HEU transparency during FY 2004, see U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Budget Request, pp. 499-503.  Information on the lack of a ﬁnal agreement on Mayak transparency is from interviews with State 
Department ofﬁcials, January 2005. The lack of ﬁnal agreement on inspections for Seversk and Zheleznogorsk plutonium was con-
ﬁrmed in interviews with State Department ofﬁcials, November 2004.
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separated civilian plutonium.  As of the end of 2003 
(the most recent year for which declarations are yet 
available), Russia’s civil separated plutonium declara-
tion included 38.2 tons of material.187  Hence, the total 
amount of nuclear material subject to declarations is 
approximately 68 tons, just over 5% of the estimated 
1275 tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in Rus-
sia as of the end of 2003,188 or 11% of the 600 tons of 
that total stockpile that is believed to be outside of 
nuclear weapons themselves.   
Rate of progress.  There has been no increase in the 
amount of material subject to declarations in the past 
year, except for the additional ton of civilian pluto-
nium that Russia’s most recent declaration includes. 
In the future, if transparency measures are eventu-
ally agreed for the Mayak Fissile Material Storage 
Facility and ﬁssile material begins to be loaded there, 
that material will effectively come under declara-
tions, as the United States will be informed of roughly 
how much material is present in the facility. Thus, 
over the next few years, some 25 tons of plutonium 
should be added to the amounts just described—or 
more, if the United States and Russia agree on policy 
changes that would allow more material to be stored 
there.189  Beyond that, progress in bringing additional 
weapons or materials under declarations is minimal, 
though it is conceivable that some tactical nuclear 
weapons might become subject to declarations if the 
U.S. proposals tabled in 2004 eventually lead to an 
agreement.
Monitoring Metric 2: Nuclear Weapons and 
Materials Subject to U.S. or International 
Monitoring
Fraction accomplished.  As with declarations, no war-
heads are currently subject to monitoring.  In the case 
of nuclear materials, the 30 tons of HEU being down-
blended each year are subject to limited monitoring 
during that process (and are removed from the total 
stockpile).  It is worth noting that during 2004, contin-
uous monitoring equipment to monitor the point at 
which the HEU and blendstock are actually blended 
to LEU was installed at the third of the three facilities 
in Russia where this work is done.  During 2004, some 
75% of the LEU delivered was subject to such con-
tinuous blend monitoring, but this should increase to 
nearly 100% in subsequent years.190  Limited monitor-
ing of the plutonium produced in Russia’s plutonium 
187 See International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication Received from the Russian Federation Concerning Its Policies Regarding 
the Management of Plutonium, INFCIRC/549/Add.9/6 (Vienna: IAEA, 2004; available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/ 
Infcircs/2004/infcirc549a9-6.pdf as of 15 February 2005). As the annual increases in Russia’s reports have been increasing by amounts 
ranging from 1 ton to 2.8 tons in recent years, by the end of 2004, Russia’s total quantity of civilian separated plutonium probably 
amounted to 39-40 tons.
188 This ﬁgure is the sum of: an estimated 145 tons of military plutonium; 38 tons of civilian separated plutonium reported by Russia; 
an estimated 1070 tons of remaining military HEU; and an estimated 22 tons of civilian HEU.  These estimates all have substantial 
uncertainties: the total is uncertain to plus or minus hundreds of tons.  These updated estimates for the end of 2003 are from David 
Albright and Kimberly Kramer, eds., Global Fissile Material Inventories (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Se-
curity, October 2004; available at http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/tableofcontents.html as of 14 February 2005). They are 
consistent, well within the range of uncertainty, with our earlier estimate of 1230 tons as of the end of 2002. See Matthew Bunn, 
“Unclassiﬁed Estimates of Russia’s Plutonium and HEU Stockpiles—and World Civil Separated Plutonium Stockpiles: A Summary and 
Update, Rev. 1” (Cambridge, Mass.: unpublished, 2003).
189 Currently, the United States takes the view that only weapon-grade plutonium or weapon-grade HEU which will never be re-
turned to weapons can be stored in this facility.  Russia takes the view that the HEU in this category is already being blended for sale 
to the United States under the HEU purchase agreement and does not require storage at Mayak, and the only plutonium it is will-
ing to place in this category is the 34 tons covered by the 2000 U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, 
of which 9 tons is material produced in the plutonium production reactors in recent years and stored there, leaving only 25 tons of 
plutonium eligible for placement in the Mayak storage facility—enough to ﬁll one-quarter of the facility.  The United States is con-
sidering approaches that would allow additional material to be stored at Mayak, such as having one portion of the facility limited to 
excess plutonium that would never be returned to weapons and would be subject to monitoring, and another portion where Russia 
could store a portion of the plutonium still reserved for support of its military stockpile.  See Bunn, “Mayak Fissile Material Storage 
Facility.”
190 See U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, pp. 499-500.
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production reactors since 1994 (amounting to some 
8-11 tons of plutonium) is now occurring, although 
as of early 2005 the United States and Russia were 
still debating the speciﬁcs of what kind of equipment 
could be used to take measurements on the canisters 
containing the plutonium at these sites.191  Together, 
the plutonium and HEU being monitored represents 
some 3% of Russia’s total nuclear material stockpile, 
or nearly 7% of the estimated 600 tons outside of 
weapons.
Rate of progress.  As noted earlier, there are no cur-
rent plans for monitoring of warhead stockpiles. 
For material stockpiles, the rate of increase in the 
amounts of materials subject to monitoring has been 
painfully slow.  As just noted, 25 tons or more of plu-
tonium is slated to be loaded into the Mayak Fissile 
Material Storage Facility over the next few years, and 
if all goes well, this will be subject to some form of 
transparency. Over the longer term, monitoring of 
plutonium being burned as fuel in the plutonium 
disposition effort would begin, but all of this material 
would be either from the plutonium stored at Mayak 
(which, if transparency arrangements are agreed, will 
already be subject to monitoring), or plutonium from 
the stocks at Russia’s plutonium production reac-
tors (also already subject to monitoring).  No date for 
completing monitoring arrangements for warheads 
and materials has been established.
Improved Monitoring Metrics for the Future
The U.S. government should assess what declarations, 
monitoring, and other transparency measures would 
give it conﬁdence that nuclear weapons and weap-
ons-usable nuclear materials around the world were 
safe and secure, and being managed in compliance 
with international agreements.  It should then track 
what fraction of the measures needed to achieve that 
conﬁdence have yet been put in place.
TRACKING PROGRESS: ENDING PRODUCTION
World stocks of nuclear weapons, separated plu-
tonium, and HEU are far larger than needed for any 
current or future military or civilian purposes.  Adding 
further to these stockpiles will increase the cost and 
complexity of ensuring they are effectively guarded 
and controlled.  Hence, ending production is an im-
portant objective.
Clearly, the most important part of that objective is 
ending (or preventing) production in countries where 
that production may be used to build a new nuclear 
arsenal—such as North Korea and Iran.  As noted ear-
lier, there has been no progress in the past year in 
limiting or rolling back North Korea’s nuclear program, 
and in February, 2005, North Korea announced that it 
had nuclear weapons and was pulling out of the six 
party talks for an indeﬁnite time.192  North Korea is 
thought to have sufﬁcient plutonium for 6-8 nuclear 
weapons, and its one operating plutonium produc-
tion reactor, restarted in early 2003, is believed to be 
producing roughly enough plutonium for one more 
each year.  North Korea is believed to be attempting 
to establish a centrifuge enrichment facility to make 
HEU for weapons as well, but there is as yet no public 
evidence that any such facility is operational.193  
All of Iran’s known and declared facilities relating to 
uranium enrichment are frozen as part of a temporary 
agreement with France, Britain, Germany, and the Eu-
ropean Union, reached in the fall of 2004.  But whether 
European negotiators will be able to translate that ac-
cord into a lasting deal that ends Iran’s enrichment 
program remains in doubt, particularly given the Bush 
administration’s continued unwillingness to partici-
pate in the talks or address Iranian security concerns. 
Iranian leaders have said that Iran’s suspension of ura-
nium enrichment will only be temporary, but assert 
191 These monitoring visits ﬁnally began to occur in 2002.  See “Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency (WFMT) Program” (Wash-
ington, D.C.: National Nuclear Security Administration, no date; available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/wfmt.shtml as of 16 
February 2005).  See also U.S. Department of Energy, Moscow Ofﬁce, Summary of DOE Programs in Russia: FY ’03 Accomplishments and 
FY ’04 Goals (Moscow: U.S. Embassy, 2004), pp. 31-33.
192 DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “DPRK Statement,” Korean Central News Agency, 10 February 2005.
193 See, for example, testimony of CIA Director Porter Goss, in Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Secu-
rity Threats to the United States, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress (16 February 2005).  Goss indicates only that North Korea continues to 
“pursue” such a capability.
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that Iran plans to produce only low-enriched uranium 
for fuel, not HEU for weapons.194
Perhaps surprisingly, there are no current efforts in 
place to put an end to further production of nuclear 
warheads in the United States and Russia.  Both the 
United States and Russia are decreasing, rather than 
increasing, their nuclear warhead stockpiles, but both 
retain the right to manufacture new warheads if 
needed to replace existing warheads.  Similarly, there 
are no current efforts to reach agreements to end 
nuclear weapon manufacture in the other nuclear 
weapon states.
Globally, efforts to end production of weapons-usable 
nuclear material were dealt a blow in July 2004, when, 
after a protracted policy review, the Bush adminis-
tration announced that the United States would no 
longer support a veriﬁed ﬁssile material cutoff treaty 
(FMCT). The statement indicated that while the United 
States still supported a legally binding treaty banning 
production of nuclear materials for weapons, it no lon-
ger supported including veriﬁcation measures, as even 
extensive measures would not provide “high conﬁ-
dence in our ability to monitor compliance,” and even 
attempting to provide such conﬁdence “would require 
an inspection regime so extensive that it could com-
promise key signatories’ core national security inter-
ests and so costly that many countries will be hesitant 
to accept it.”195  The argument that an FMCT could not 
be veriﬁed has little merit, as existing IAEA safeguards 
approaches applied to enrichment and reprocessing 
plants could do most of the job.196  This announcement 
effectively killed prospects for near-term progress to-
ward concluding an FMCT—prospects which were 
already slim, as the non-NPT states who would be cru-
cial parties to such a treaty (India, Pakistan, Israel, and 
North Korea) do not appear ready to agree to such a 
pact, and some of the NPT nuclear weapon states are 
ofﬁcially supportive but not enthusiastic.  Neverthe-
less, in late 2003, when China removed the previous 
stumbling block to negotiations by dropping its in-
sistence that it would not allow FMCT negotiations to 
begin unless negotiations on space weapons began 
simultaneously, there had seemed to be some hope 
for at least beginning negotiations—a hope that the 
Bush administration’s announcement brought to an 
abrupt end.197
As currently envisioned, an FMCT would only ban pro-
duction of weapons-usable nuclear materials for use 
in nuclear weapons—production of such materials 
for civilian purposes, or permitted military purposes 
(such as naval fuel) would be permitted.  Worldwide, 
there is little if any current production of HEU for non-
weapons purposes, but civilian separation and use of 
weapons-usable plutonium continues on a massive 
scale.  Each year, some 20 tons of civilian plutonium is 
reprocessed from spent fuel, and only 10 tons of that is 
fabricated into fuel and used in reactors, adding some 
10 tons to the global stockpile every year.198  Already, 
over 230 tons of weapons-usable civilian plutonium 
194 See, for example, “Iran Vows Enrichment Freeze Will Be Short-Lived,” Agence France Press, 31 January 2005.
195 U.S. Department of State, “Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty Policy” (Washington, D.C.: State Department, 2004).  The original state-
ment to the Conference on Disarmament was made by U.S. Ambassador Jackie W. Sanders on July 29, 2004.
196 It is true that covert facilities for producing small amounts of nuclear material are difﬁcult to detect, but that problem is most 
relevant in the case of states that do not yet have nuclear weapons, all of whom are already obligated under the NPT not to produce 
weapons material.  It is also true that verifying that HEU produced after entry into force for use as naval fuel was not in fact used for 
weapons, without undue intrusiveness, would raise some difﬁculties.  But these are issues that could readily be addressed through 
negotiation, and putting a veriﬁed cap on production at the known military production facilities in the weapon states and the 
non-NPT states would have substantial beneﬁts with little risk; if the non-NPT states could be convinced to agree, it would cap their 
arsenals and bring them a step closer to the international nonproliferation regime.
197  The FMCT is being discussed in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which operates on the basis of consensus.  As many 
other parties oppose the Bush administration’s approach, it appears extremely unlikely that this approach will provide the basis for 
a consensus to start negotiation of an FMCT.  For a discussion, see Matthew Bunn, “Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty,” in Nuclear Threat 
Initiative Research Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials, ed. Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier (2004; available at 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/ending/fmct.asp as of 15 February 2005).
198 See David Albright, “Separated Civil Plutonium Inventories: Current Status and Future Directions,” in Global Fissile Material Inven-
tories, ed. David Albright and Kimberly Kramer (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, 2004; available at 
http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/separated_civil_pu.html as of 15 February 2005).
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has built up in civilian stores around the world, and 
within a few years, these stocks of civilian separated 
plutonium will exceed the total amount of plutonium 
in all the world’s military stockpiles.  Yet as of today, 
there are no U.S. programs in place designed to reduce 
this massive buildup of civilian separated plutonium. 
In short, metrics measuring how much of the jobs of 
(a) stopping production of bomb material in potential 
new nuclear weapon states, or of (b) stopping produc-
tion of military and civilian bomb material worldwide, 
would show very little progress made so far.
The main part of ending production where some 
progress is being made—and a considerable amount 
of money is planned to be spent—is shutting down 
production of military plutonium in Russia.  Under a 
program called Elimination of Weapons Grade Pluto-
nium Production (EWGPP), the United States plans to 
provide alternate power sources to replace Russia’s 
last three plutonium production reactors, in the cities 
of Seversk and Zheleznogorsk, allowing them to be 
shut down without leaving the nearby towns in the 
cold and the dark.  Between them, the three reactors 
produce approximately 1.2 tons of weapon-grade 
plutonium per year, adding to Russia’s already large 
stockpile of excess plutonium.  Under current plans, 
the two reactors at Seversk are expected to shut 
down in 2008, and the one reactor at Zheleznogorsk 
is expected to shut in 2011.  
Key developments in the past year included:
In November 2004, the Seversk project passed 
the critical decision reviews at DOE that provided 
U.S. authorization to begin construction.199
•
In January 2005, DOE signed a $285 million con-
tract with Washington Group International (WGI) 
for the next phase of WGI’s work as the integrat-
ing contractor for the work at Seversk, overseeing 
the work of Russian contractors who will do the 
actual construction.200  This followed speciﬁc con-
tracts granted during 2004 for the various boilers, 
turbines, and related systems that are to be up-
graded.201
In February 2005, DOE requested a budget of $132 
million for this effort for FY 2006, three times the 
$44 million appropriated for FY 2005, and well 
over twice the budget previously projected for FY 
2006.202  The drastically increased budget was not 
intended to accelerate the effort, but only to meet 
the previous schedule in the face of cost estimates 
that have more than doubled, to some $1.1 bil-
lion.203
In early 2004, Russia ﬁnally began allowing U.S. 
experts needed access to the construction sites 
at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk.  The site where the 
Zheleznogorsk power plant is to be built was only 
chosen, and acquired by the Russian government, 
in February 2004.204
Congress passed legislation enabling DOE to so-
licit international contributions that would go 
directly to the account for the program to shut 
down these reactors, and in early 2005, the United 
Kingdom pledged some $20 million to the Zhe-
leznogorsk project.205 
•
•
•
•
199 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 506.
200 “U.S. Signs Contract as Part of Effort to Permanently Shut Down Plutonium Production Reactors in Russia” (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Energy, 20 December 2004; available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/PR_NA-04-34_Contract_signed_for_
electricity_plant_in_EWGPP_program-shutting_down_pu_reactors_(12-04).htm as of 20 February 2005).
201 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 506.
202 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 505; U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2005 
Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security Administration—Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, p. 467.
203 This cost estimate is mentioned, for example, in U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, Nuclear Proliferation: DOE’s Effort to Close 
Russia’s Plutonium Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is Uncertain, GAO-04-662 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2004; 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04662.pdf as of 14 February 2005).
204 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, pp. 506-507. Why access had been a serious 
issue at these sites remains something of a mystery, as there are no sensitive nuclear activities taking place at either one.
205 “Grifﬁths Announces £12 Million Pledge to End Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production in Former Soviet Union“ (London: U.K. De-
partment of Trade and Industry, 26 January 2005).
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In February 2005, DOE organized an international 
conference in Switzerland to solicit funding sup-
port.206
In short, after a decade of delays and wrong turns, 
this effort made signiﬁcant progress in the past year. 
The project remains fraught with difﬁculties and un-
certainties, however:
The new cost estimates, at roughly $1.1 billion, 
are very high for the amount of plutonium whose 
production will be avoided by this effort.  This is 
particularly the case for the Zheleznogorsk proj-
ect, which would shut only one reactor, rather 
than two, but is projected to cost roughly twice as 
much as the Seversk project (because a whole new 
power plant will have to be built)—and which will 
not shut the reactor down until 2011, which may 
be only a few years before its advancing age would 
force Russia to shut it down in any case.207  DOE has 
indicated that it will solicit international contribu-
tions to reduce the cost to the United States of 
shutting the Zheleznogorsk facility.
As a Government Accountability Ofﬁce report in 
June 2004 noted, the project involves a welter of dif-
ferent U.S. and Russian organizations that all must 
coordinate successfully, raising signiﬁcant concerns 
over the difﬁculty of managing the effort.  The Rus-
sian contractor that is supposed to oversee most of 
the work, in particular, is a Rosatom-owned entity 
created in 2002, which has never before worked 
•
•
•
with U.S. contractors on a large construction proj-
ect, and has limited staff, budget, and authority.208
Although it would be relatively simple to shut these 
reactors down for much of the summer, when their 
heat is not needed, and thereby reduce their pluto-
nium production, Russia has not agreed to do so.209
Russia has declined U.S. assistance to upgrade the 
safety of these reactors—some of the most danger-
ous in the world, based on a design that was the 
predecessor of the Chernobyl reactor design—ap-
parently because of a reluctance to allow the level 
of U.S. access to these facilities that this assistance 
would have required.210
Ending Production Metric 1: Reduction in 
Russian Weapons-Usable Material Production
Fraction accomplished.  The ultimate metric here is 
very simple: the reduction in the rate of weapons-us-
able material production resulting from U.S. sponsored 
programs.  So far, this is zero, as U.S.-funded programs 
have not affected this production rate—and it will 
remain zero until the ﬁrst of the three remaining 
plutonium production reactors actually shuts down 
(see Figure 3-6 on the following page).  The picture is 
somewhat more promising if judged by the fraction 
of all the work that needs to be done to shut these re-
actors down that has been completed. In the budget 
justiﬁcations released in February 2005, DOE esti-
mated that as of the end of FY 2004, 13% of the work 
•
•
206 “Nations Gather to Help Nuclear Cities Shut Down Plutonium Production Reactors” (Washington, D.C.: National Nuclear Secu-
rity Administration, 14 February 2005; available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/PR_2005-02-14_NA-05-03.htm as of 17 February 
2005).
207 There have been a series of different estimates over the years of when age would force these reactors to shut down, ranging from 
as early as 2012 to as late as 2020.  The key issue is radiation-induced swelling of the graphite blocks that are the moderator for these 
reactors.  
208 U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, Nuclear Proliferation: DOE’s Effort to Close Russia’s Plutonium Production Reactors Faces Chal-
lenges, and Final Shutdown Is Uncertain, pp. 12-16.
209 U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, Nuclear Proliferation: DOE’s Effort to Close Russia’s Plutonium Production Reactors Faces Chal-
lenges, and Final Shutdown Is Uncertain, pp. 17-18.
210 U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, Nuclear Proliferation: DOE’s Effort to Close Russia’s Plutonium Production Reactors Faces 
Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is Uncertain, pp. 18-20. Russia’s sensitivity over access to these reactors is somewhat difﬁcult to un-
derstand, as these reactors are no longer producing plutonium intended for military purposes, and will soon shut down; moreover, 
U.S. personnel have had extensive access to the nearly identical plutonium production reactors that are already shut down.  For a 
discussion of the history of efforts to end plutonium production at these reactors, see Frank N. von Hippel and Matthew Bunn, “Saga 
of the Siberian Plutonium Production Reactors,” Federation of American Scientists (F.A.S.) Public Interest Report 53, no. 6 (November/
December 2000; available at http://www.fas.org/faspir/v53n6.htm as of 30 April 2005).
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for the Seversk project had been completed, based 
on the fraction of the total estimated cost of the proj-
ect that had been expended211—but that fraction was 
based on the previous cost estimate, roughly half the 
current cost estimate, and thus a more accurate es-
timate of the fraction of the work completed for the 
Seversk project would be in the range of 6-7%.212  For 
the Zheleznogorsk project, the fraction completed 
is only about 2-3%.213  Russian production of HEU for 
weapons ended, and most of Russia’s plutonium pro-
duction reactors were shutdown, before cooperative 
threat reduction programs began, and so U.S.-funded 
programs cannot take credit for those steps.  The plu-
tonium production rate at the last three production 
reactors has been reduced because of reductions in 
their permitted peak power imposed by Russia’s nu-
clear safety regulatory agency, but this was not the 
result of U.S. programs intended to reduce plutonium 
production.  Russia continues to separate roughly a 
ton of weapons-usable civilian plutonium each year 
as well, and the Bush administration abandoned a 
promising Clinton-era effort to end that production, 
so there are no current U.S. programs to reduce that 
production.
Rate of progress.  As just noted, DOE estimates that 
13% of the work needed to shut down the Seversk re-
actors was done by the end of FY 2004, though more 
realistic estimates would cut that ﬁgure roughly in 
half; all but 1% of that work was accomplished during 
FY 2004.  DOE plans to have 32% of the Seversk proj-
ect completed by the end of FY 2005, and to almost 
double the FY 2005 ﬁgure, to 61%, in FY 2006, ﬁnish-
ing the project in early FY 2009.214  The Zheleznogorsk 
effort is projected to move slowly until the Seversk 
project is largely completed, primarily because of 
budget constraints.215
Improved Ending Production  
Metrics for the Future
The U.S. government should develop: (a) measures 
to assess progress in ending (or preventing) produc-
tion of nuclear material in potential or new nuclear 
weapon states such as North Korea and Iran; (b) an 
estimate of global production of nuclear materi-
als for weapons each year, and progress in bringing 
that production to an end; and (c) an estimate of to-
tal worldwide production of weapons-usable nuclear 
material each year, both military and civilian, and of 
progress in reducing (and ultimately ending) that 
production.
TRACKING PROGRESS:  
REDUCING NUCLEAR STOCKPILES
Ultimately, the only way to guarantee that any par-
ticular nuclear weapon or cache of weapon-usable 
nuclear material will not be stolen is to destroy it. 
Reductions in the total size of these stockpiles are 
also an important long-term foundation for deep 
211 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 508.
212 DOE reports that the 13% ﬁgure came from having expended $22 million out of a total estimated cost of $171 million.  U.S. 
Department of Energy, Performance and Accountability Report: FY 2004, p. 127.  Current estimates of the total cost for the Seversk 
projects are more than twice as high.
213 DOE estimates 5%, but that is again based on the fraction of earlier cost estimates expended. U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 508.
214 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 508.
215 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 508.
Figure 3-6 
How Much Ending Production Work Have U.S.-Funded Programs Completed?
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and difﬁcult-to-reverse reductions in nuclear arms. 
To date, however, there are no arms control agree-
ments that call for destroying nuclear warheads 
themselves (as opposed to simply taking them off 
of delivery systems)—though the United States and 
Russia made unilateral pledges to destroy speciﬁed 
fractions of certain types of warheads in 1991-1992. 
With respect to reductions in nuclear materials, the 
key agreements in place are the U.S.-Russian HEU 
Purchase Agreement, which commits Russia to elimi-
nating 500 tons of weapon-grade HEU by blending it 
to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for sale to the United 
States,216 and the Plutonium Management and Dis-
position Agreement (PMDA) of 2000, which commits 
both Russia and the United States to carry out dis-
position of 34 tons of weapon-grade plutonium 
(possibly mixed with up to an additional four tons 
of reactor-grade plutonium).217  Implementation of 
the HEU Purchase Agreement (and of unilateral U.S. 
programs to reduce its own excess HEU stockpile) 
continues, but the PMDA, while being provisionally 
applied, has not yet entered into force, and disposi-
tion of both U.S. and Russian excess plutonium has 
been delayed for years. 
Key developments in this area in the last year in-
cluded:
As noted above, the U.S.-Russian impasse over li-
ability provisions of agreements on plutonium 
disposition continued.  This disagreement led 
the Bush administration to allow the U.S.-Russian 
•
agreement on technical cooperation on plutonium 
disposition to expire the previous year.  The lack of 
any plutonium disposition agreement including li-
ability protection has delayed both “Russianizing” 
the design of a plutonium fuel fabrication facility 
and construction of such facilities in Russia and the 
United States.  In early 2005, the Bush administration 
ﬁnally decided to compromise on liability language 
different from that included in the U.S.-Russian Co-
operative Threat Reduction umbrella agreement.218 
This raised hopes that the issue would be resolved 
in time for the Bratislava summit, but it was not.219 
As of March 2005, U.S.-Russian discussions of the 
subject were continuing, and construction of plu-
tonium fuel fabrication facilities in both the United 
States and Russia remained largely in limbo, though 
DOE has found ways to move forward on some 
initial steps even in the absence of liability protec-
tion.220  Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) summed up 
the situation in February 2005, after the adminis-
tration’s liability compromise had been proposed, 
saying: “We are putting so much in jeopardy by not 
resolving this issue.  While I am pleased with recent 
progress, I remain frustrated that opposition from 
within our own government over the liability issue 
has delayed the startup of operations beyond 2009. 
The delay is likely to result in substantial penalties 
to the federal government due to our failure to dis-
pose of the [plutonium] in a timely manner.”221
In early 2005, DOE formally notiﬁed Congress that 
the legislated deadline of 2009 for beginning to 
•
216 Matthew Bunn, “HEU Purchase Agreement,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materi-
als (2003; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/reducing/heudeal.asp as of 29 March 2005). 
217 U.S. Department of Energy, Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian 
Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Re-
lated Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2000; available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/docs/2000_Agreement.pdf as of 30 
March 2005).
218 See, for example, Daniel Horner, “Bush, Putin Pledge Cooperation on Upgrading Nuclear Security,” Nuclear Fuel, 28 February 2005.
219 The liability issue went unmentioned in the ﬁnal Bratislava statement.  For discussion, see Horner, “Bush, Putin Pledge Cooperation 
on Upgrading Nuclear Security.”
220 DOE, for example: has been working closely with Russian regulators to develop an approach for rapid review and licensing of the 
Russian facility once the liability impasse is overcome; has contracted with the French ﬁrm whose MOX technology is to be used 
to send the plant design to Russia so that work on adapting the design to Russian circumstances can get underway, since France 
already has a liability agreement in place with Russia; and has identiﬁed initial steps (such as clearing construction sites) that can 
be taken without liability provisions in place.  See, for example, Daniel Horner, “Work on MOX Plants Could Start This Year Despite 
Liability Issue,” Nuclear Fuel, 31 January 2005; Daniel Horner and Ann MacLachlan, “DOE Using ‘French Option’ to Send MOX Design 
Information to Russia,” Nuclear Fuel, 22 November 2004.
221 “Sen. Domenici Has Secretary Rice’s Commitment to Advance U.S.-Russia Plutonium Disposition Program.”
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fabricate plutonium fuel at Savannah River—a 
deadline South Carolina’s congressional delega-
tion insisted on, to ensure that the material would 
not stay at Savannah River in indeﬁnite stor-
age—would not be met.222  Under the law, if delays 
continue, DOE will face substantial ﬁnancial penal-
ties.
In late 2004, DOE shipped 140 kilograms of 
weapon-grade plutonium to France for fabrication 
into uranium-plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) lead 
test assemblies for use in the U.S. reactors slated 
to burn plutonium fuel.223  There was considerable 
controversy over whether security for this ship-
ment was sufﬁcient.224  In late 2004, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) indicated that there 
was “no rational reason” that the reactors that 
would burn this MOX fuel would need substan-
tially increased security, and in early 2005, NRC 
approved the use of the lead test assemblies fab-
ricated in France in the Catawba reactors in South 
Carolina.225
Talks on an international ﬁnancing and manage-
ment approach for disposition of Russian excess 
weapons plutonium continued, but no ﬁnal agree-
ment was reached.  Final agreement is likely to 
require some resolution of the liability issue.  To 
date, the pledges that countries have made are 
sufﬁcient to cover roughly half the estimated cost 
of disposition of the 34 tons of excess weapons 
plutonium covered by the 2000 PMDA—enough 
•
•
to build the needed plutonium fuel fabrication fa-
cility, but not enough yet to operate it as well.226
The U.S. House of Representatives attempted to 
slash a substantial portion of the plutonium dis-
position program’s FY 2005 budget, because the 
delays resulting from the liability dispute had led 
to large unspent balances.227
In its FY 2006 budget request, the Bush adminis-
tration requested $10 million to restart work on 
plutonium immobilization, for material not cov-
ered under the PMDA and not suitable for use in 
MOX fuel—work the administration had previ-
ously canceled.228
In early 2005, the director of the plutonium disposi-
tion program at DOE resigned.  Since he had run all 
aspects of the effort, and had fought tenaciously to 
move it forward, his resignation—with no replace-
ment immediately in sight—reduced conﬁdence 
in the effort in Congress and elsewhere.
An additional 30 tons of HEU from Russian dis-
mantled nuclear weapons was blended to LEU 
and shipped to the United States.
The initiative to slightly increase the pace at which 
the United States purchased Russian HEU, by pur-
chasing some HEU for U.S. research reactors, was 
substantially delayed, as the United States and 
Russia were unable to agree on prices, and DOE re-
quested no additional money for the effort in its 
FY 2006 budget.229
•
•
•
•
•
222 Sammy Fretwell, “Bomb-Grade Plutonium Conversion Delayed; Production of Fuel for Power Plants Was to Start at SRS in Four 
Years,” The State (Columbia, S.C.), 10 February 2005.
223 Ann MacLachlan, “Opponents Protest as U.S. Pu Makes Its Way to Cadarache,” Nuclear Fuel, 11 October 2004.
224 Daniel Horner, “House Members Raise Questions over Plutonium Shipment to France,” Nuclear Fuel, 30 August 2004; MacLachlan, 
“Opponents Protest as U.S. Pu Makes Its Way to Cadarache.”
225 For the decision making the remarkable statement that there is “no rational reason” why a MOX-fueled reactor should have in-
creased security, see U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, In the Matter of Duke Energy Corporation (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 
1 and 2), CLI-04-29 (Washington, D.C.: NRC, 2004; available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/orders 
/2004/2004-29cli.pdf as of 29 March 2005). For the announcement of the authorization to load MOX lead test assemblies into the 
Catawba reactors, see U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Authorizes Use of Mixed Oxide Fuel Assemblies at Catawba Nucle-
ar Power Plant” (Washington, D.C.: NRC, 2005; available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2005/05-043.pdf 
as of 28 March 2005).
226 Interviews with State Department and DOE ofﬁcials, December 2004.
227 Wier, “Legislative Update.”
228 Lauren Markoe, “SRS Slated for New Surplus Plutonium Disposal,” The State (Columbia, S.C.), 20 February 2005.
229 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 549.
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Disposition of U.S. HEU continued, with another 20 
tons downblended or shipped for downblending 
(bringing the total to 65 tons so far, out of 174 tons 
of U.S. HEU declared excess), and six additional 
tons of HEU were added to the project in which 
the Tennessee Valley Authority will use fuel that 
does not quite meet commercial speciﬁcations, 
made from downblended U.S. HEU.230
The U.S. Department of Defense halted its funding 
for Russian trains transporting nuclear weapons to 
storage and dismantlement facilities for much of 
the year, in a dispute over transparency measures 
for these shipments.231  This program is perhaps 
the closest thing to direct U.S. assistance for dis-
mantlement of Russian nuclear warheads that 
currently exists.
The metrics in this area are very simple—the fractions 
of the relevant stockpiles that have been reduced 
(see Figure 3-7).
Reducing Metric 1: Reduction in  
Russian Warhead Stockpile 
Fraction accomplished.  Although the Nunn-Lugar 
cooperative threat reduction program is often thought 
of as a weapons dismantlement effort, the fact is that 
the United States has never paid for the dismantle-
ment of a single Russian nuclear warhead, because 
Russia and the United States have never been able to 
•
•
agree on the kind of monitoring measures the United 
States would require to ensure that the dismantle-
ments for which it was paying were really occurring. 
DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program does 
pay for shipments of warheads to dismantlement 
sites, and it routinely pays for the dismantlement of 
nuclear missiles, bombers, and submarines, but not 
for dismantlement of the warheads themselves.
Nevertheless, Russia has dismantled thousands of 
nuclear warheads since the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union.  Under DOD’s nuclear warhead trans-
portation program, the United States has paid for 
over 250 nuclear warhead shipments, typically car-
rying some 20-30 warheads each, either to central 
storage facilities or to dismantlement facilities.  While 
what is hoped to be a temporary halt in this effort be-
gan in 2004, if the issues that led to that pause are 
resolved, DOD anticipates supporting approximately 
70 shipments per year over the next ﬁve years.232  
The U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement has also 
provided a ﬁnancial incentive to dismantle warheads, 
by arranging for the commercial sale of uranium 
blended from the HEU warheads contain.  By the 
end of 2004, over 230 tons of HEU had been blended 
down under this agreement; if we assume that, on av-
erage, Russian warheads contain 25 kilograms of HEU, 
this is the equivalent of more than 9,000 nuclear war-
heads.233  Presumably a large fraction of the warheads 
230 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, pp. 516-517.
231 U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006, pp. 12, 43.
232 Interview with DOD ofﬁcial, January 2004, supplemented by U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual 
Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006, p. 43. DOD reports that 45 shipments took place in FY 2004.  
233 USEC, “Chronology: US-Russian Megatons to Megawatts Program: Recycling Nuclear Warheads into Electricity (as of December 31, 
2004)” (Bethesda, Md.: USEC, 2005; available at http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/Megatons_chronology.asp as of 28 March 2005).  
Figure 3-7 
How Much Reducing Work Have U.S.-Funded Programs Completed?
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transported to dismantlement facilities with U.S. as-
sistance were the same as warheads dismantled to 
provide HEU for the HEU Purchase Agreement, and 
hence these ﬁgures should not be added together. 
What is unknown, however, is (a) how much of the 
HEU blended down to date was from warheads dis-
mantled even before the HEU Purchase Agreement 
was negotiated (whose dismantlement the agree-
ment therefore could not take credit for), and (b) how 
many warheads Russia had when the agreement 
began.  By some public estimates, Russia had some 
32,000 warheads in 1993, when the HEU Purchase 
Agreement began, and has since reduced this ﬁgure 
to some 16,000.234  If all of the HEU blended to date 
came from warheads dismantled in part as a result of 
this HEU deal (a generous assumption), then it could 
be argued that U.S. programs have contributed to the 
dismantlement of nearly 30% of the total stockpile of 
nuclear warheads that Russia had when the agree-
ment began. 
Rate of progress.  Today, some 30 tons of HEU is 
being blended down every year under the HEU Pur-
chase Agreement, representing the equivalent of 
some 1,200 warheads per year, roughly an additional 
4% each year of the warheads Russia had when the 
HEU Purchase Agreement began.  The HEU Purchase 
Agreement is currently scheduled to end in 2013.  As 
there is no program in place to directly fund Russian 
warhead dismantlement, there is no planned comple-
tion date for such an effort.
Reducing Metric 2: Reduction in Russian  
Highly Enriched Uranium Stockpile
Fraction accomplished.  As just noted, by the end of 
2004, 231.5 metric tons of HEU had been destroyed 
(by blending it to low enriched uranium reactor fuel) 
as part of the U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement. 
In addition, by the end of FY 2004, some 5.4 tons 
of HEU had been destroyed as part of the Material 
Consolidation and Conversion (MCC) effort in DOE’s 
MPC&A program.235  This represents some 18% of the 
over 1,200 tons of weapon-grade HEU equivalent 
Russia was believed to possess when the HEU deal 
began.236
Rate of progress.  As already described, an additional 
30 tons of HEU is currently being destroyed each year, 
representing roughly an additional 2% of the original 
Russian HEU stockpile.  The program is currently sched-
uled to end in 2013, after 500 tons—some 40% of the 
original stockpile—has been blended.  In addition, 
DOE plans to blend down roughly an additional two 
tons per year in the MCC effort during FY 2005-2006.237 
Russia is also consuming some of its HEU stockpile as 
fuel for naval, icebreaker, research, and plutonium pro-
duction reactors, and is using some for commercial 
production of LEU fuel from European reprocessed 
uranium.238  To address a larger fraction of the stockpile 
more quickly, the blend-down of HEU should be sub-
stantially accelerated, and expanded well beyond the 
500 tons initially agreed.  
Reducing Metric 3: Reduction in  
Russian Plutonium Stockpile
Fraction accomplished.  Years of effort and hun-
dreds of millions of dollars of investment have been 
focused on laying the groundwork for disposition of 
excess weapons plutonium.  But the program is not 
yet at the point where any substantial amounts of ex-
cess weapons plutonium have been used as reactor 
fuel or otherwise transformed into forms unsuitable 
for weapons use.  Hence, the fraction accomplished to 
date in actually reducing the stockpile is zero.
234 Norris and Kristensen, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces, 2005.”
235 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 485.
236 David Albright has recently estimated that Russia had 1070 tons of military HEU as of the end of 2003, and 15-30 tons of civil HEU. 
(These are somewhat inconsistently expressed, as the 1070 ﬁgure is also the centerpoint of an estimate with a wide uncertainty 
range.)  These ﬁgures would have been somewhat more than 200 tons higher when the HEU Purchase Agreement began, before 
HEU began to be destroyed in that effort.  See Albright and Kramer, eds., Global Fissile Material Inventories.  For a discussion of a range 
of previous unclassiﬁed estimates, and of the various uses that are drawing down Russia’s HEU stockpile over time, see Bunn, “Un-
classiﬁed Estimates of Russia’s Plutonium and HEU Stockpiles—and World Civil Separated Plutonium Stockpiles.”  
237 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 485.
238 Bunn, “Unclassiﬁed Estimates of Russia’s Plutonium and HEU Stockpiles—and World Civil Separated Plutonium Stockpiles.”
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Rate of progress.  To date, the annual rate of prog-
ress in reducing excess plutonium stockpiles is also 
zero.  The last year, like the year before it, was a difﬁ-
cult one for the plutonium disposition effort, with the 
liability dispute blocking efforts to move toward con-
struction of U.S. and Russian facilities to make reactor 
fuel from excess weapons plutonium.  The U.S. gov-
ernment is seeking a U.S.-Russian liability protocol 
and a multilateral agreement on funding and manag-
ing Russian plutonium disposition, as envisioned in 
the PMDA.  These could provide the basis for actual 
construction and operation of the large facilities re-
quired—but progress toward resolving these issues 
have been slow.  
Efforts are still underway to pull together an inter-
national ﬁnancing package.  Despite the inclusion of 
plutonium disposition as one of the priorities in the 
$20 billion G8 Global Partnership, total pledges for the 
effort are still far below the $2 billion estimated cost 
of disposition of the 34 tons of Russian weapons plu-
tonium covered by the 2000 agreement (let alone the 
larger cost of disposition of a much larger fraction of 
Russia’s weapons plutonium, which would be neces-
sary if the effort was to make a signiﬁcant difference 
in reducing the nuclear theft and rearmament threats 
this material poses).  It seems clear that the decision 
to rely on an international funding approach, rather 
than paying for this effort with U.S. funds and allowing 
other nations to fund other priorities, has already de-
layed progress and will likely result in a more complex 
and less responsive management structure, reporting 
to multiple governments, in the future.  Because of 
the uncertainties in resolving the liability and ﬁnanc-
ing issues, among others, DOE does not even project 
a target date for when the Russian plutonium disposi-
tion program might be ﬁnished.239
If both the liability problem and the international ﬁ-
nancing and management issues can be resolved 
quickly, DOE hopes that construction of the needed 
plutonium fuel facilities could begin in FY 2006, and 
could be completed by approximately FY 2011.240  Ac-
tual loading of substantial quantities of fuel made 
from excess weapons plutonium will probably not oc-
cur until 2011-2012.  At the initial stage, current plans 
are to begin destroying approximately two tons per 
year of Russian excess weapons plutonium at that 
time, and then to attempt to increase this rate to four 
tons per year.  Russia will carry out disposition of ap-
proximately 38 tons of separated plutonium under the 
U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition and Management 
agreement, including 34 tons of excess weapons plu-
tonium and 4 tons of reactor-grade plutonium with 
which it will be blended, to maintain the conﬁdenti-
ality of the precise isotopic mix in Russia’s weapons 
plutonium.  If operations in fact began in 2011, and the 
four ton per year rate were achieved quickly, disposi-
tion of the material covered by this initial agreement 
could be completed in 2021-2022; if the program 
remained at two tons per year, disposition of this ma-
terial would not be completed until 2029.
The 38 tons of material covered in this agreement, 
however, represents less than one-quarter of Rus-
sia’s total stockpile of over 180 tons of separated 
plutonium (counting both weapons plutonium 
and weapons-usable civil plutonium).241  Indeed, as 
Russia’s plutonium production reactors continue to 
produce plutonium, and Russia continues to sepa-
rate weapons-usable civilian plutonium as well, if 
these are not stopped in a timely way, a two-ton-
per-year disposition program would effectively be 
running in place—eliminating as much plutonium 
every year as is produced every year.242  If production 
239 This has now been true for years, as the liability dispute has dragged on.  See U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 517; U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security 
Administration—Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, p. 480.
240 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 517.
241 Albright estimates a total Russian stockpile of 145 tons of military plutonium as of the end of 2003 (again, with substantial un-
certainty bounds), and Russia has ofﬁcially declared that as of that time, it also possessed 38.2 tons of separated civilian plutonium. 
Albright and Kramer, eds., Global Fissile Material Inventories; International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication Received from the 
Russian Federation Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium.
242 The plutonium production reactors continue to produce in the range of 1.2 tons of plutonium per year, and Russia’s declarations 
of separated civilian plutonium have increased, on average, by 1.3 tons per year for the past several years.  Thus, the total increase in 
separated plutonium stocks is in the range of 2.0–2.5 tons per year.
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were stopped, but disposition of all 170 tons of Rus-
sia’s stockpile except the amount needed to sustain 
a stockpile of 10,000 warheads were included in the 
program, at four tons a year, completion of the pluto-
nium disposition effort would stretch beyond 2040 
(or beyond 2070 at two tons per year).
Improved Reducing Metrics for the Future
The U.S. government should develop an assessment 
of (a) the total world military stockpiles of HEU and 
separated plutonium, and (b) the total world civilian 
stockpiles of HEU and separated plutonium, and track 
progress in reducing these total stockpiles.
SUMMARY: HOW MUCH OF THE JOB IS DONE?
Figure 3-8 summarizes what fraction of the job has 
been accomplished, when judged by the metrics 
described above for each of the six categories of ef-
fort.  Also shown is the fraction of the job that was 
accomplished during FY 2004, to give an impres-
sion of the current rate of progress when judged by 
these metrics.  There are substantial uncertainties in 
all of these estimates—even those based on ofﬁcial 
government data, since that data itself is uncertain.  
Overall, it is clear that while much has been ac-
complished in these efforts, across a broad range 
of metrics, less than half of the job has yet been 
done, after more than a decade of threat reduc-
tion efforts.  There remains too much grey space on 
this chart—grey space that represents thousands 
of insufﬁciently secure warheads, enough insecure 
nuclear material for tens of thousands more, and 
thousands of excess nuclear weapons scientists and 
workers not yet permanently redirected to civilian 
work.  Some of the bars are only inching across that 
grey space.  In some cases, the rate of progress even 
three years after the September 11 attacks remains 
so slow that if the current rate were continued, it 
would still be a decade or more before the job is 
done.  Terrorists and thieves may not give the world 
the luxury of that much time.
It would certainly not be correct to argue that noth-
ing is being done to address this threat.  The fact is 
that at the working level, hundreds of nuclear ex-
perts in the United States, Russia, and other countries 
have been working with dedication and creativity 
to move these efforts forward.  Hardly a week goes 
by without four to eight separate U.S. teams travel-
ing to Russia just for projects focusing on improving 
security for nuclear warheads and materials—with 
a comparable number of teams traveling for the 
various other projects considered in this report.243 
From travel to remote, frozen locales, to families left 
behind for weeks at a time, to frustration over the 
remaining obstacles to getting their jobs done, the 
participants in these efforts have endured consider-
able hardships with remarkably good spirit.  Even at 
the cabinet level, former Secretary of Energy Spen-
cer Abraham pushed hard to move this agenda 
forward, meeting frequently with Russian counter-
parts, launching new initiatives such as the GTRI, and 
setting demanding objectives for these programs to 
meet—and early indications are that his successor, 
Samuel Bodman, also plans to make this agenda a 
high priority.  President Bush himself has eloquently 
highlighted the threat, reportedly has repeatedly 
prodded his staff about whether enough was being 
done to address it,244 and clearly pushed for action 
at the Bratislava summit.
Yet when one looks objectively at what is being 
done, and poses the question, “Are the actions now 
being taken sufﬁcient to ensure, within a few years, 
that all the world’s stockpiles of nuclear weapons 
and weapons-usable nuclear material will be secure 
enough to be protected against the threats that ter-
rorists and criminals have demonstrated they can 
pose?” the answer is plainly “no.”  
Securing the world’s nuclear stockpiles has been 
largely left to the Department of Energy (along with 
243 Drawn from weekly data compiled by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Moscow ofﬁce.  A similar weekly number of DOD CTR 
teams can be added to these ﬁgures, covering a broad range of types of threat reduction activities, going well beyond nuclear mate-
rial and nuclear weapon security.
244 Interviews with administration ofﬁcials, January 2005.
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the modest portion of the Defense Department’s 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program focused 
on that topic, and the even more modest portions 
of the Department of State’s efforts devoted to it). 
For better or for worse, the Department of Energy 
has never been one of the leading national security 
agencies of the U.S. government, and the energy 
secretary rarely participates in the meetings where 
key security and diplomatic policies are formulated. 
There have been only intermittent efforts by the 
most senior White House ofﬁcials to identify and 
correct the obstacles to progress, and the subject is 
only rarely on the agenda when the president and 
the top national security ofﬁcials of the govern-
ment are meeting with their foreign counterparts. 
Yet most of the impediments to an expanded and 
Figure 3-8 
Controlling Nuclear Warheads, Material, and Expertise: 
How Much Work Have U.S.-Funded Programs Completed?
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accelerated effort involve issues of enormous politi-
cal and security sensitivity, stretching across agency 
boundaries—issues, in short, that only sustained 
presidential leadership is likely to be able to resolve.
Unfortunately, the same is even more true in Rus-
sia, and in many of the other countries that can and 
should play key roles in a fast-paced global effort to 
secure the world’s nuclear stockpiles.  President Pu-
tin has not directed his government to allocate the 
resources that are clearly needed to secure Russia’s 
nuclear stockpiles; has not intervened to prevent 
Russia’s security agencies from throwing up obsta-
cles to cooperation focused on improving nuclear 
security; has not given his nuclear agencies the mis-
sion, authority, and resources to set and enforce 
stringent nuclear security rules; has not given orders 
to consolidate Russia’s far-ﬂung nuclear stockpiles in 
a small number of secure locations; and has done lit-
tle to put Russia in the position of jointly leading an 
effort to secure nuclear stockpiles beyond Russia’s 
borders.  Both President Bush and President Putin 
appear to have given orders that nuclear security 
should be improved, and that cooperation to that 
end should go forward.  But neither has devoted 
the sustained attention needed to making sure 
that these efforts are not delayed by bureaucratic 
and political impediments they are in a position to 
sweep aside.
In both governments, there is a natural reluctance to 
raise issues to the presidential level if there is some 
hope of resolving them short of that.  It may well 
be, as a result, that neither president is even aware, 
for example, that dozens of sets of sensors and fenc-
ing that Russian security experts requested and the 
United States provided for a “quick ﬁx” of security at 
Russia’s nuclear warhead storage sites are still sitting 
in warehouses, more than four years after they were 
delivered; or that the $300 million Mayak Fissile Mate-
rial Storage Facility is still sitting empty (and will stay 
three-quarters empty unless either U.S. or Russian 
policies are changed); or that Russia’s nuclear agen-
cies have refused to force facilities that no longer 
have any genuine need for weapons-usable nuclear 
material to give it up, or to allow the United States to 
give them incentives to do so; or that deep problems 
of security culture, if not resolved, may mean that sites 
will still not have strong security even after modern 
security and accounting equipment is installed.
In short, while steps were taken in the last year to lay 
the foundation for potentially rapid progress in the 
future, an enormous amount of work is still needed 
to seize those opportunities, to build a structure of 
rapid action on the ground on the foundations that 
have been built.  Doing so is likely to require inten-
sive efforts coming not only out of the implementing 
agencies but from the U.S. and Russian presidents, 
along with other world leaders, in order to overcome 
difﬁcult obstacles that stretch across agency bound-
aries.  If such a sustained presidential effort is not 
forthcoming, a potentially deadly gap between the 
urgency of the threat and the scope and pace of U.S. 
and Russian efforts to address it is likely to remain.
4UPDATE OF THE BUDGET PICTURE
The Bush administration has requested a signiﬁcant 
increase in funding for programs to improve con-
trols on nuclear warheads, materials, and expertise 
around the world for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006.  Although 
adequate annual funding is not a sufﬁcient condition 
for progress in securing nuclear stockpiles, it is cer-
tainly a necessary one.  For several programs working 
to control nuclear warheads, materials, and expertise 
around the globe, managers are pushing up against 
constraints other than budgets, from disputes over 
how to cooperate to upgrade security at particularly 
sensitive nuclear facilities without unduly compro-
mising nuclear secrets, to disagreements over liability 
in the event of a nuclear accident in the course of co-
operation. 
But for some initiatives, as discussed below, additional 
funding would expand both the scope and pace of 
the work program ofﬁcials can carry out.  And if the 
non-monetary obstacles could be overcome for other 
programs, more money would surely be needed to 
carry out an expanded, strengthened, and acceler-
ated effort.  The United States should act to ensure 
that sufﬁcient funding is available so that budgets do 
not constrain progress in these efforts, as the costs of 
these programs are small compared to the untold hu-
man and economic costs of a terrorist nuclear attack.
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE FY 2006 BUDGET PROPOSAL
For FY 2006, which will start October 1, 2005, the Bush 
administration is proposing a budget of $982 million 
to control nuclear warheads, materials, and expertise 
around the world, as shown in Table 4-1.1  If approved, 
that resource level would be just over $175 million 
greater than the approved level for FY 2005, a 22% 
increase.  As Figure 4-1 shows, the FY 2006 proposal 
would provide more annual funding for this group of 
programs than has ever been granted before.  
With most of the headlines about the administration’s 
proposals for federal spending focusing on how little 
money there is to go around and how many politi-
cally sensitive programs are slated for the chopping 
block, the group of programs aimed at controlling 
1 This is out of a total threat reduction request of $1.312 billion (using a broad deﬁnition that includes programs beyond the bound-
aries of the former Soviet Union, but does not include spending on managing the United States’ own stockpiles).  The total request 
is discussed in detail below.  These ﬁgures are recorded in Anthony Wier, “Interactive Budget Database,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative 
Research Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2005; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/
funding.asp as of 15 March 2005). Users can use this database to compile custom charts on the cooperative threat reduction goals, 
agencies, and programs of their choice.  For a discussion of which programs are counted in our totals, see Anthony Wier, “Funding 
Summary,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2004; available at http://www.nti.
org/e_research/cnwm/overview/funding.asp as of 15 March 2005).  It should be noted that many programs related to controlling 
expertise or interdicting smuggling cover chemical, biological, and missile technologies as well as nuclear technologies, and hence, 
by including the full budgets for these programs, we inevitably overestimate somewhat the total budget that is speciﬁcally for con-
trolling nuclear warheads, materials, and expertise.  The ﬁgures are taken from the following budget documents: U.S. Department 
of Energy, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security Administration—Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, vol. 1, 
DOE/ME-0046 (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2005; available at http://www.mbe.doe.gov/Budgets/06Budgets/Content/Programs/Vol_1_
NNSA_3.pdf as of 14 February 2005); U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal 
Year 2006 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2005); U.S. Department of State, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Justiﬁcation 
for Foreign Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2005; available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/42245.pdf as of 3 March 2005). For initial summaries of the FY 2006 proposals, also see:  William Hoehn, “Preliminary Analysis 
of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2006 Cooperative Threat Reduction Budget Request” (Washington, D.C.: Russian 
American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, 2005; available at http://www.ransac.org/PDFFrameset.asp?PDF=preliminary_analysis 
_fy2006_ctr_request.pdf as of 15 March 2005); William Hoehn, “Preliminary Analysis of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Fiscal Year 
2006 Nonproliferation Budget Request“ (Washington, D.C.: Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, 2005; available at 
http://www.ransac.org/PDFFrameset.asp?PDF=preliminary_analysis_fy2006_doe_nn_request.pdf as of 15 March 2005).
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nuclear warheads, materials, and expertise have man-
aged on the whole to come out very well, though it 
is only a few individual programs that are responsi-
ble for most of the cumulative increase.  Some of the 
signiﬁcant changes for individual programs being 
proposed for the FY 2006 budget include:
The Department of Energy (DOE) is requesting 
a near tripling of the annual budget of the Elimi-
nation of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production 
program, from $44 million in FY 2005 to $132 mil-
lion.  This proposal alone accounts for over half 
of the total proposed increase for programs to 
control nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise 
overseas.  The increase is due to revised cost esti-
mates to build fossil fuel energy plants to replace 
the heat and electricity provided by three pluto-
nium production reactors in the Russian nuclear 
cities of Seversk and Zheleznogorsk.  
•
The Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, which 
we count separately from DOE’s Material Protec-
tion, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program 
because of its focus on interdiction rather than 
security, would receive a $54 million increase in 
the administration's FY 2006 proposed budget. 
The Megaports Initiative within the SLD program 
is requesting nearly $59 million more for FY 2006, 
raising the annual request to $74 million, mean-
ing that the “core” SLD program of installing and 
maintaining radiation detection equipment at key 
border crossings in and around the former Soviet 
Union is slated for a $5 million decrease, to a pro-
posed budget of $24 million.  
The Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security 
program at the Department of Defense (DOD) is 
requesting a $30 million budget for FY 2006, after 
DOD had reallocated its entire $26 million FY 2005 
•
•
Table 4-1 
Proposed and Approved U.S. Budgets for Controlling Nuclear Warheads, Material, and Expertise
(US$ in millions, 
 by ﬁscal year)
FY 1992–
FY 2003 
Enacted
FY 2004 
Final 
Enacted
FY 2005 
President’s 
Budget
FY 2005 
Final 
Enacted
FY 2006 
President’s 
Budget
Change from 
FY 2005 
Final
% Change 
from 
FY 2005 Final
Securing Warheads and 
Materials
2,471.9  323.5  310.0  409.8  453.2 43.4 10.6%
Interdicting Nuclear  
Smuggling
468.6  120.9  127.1  131.7  192.9 61.2 46.5%
Stabilizing Employment 
for Nuclear Personnel
721.4  105.0  106.5  105.8  105.5 -0.3 -0.3%
Monitoring Stockpiles 
and Reductions
158.8  35.2  38.9  38.7  34.0 -4.8 -12.3%
Ending Further  
Production
139.3  81.8  50.1  44.0  132.0 88.0 200.2%
Reducing Excess  
Stockpiles
713.2  56.2  74.0  73.4  64.0 -9.4 -12.8%
Total 1 4,673.3  722.6  706.6 2  803.3 2  981.5 178.2 22.2%
1 The totals reported for FY 1992–2003 and FY 2004 Final Enacted in Table 4-2 of our 2004 report differs slightly from this year’s re-
port because of changes in past budget information from DOD and DOE, a rescission of prior year DOD balances that was applied 
to FY 2003, and the expiration of FY 2001 funds for the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production program transferred 
from DOD to DOE.
2 As of April 2005, Congress and the administration were still deliberating on a FY 2005 supplemental appropriations bill, so no 
funding from that supplemental is reﬂected in this table.  Initial versions of the bill passed in the House of Representatives and 
the Senate included $55 million in FY 2005 funding for projects to secure nuclear materials outside the former Soviet Union.  The 
House also included $55 million for the Megaports program, while the Senate initially allocated only $29 million. 
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budget to the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security 
program.2  
The administration is proposing to gather the 
various component pieces making up the Global 
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) into a uniﬁed 
budget line item.  Within the new GTRI budget 
line, for FY 2006 the administration is looking to 
increase by $6 million, to almost $25 million, the 
funding available for the Reduced Enrichment 
for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. 
Money added by Congress for FY 2005 had in-
creased RERTR funding by $10 million over its ﬁnal 
FY 2004 level of $9 million.  
Also within GTRI, the administration is proposing 
to keep funding for the Russian Research Reactor 
Fuel Return (RRRFR) program at about the ﬁnal $15 
•
•
million FY 2005 level, though the FY 2005 level had 
been increased by $5 million over the original ad-
ministration level by congressional additions.  The 
administration is also proposing to nearly double 
for FY 2006, from $4.5 million to just over $8 mil-
lion, the budget for U.S. Foreign Research Reactor 
Spent Nuclear Fuel Return, to repatriate spent 
research fuel originally provided by the United 
States to foreign countries.
The administration is also proposing within the 
GTRI budget line to eliminate funding for the pro-
gram to purchase HEU research reactor fuel from 
Russia, which received nearly $10 million in FY 
2005.  Meanwhile, the program to secure the spent 
fuel from Kazakhstan's BN-350 reactor is slated to 
see an increase from $2 million in FY 2005 to $8 
million in FY 2006.
•
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006, p. 80.
Figure 4-1 
Annual U.S. Budgets for Controlling Nuclear Warheads, Material, and Expertise
Note:  FY 1999 includes one-time funding of $325 million added by the FY 1999 Omnibus and Supplemental Appropriations Act 
to buy natural uranium to solidify the HEU Purchase Agreement, and a one-time appropriation of $200 million to support Russian 
plutonium disposition.
Source:  Authors’ calculations, based on data in “Interactive Budget Database,” Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Control-
ling Nuclear Warheads and Materials, March 2005 (available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/funding.asp as of 
22 March 2005).
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The $24 million International Radiological Threat 
Reduction program is being transferred from the 
MPC&A budget to the GTRI budget line, while a 
$13 million proposal for domestic radiological 
threat reduction (a $5 million increase over com-
parable FY 2005 efforts) is new to our accounting 
of the budget for controlling nuclear weapons, 
materials, and expertise (contributing on paper 
to the overall increase for such programs noted 
above).3  
In our accounting, the MPC&A program, exclud-
ing the SLD program, shows a $30 million paper 
reduction from the FY 2005 ﬁnal allocation to the 
FY 2006 proposal.  This is largely because of the 
proposed transfer in FY 2006 of the International 
Radiological Threat Reduction program to the 
GTRI budget line.  Within the MPC&A program, 
DOE is proposing to increase funding by $33 mil-
lion to secure civilian nuclear sites, particularly 
outside the former Soviet Union, to $47 million 
for FY 2006.  That increase is offset by proposed 
signiﬁcant funding reductions for: securing the 
Russian Navy complex (by $9 million, to approxi-
mately $6 million); securing Russian Strategic 
Rocket Forces sites (to $48 million in FY 2006, a 
$14 million drop); and sustainability initiatives 
(to $30 million, down by $11 million).  Even so, 
the “core” MPC&A program—that is, excluding 
the SLD and International Radiological Threat Re-
duction program—is slated to receive over $46 
million total more in FY 2006 than it did in FY 
2004.
The FY 2006 budget proposal comes on the heels of 
a FY 2005 budget season in which Congress added 
signiﬁcant funding beyond the administration’s ini-
tial request for the MPC&A account and for activities 
under the new Global Threat Reduction Initiative, 
among other things.  Some of the most signiﬁcant 
•
•
outcomes from the FY 2005 congressional budget 
cycle included:4
For FY 2005, the MPC&A program, excluding the 
SLD portion, received a ﬁnal budget allocation of 
$275 million, a nearly 30% increase over the ﬁnal 
FY 2004 level of $212 million, and a nearly 40% in-
crease over the Bush administration's request.  The 
House of Representatives, led by Energy and Water 
Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman David 
Hobson (R-OH), initially tried to increase fund-
ing by over $35 million more than that, but ﬁnally 
agreed to a slightly lower level.
After initial hesitation following the administra-
tion's announcement of the GTRI, Congress added 
$30 million in unrequested funding for GTRI- 
related activities.  With a combined $94 million in 
FY 2005 funding, the component programs of the 
GTRI collectively have $24 million more to spend 
in the current ﬁscal year than they did in FY 2004.  
The House of Representatives initially added $65 
million to the SLD FY 2005 $39 million request, but 
agreed in conference with the Senate on a ﬁnal 
level of $44 million, a $5 million increase.
The FY 2005 budget for the Elimination of Weap-
ons Grade Plutonium Production program was 
cut by $10 million from its $50 million proposed 
level.  The program escaped an even deeper cut 
proposed initially by the House, but also beneﬁted 
from the reappropriation of $4 million in expired 
funds originally transferred from DOD.
All told, after accounting for various program deci-
sions and budget reallocations, the current budget 
level for FY 2005 for cooperative programs focused 
on countering the threat of nuclear weapons, mate-
rials, and expertise is $803 million, $80 million more 
than the ﬁnal FY 2004 level, and nearly $100 million, 
•
•
•
•
3 In general, our budget categories for controlling nuclear warheads, materials, and expertise focus only on nuclear weapons and the 
materials from which they could be made, rather than radiological materials, but we have included the radiological funding here 
because, as an effort within larger line items that are focused on controlling nuclear material (previously MPC&A, now GTRI), it is dif-
ﬁcult to separate out in budget accounting.
4 For a recap of the 2004 legislative session, see Anthony Wier, “Legislative Update,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Con-
trolling Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2004; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/legislative.asp as of 2 
February 2005). The highlights that follow are derived from that analysis.
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or over 13%, greater than the Bush administration's 
FY 2005 request.
As of April 2005, the ﬁnal budget for FY 2005 may also 
be subject to further change before the end of the 
ﬁscal year.  The Congress and the administration are 
deliberating over a large supplemental appropriation 
package submitted by the administration in February 
2005, to support on-going military and anti-terror-
ism activities and other international assistance.  The 
original administration request included $110 million 
in supplemental funding for the Megaports pro-
gram to support deployment of radiation detection 
equipment and training for ofﬁcials at four additional 
overseas ports.5  In its initial version of the bill, the 
House of Representatives halved Megaports Initiative 
funding to $55 million, providing the remaining $55 
million “to address urgent priorities outside of the 
former Soviet Union to secure nuclear materials from 
diversion or theft by terrorists or states of concern.”6 
In its version, the Senate retained the $55 million for 
securing nuclear materials outside the former Soviet 
Union, but reduced Megaports funding to $29 million 
because, as the Senate Appropriations Committee 
explained, the Megaports Initiative could not expect 
to spend any more by the end of the ﬁscal year.7  As 
of early April 2005, the two houses of Congress were 
still negotiating to reconcile competing versions of 
the bill, so the ﬁnal budget allocations arising from 
the supplemental bill are not yet known.
The administration’s FY 2006 budget proposal will 
affect the various goals for controlling nuclear war-
heads, materials, and expertise in different ways.
Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials.  As 
shown in Table 4-2, the most critical part of the mis-
sion to control nuclear weapons and materials is 
slated to receive increased budgetary support during 
the current and upcoming budget cycles.  As noted 
above, Congress added signiﬁcant unrequested 
funding in the FY 2005 budget season for the MPC&A 
program and the administration’s new GTRI effort, 
and for FY 2006 the administration is proposing to 
largely sustain the previous year’s additions.  
Even with expanded funding and authority for the 
new GTRI effort to secure and remove nuclear and 
radiological materials from vulnerable sites, however, 
GTRI does not yet have sufﬁcient funding to offer a 
broad range of incentives to a large number of sites 
and governments to convince them to give up their 
dangerous materials.  A funding increase targeted at 
GTRI could give program ofﬁcials greater freedom to 
explore incentives to convince facilities and states 
to give up nuclear material that could fuel a terrorist 
nuclear attack.  It is worth remembering that Project 
Sapphire, the operation in 1994 to remove nearly 600 
kilograms of HEU from Kazakhstan, ended up costing 
some $40 million with all the incentives the Kazakh 
government was given;8 certainly not every removal 
operation will require such investments, but program 
5 U.S. Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, “Estimate #1—Emergency Supplemental (Various Agencies): Ongoing Military Operations 
in the War on Terror; Reconstruction Activities in Afghanistan; Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction; and Other Purposes—2/14/05,” in 
Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 2005 (Washington, D.C.: OMB, 2005; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/amendments/supplemental_2_14_05.pdf as of 11 April 2005).
6 See the initial House version of U.S. House of Representatives, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global 
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, 109th Congress, 1st Session, H.R. 1268 (2005; available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
bdquery/z?d109:h.r.01268: as of 11 April 2005). The explanation of the targets of the money can be found in U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, Report by the House Appropriations Committee on the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global 
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, 109th Congress, 1st Session, House Report 109-16 (2005; available at http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/z?cp109:hr16.109: as of 11 April 2005). 
7 For the Senate explanation of its initial funding allocation, see U.S. Senate, Report by the Senate Appropriations Committee on the 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, 109th Congress, 1st Session, 
Senate Report 109-52 (2005; available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/z?cp109:sr52.109: as of 11 April 2005).
8 Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, “Removing Material from Vulnerable Sites,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Controlling 
Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2004; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/securing/vulnerable.asp as of 2 February 
2005). Also see Philipp C. Bleek, Global Cleanout: An Emerging Approach to the Civil Nuclear Material Threat (Cambridge, Mass.: Project 
on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, September 2004; available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/
bleekglobalcleanout.pdf as of 13 April 2005).
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Table 4-2 
U.S. Funding for Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials
(US$ in millions, 
 by ﬁscal year) Dep’t.
FY 2004 
Final 
Enacted
FY 2005 
President’s 
Budget
FY 2005 
Final  
Enacted
FY 2006 
President’s 
Budget
Change from 
FY 2005  
Final
% Change 
from 
FY 2005 Final
Material Protection,  
Control, & Accounting
DOE  212.147 1  199.000 1  275.451 1  245.506 2 -29.945 -10.9%
Nuclear Weapons Storage 
Security - Russia
DOD  48.000  48.672  73.899 3  74.100 0.201 0.3%
Nuclear Weapons  
Transportation Security 
- Russia
DOD  23.200  26.300 0.000 3  30.000 30.000 N/A
Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative (GTRI)
DOE  [69.464]  -  11.000 4
[93.803]
 97.975 [4.172] 5 [4.4%] 5
Reduced Enrichment for 
Research and Test  
Reactors (RERTR)
DOE  8.860  9.965  18.813 6 [24.732] 6 [5.919] 5 [31.5] 5
Russian Research Reactor 
Fuel Return
DOE  9.691  9.866  15.246 6  [14.703] 6 [-0.543] 5 [-3.6%] 5
Foreign Research Reactor 
Spent Nuclear Fuel  
Acceptance Program
DOE  6.115 7  4.918 4.500 6  [8.712] 6 [4.212] 5 [93.6%] 5
BN-350 Fuel Security DOE  8.270  2.000  1.984 6  [8.000] 6 [6.016] 5 [303.2%] 5
International Nuclear  
Security
DOE  7.167 8  9.230  8.884  5.578 -3.306 -37.2%
Total, Securing Nuclear 
Warheads and Materials
 323.450  309.951 9 409.777 9  453.159 43.382 10.6%
1 Excludes Second Line of Defense funding. Includes funding for the Radiological Dispersal Device program, which will be rolled 
into the Global Threat Reduction Initiative budget line in FY 2006.
2 Excludes Second Line of Defense funding, and excludes funding for the Radiological Dispersal Device program, which will be 
rolled into the Global Threat Reduction Initiative budget line in FY 2006.
3 Updated to reﬂect allocation speciﬁed in Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006.
4 Reﬂects Emerging Threats component of FY 2005 GTRI funding. Through FY 2005, funding for component programs rolled into 
GTRI are shown under each original funding line. DOE estimates comparable FY 2005 total GTRI component funding to be $93.803 
million.
5 Bracketed ﬁgures reﬂect the changes in funding proposed between FY 2005 and FY 2006 for the GTRI component activities, and 
for the sum of those components. DOE estimates comparable FY 2005 total GTRI component funding to be $93.803 million.
6 Funding for subsequent ﬁscal years have been rolled into the Global Threat Reduction Initiative budget line. FY 2006 bracketed 
ﬁgures show comparable funding level.
7 Updated to reﬂect allocation speciﬁed in FY 2006 DOE Congressional Budget Justiﬁcation.
8 According to FY 2005 DOE Congressional Budget Justiﬁcation, includes funding for program formerly known as “Russia/NIS Safe-
guards Sustainability,” and for efforts to remove nuclear material from vulnerable sites.
9 As of early April 2005, Congress and the administration were still deliberating on a FY 2005 supplemental appropriations bill, so 
no funding from that supplemental is reﬂected in this table.  Initial versions of the bill passed in the House of Representatives and 
the Senate included $55 million in FY 2005 funding for projects to secure nuclear materials outside the former Soviet Union. 
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ofﬁcials should be empowered to pursue every rea-
sonable option to guarantee that nuclear material 
will not fall into the wrong hands.
Similarly, for material that cannot be removed from 
vulnerable sites, additional funding could enable 
DOE to provide security upgrades for those facilities, 
particularly in the non-nuclear weapons states.9  UN 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, which was 
passed largely through the initiative of the United 
States, creates a binding legal obligation on every 
country on earth to put in place “appropriate effec-
tive” security and accounting for their nuclear and 
other weapons of mass destruction stockpiles.10  Ad-
ditional funding beyond DOE’s proposed $6 million 
budget for the International Nuclear Security effort 
could increase the scope and pace of work to help 
other countries meet the UNSCR 1540 standard in se-
curing caches of nuclear materials.
As noted above, one of the proposed reductions for FY 
2006 in DOE’s MPC&A budget is for efforts to ensure 
that Russia can sustain U.S.-provided infrastructure 
over the long term.  DOE is looking to reduce annual 
funding for this program from $41 million in FY 2005 
to $30 million in FY 2006.11  DOE explains that the 
reduction will be enabled by DOE’s ability to move 
the purchase of 10 hardened railcars for nuclear 
material transport forward to FY 2005.  But with se-
curity upgrades being completed for more and more 
sites, and with DOE’s 2008 deadline for completing 
all nuclear material security upgrades in Russia fast 
approaching, it seems counterintuitive that DOE is 
reducing the budget for MPC&A sustainability prep-
aration.  Presidents Bush and Putin at their February 
2005 summit in Bratislava announced that their two 
countries will convene a bilateral workshop to fo-
cus attention on improving nuclear security culture, 
including fostering well-trained security personnel 
and well-maintained security systems.12  Current and 
future budget proposals—in both countries—will 
need to be calibrated to support the initiatives that 
come out of that workshop. 
As noted above, both the House and the Senate also 
have approved initial versions of supplemental leg-
islation to provide an extra $55 million in FY 2005 
funding to support operations to secure nuclear ma-
terials outside the former Soviet Union.  As of April 
2005, a ﬁnal version of that legislation has not been 
signed into law, and so is not counted in the charts 
above.
Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling.  The FY 2005 and 
2006 budget levels will sustain, and in some cases ex-
pand, the enhanced budgetary support programs to 
interdict nuclear smuggling overseas have received 
since the 9/11 attacks (see Table 4-3).  
While the increase being requested by DOE’s Mega-
ports Initiative in the Second Line of Defense budget 
line would fund installation of radiation detection 
equipment at ﬁve major international ports, DOE ex-
pects that the reduced annual funding for the “core” 
SLD will reduce the number of new sites with SLD 
radiation detection equipment from 29 new sites in 
FY 2005 to 12 in FY 2006.13  Meanwhile, the nearly $8 
million proposed increase for the State Department’s 
Export Control and Related Border Security Assis-
tance program, an 18% increase over the FY 2005 
allocation, would allow the program to fund coop-
erative projects, related to nuclear and other export 
control efforts, in over 40 countries.14  UNSCR 1540 
9 Currently, funding for security upgrades in non-nuclear weapons states outside the former Soviet Union comes from the Global 
Nuclear Security budget line, while the MPC&A program funds upgrades in other states, including the former Soviet Union.
10 United Nations, “1540 Committee” (New York: UN, 2005; available at http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/meeting.html as 
of 25 February 2005).
11 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, pp. 489-491.
12 “Joint Statement by President Bush and President Putin on Nuclear Security Cooperation” (Bratislava, Slovakia: The White House, 
Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary, 2005; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050224-8.html as of 25 Feb-
ruary 2005).
13 DOE notes that there were 66 sites with radiation detection equipment by the end of FY 2004, and of those 66, 2 were megaports, 
leaving 64 other sites.  For FY 2005, the target is 98 sites total, 5 of which are megaports.  For FY 2006, the target is 115 cumulative, 10 
of which are megaports.  U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 485.
14 U.S. Department of State, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Justiﬁcation for Foreign Operations, pp. 128-132.
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creates a legal obligation for all 191 member states 
of the United Nations to put in place “appropriate 
effective” controls on the movement of WMD and 
related materials across their borders, and most of 
these states will require assistance to put effective 
controls in place, but these U.S.-sponsored programs 
would need additional money and personnel to help 
countries around the world meet the UNSCR 1540 
mandate.15
As noted above, the House approved an initial ver-
sion of supplemental legislation that would create an 
extra $55 million in FY 2005 funding to support the 
Megaports Initiative.  The Senate, meanwhile, only 
provided $29 million to support the Megaports pro-
gram.  As of April 2005, the two chambers have yet 
to reconcile their competing versions of the bill, and 
ﬁnal legislation has not been signed into law, so no 
additional funding for Megaports is counted in the 
charts above.
Stabilizing Employment for Nuclear Personnel. 
The cumulative FY 2006 budget proposed for the 
programs pursuing this goal is almost identical to 
the ﬁnal allocation of FY 2005 (see Table 4-4).16  In-
deed, the budgets for these programs have been 
15 United Nations, “1540 Committee.”
16 None of the programs focus solely on redirecting former Soviet scientists and engineers with nuclear expertise (except for the 
Nuclear Cities Initiative component of the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention), but their entire budgets are included here 
because of the difﬁculty of breaking out how much of each is spent on nuclear scientists and engineers versus other scientists and 
engineers with WMD knowledge.
Table 4-3  
U.S. Funding for Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling
(US$ in millions, 
 by ﬁscal year) Dep’t.
FY 2004 
Final 
Enacted
FY 2005 
President’s 
Budget
FY 2005 
Final  
Enacted
FY 2006 
President’s 
Budget
Change from 
FY 2005  
Final
% Change 
from 
FY 2005 Final
Second Line of  
Defense
DOE  46.349 1  39.000 2  44.000 2  97.929 2 53.929 122.6%
Export Control and  
Related Border Security 
Assistance
State  35.788  38.000  37.696  44.400 6.704 17.8%
WMD Proliferation  
Prevention
DOD  29.400  40.030  39.900 3  40.600 0.700 1.8%
International  
Counterproliferation
DOD  9.400  10.100  10.100  10.000 4 -0.100 -1.0%
Total, Interdicting  
Nuclear Smuggling 5
 120.937  127.130 6 131.696 6  192.929 61.233 46.5%
1 Funding listed under the Material Protection, Control, & Accounting budget line item. Updated to reﬂect allocation speciﬁed in 
FY 2006 DOE Congressional Budget Justiﬁcation.
2 Funding listed under the Material Protection, Control, & Accounting budget line item.
3 Updated to reﬂect allocation speciﬁed in Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006.
4 Estimated amount, until further information is made available by the Defense Department.
5 This total does not include amounts requested for radiation detection at U.S. borders or inside the United States.  For example, 
for FY 2006 the Department of Homeland Security is requesting $227 million to fund the Domestic Nuclear Detection Ofﬁce, to 
coordinate development and deployment of a national domestic nuclear detection architecture.
6 As of early April 2005, Congress and the administration were still deliberating on a FY 2005 supplemental appropriations bill, 
so no funding from that supplemental is reﬂected in this table.  Initial versions of the bill passed in the House of Representatives 
included $55 million for the Megaports Initiative, while the Senate initially allocated only $29 million. 
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remarkably stable in nominal terms over the last 
several years.  The previous chapter showed that 
these efforts have a long way to go in meeting 
meaningful goals for creating sustainable civilian 
work for former Soviet scientists and for helping to 
downsize Russia’s nuclear weapons complex to a 
level appropriate to its planned stockpiles.  As we 
have discussed in prior reports, having anything 
more than a marginal effect on the wrenching tran-
sition of the ten entire cities in Russia where most of 
Russia’s nuclear materials and nuclear personnel re-
side will require fundamental changes in the effort 
along with additional funding.17 
For FY 2006 the State Department’s Nonproliferation 
of WMD Expertise budget line will also fund projects 
to support civilian employment for former Iraqi and 
Libyan weapons scientists.18  It is not clear whether 
the $2.5 million requested increase for the larger 
budget line will be enough to cover expansion of 
work in Iraq and Libya, or whether these additions 
will require reductions in other program activities, 
including support of the International Science and 
Technology Centers in Moscow and Ukraine.
Both the DOE and State Department efforts are trying 
to elicit greater contributions from private partners in 
17 Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on 
Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/
overview/2004report.asp as of 1 February 2005), pp. 70-71; Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John Holdren, Controlling Nuclear 
Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, 
Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2003; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/report.asp as of 
1 February 2005), pp. 141-146.
18 U.S. Department of State, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Justiﬁcation for Foreign Operations, pp. 136-137.
Table 4-4  
U.S. Funding for Stabilizing Employment for Nuclear Personnel
(US$ in millions, 
 by ﬁscal year) Dep’t.
FY 2004 
Final 
FY 2005 
President’s 
Budget
FY 2005 
Final  
Enacted
FY 2006 
President’s 
Budget
Change from 
FY 2005  
Final
% Change 
from 
FY 2005 Final
International Science and 
Technology Centers/ 
BW Redirection
State  50.202 1  -  -  - N/A N/A
Nonproliferation of WMD 
Expertise
State  -  50.500 2 50.096 2  52.600 2 2.504 5.0%
Global Initiatives for Prolif-
eration Prevention 3
DOE  39.764  41.000  40.675 4  37.890 -2.785 -6.8%
Civilian Research and  
Development Foundation
State  15.000 5  15.000 5  15.000 5  15.000 5 0.000 0.0%
Total, Stabilizing  
Employment for Nuclear 
Personnel
104.966  106.500  105.771  105.490 -0.281 -0.3%
1 Budget information does not show enough detail to provide component targeted at nuclear weapons scientists and engineers.
2 Replaces budget item called “International Science and Technology Centers/BW Redirection.” Budget information does not show 
enough detail to provide component targeted at nuclear weapons scientists and engineers.
3 DOE and congressional documents combine amounts for the Nuclear Cities Initiative and the Initiatives for Proliferation Preven-
tion into the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention line item.  This account was formerly called “Russian Transition Initiatives.” 
DOE changed the name in the FY 2006 Congressional Budget Justiﬁcation.
4 Updated to reﬂect allocation speciﬁed in FY 2006 DOE Congressional Budget Justiﬁcation.
5 Estimated amount, until further information is made available by the State Department.
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scientiﬁc redirection projects, and are increasing train-
ing and support so that scientists and their institutes 
can move away from U.S. support.  DOE boasts that 
for FY 2004 it received matching contributions equal 
to 100% of U.S. governmental funding, an indicator of 
commercial interest in supported projects.19  For FY 
2003, 10% of State Department funds, which in the 
past have tended to support fundamental scientiﬁc 
research that were not directly ready for commercial 
activity, were matched by private groups.20  
Monitoring Stockpiles and Reductions.  Funding 
for these programs have also largely been stable, 
though for FY 2006 the Bush administration is pro-
posing to reduce funding for the Warhead and Fissile 
Material Transparency program by $3 million, an al-
most 18% decrease from its $16 million level in FY 
2005 (see Table 4-5).21  In general, funding is not the 
greatest constraint for these efforts.  As we discussed 
in our March 2003 report, the most critical issues 
blocking or delaying progress are almost entirely pol-
icy issues, though additional funding would likely be 
needed were those policy issues resolved.22  
Ending Further Production.  As noted above, for 
FY 2006 the administration is proposing to nearly 
triple the annual funding for the program to con-
struct fossil fuel plants in the Russian closed nuclear 
cities Seversk and Zheleznogorsk to replace the heat 
and energy generated by three reactors that con-
tinue to produce 1.2 metric tons of weapon-grade 
plutonium every year (as shown in Table 4-6).  The 
proposed funding increase reﬂects new estimates 
of the projected costs of the projects, not an effort 
to accelerate the 2008 shutdown of the two Seversk 
reactors or the 2011 shutdown of the Zheleznogo-
rsk reactor.23  Indeed, in order to maintain the 2011 
scheduled shutdown for the Zheleznogorsk reactor, 
19 U.S. Department of Energy, Performance and Accountability Report: FY 2004, DOE/ME0044 (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2004; available 
at http://www.mbe.doe.gov/progliaison/doe04par.pdf as of 18 February 2005), p. 134. It is important to note, however, that these 
matching funds in most cases represent U.S. companies paying for their own work on joint projects, not money that actually em-
ploys additional WMD experts from the former Soviet Union.
20 U.S. Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, “Department of State and International Assistance Programs,” in Budget of the United States 
Government: Fiscal Year 2006—Program Assessment Rating Tool (Washington, D.C.: OMB, 2005; available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/budget/fy2006/pma/state.pdf as of 1 March 2005), p. 217.
21 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 473.
22 Bunn, Wier, and Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, pp. 147-150.
23 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 511.  For more information, see U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability Ofﬁce, Nuclear Proliferation: DOE’s Effort to Close Russia’s Plutonium Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and 
Table 4-5 
U.S. Funding for Monitoring Weapons and Warhead Stockpiles and Reductions
(US$ in millions, 
 by ﬁscal year) Dep’t.
FY 2004 
Final 
FY 2005 
President’s 
Budget
FY 2005 
Final  
Enacted
FY 2006 
President’s 
Budget
Change from 
FY 2005  
Final
% Change 
from 
FY 2005 Final
HEU Transparency  
Implementation
DOE  17.894  20.950  20.784  20.483 -0.301 -1.4%
Warhead and Fissile Mate-
rial Transparency
DOE  15.814  16.431  16.431  13.482 -2.949 -17.9%
Trilateral Initiative DOE  1.500 1  1.500 1  1.500 1  0.000 2 -1.500 -100.0%
Total, Monitoring  
Stockpiles and Reductions
 35.208  38.881  38.715  33.965 -4.750 -12.3%
1 While funding for this activity is embedded in a larger budget line item, in recent years, this project is thought to have been 
funded at approximately $1.5 million per year. 
2 Previous levels had been assumed pending further information; as the effort is largely dormant, no assumption is made for FY 
2006 until further information becomes available.
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even with the increased budgets stretching at least 
ﬁve years in the future, DOE says it will require inter-
national contributions.24  For FY 2006, DOE may face 
some difﬁculties in obtaining this additional fund-
ing: in its initial effort to reduce FY 2005 funding for 
the program, the House Appropriations Committee 
reasoned, “The Committee is unprepared to perpetu-
ate the Department’s preference for proposing new 
initiatives with inadequate cost estimates, only to be 
confronted with signiﬁcant cost increases once Con-
gress has begun funding the activity.”25
Reducing Excess Stockpiles.  The program to dis-
pose of Russia’s excess weapons plutonium also 
escaped a House effort to halve new funding for the 
program, using the failure of the United States and 
Russia to agree on how liability for accidents and sab-
otage would be distributed for construction projects 
Final Shutdown Is Uncertain, GAO-04-662 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2004; available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04662.pdf as 
of 14 February 2005).
24 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 511.
25 United States House of Representatives, Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2005, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, 
House Report 108-554 (2004; available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/z?cp108:hr554.108: as of 15 March 2005).
Table 4-6  
U.S. Funding for Ending Further Production of Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material 
(US$ in millions, 
 by ﬁscal year) Dep’t.
FY 2004 
Final 
Enacted
FY 2005 
President’s 
Budget
FY 2005 
Final  
Enacted
FY 2006 
President’s 
Budget
Change from 
FY 2005  
Final
% Change 
from 
FY 2005 Final
Elimination of Weapons 
Grade Plutonium  
Production
DOE  81.835 1  50.097  43.969 2  132.000 88.031 200.2%
Total, Ending Further  
Production
 81.835  50.097  43.969  132.000 88.031 200.2%
1 All $32.1 million in FY 2001 funds transferred to DOE from DOD expired, and were reappropriated to DOE n FY 2004 by the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act of FY 2004.
2 $4.189 million in FY 2002 funds transferred to DOE from DOD expired, and were reappropriated to DOE in FY 2005 by the National 
Defense Authorization Act of FY 2004.
Table 4-7  
U.S. Funding for Reducing Excess Stockpiles of Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material
(US$ in millions, 
 by ﬁscal year) Dep’t.
FY 2004 
Final 
Enacted
FY 2005 
President’s 
Budget
FY 2005 
Final 
Enacted
FY 2006 
President’s 
Budget
Change from 
FY 2005  
Final
% Change 
from 
FY 2005 Final
Russian Plutonium  
Disposition
DOE  55.218 1  64.000  63.493 1  64.000 0.507 0.8%
HEU Reactor Fuel Purchase DOE  1.000  10.000  9.920 2  [0.000] 2 -9.920 -100.0%
Total, Reducing Excess 
Stockpiles 3
 56.218  74.000  73.413  64.000 -9.413 -12.8%
1 Updated to reﬂect allocation speciﬁed in FY 2006 DOE Congressional Budget Justiﬁcation.
2 Funding for subsequent ﬁscal years will be rolled into the Global Threat Reduction Initiative budget line. DOE nevertheless pro-
poses to zero out funding for this program in FY 2006.
3 Total does not include funding to dispose of U.S. excess plutonium and HEU.  For FY 2006, DOE is requesting a combined $589 
million for these programs.
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Table 4-8  
Proposed and Approved Funding Levels for All U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Efforts
(US$ in millions, 
 by ﬁscal year)
FY 1992–
FY 2003 
Enacted
FY 2004 
Final 
Enacted
FY 2005 
President’s 
Budget
FY 2005 
Final 
Enacted
FY 2006 
President’s 
Budget
Change from  
FY 2005  
Final
% Change 
from 
FY 2005 Final
Department of Energy 1  2,897.0  466.1  484.9  583.6  720.7 137.2 23.5%
Department of Defense 2 4,300.9  466.8  421.1  419.8  427.0 7.3 1.7%
Department of State 3 883.3  145.8  153.0  149.5  164.5 15.0 10.0%
Total 8,081.2 4 1,078.8 4 1,059.0 4 1,152.9 5  1,312.3 159.4 13.8%
1 In its own documents, the administration reports that it is requesting $1,013 million in FY 2006 for cooperative nonproliferation 
programs as part the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, with $526 million of that coming 
out of the Department of Energy.  The administration ﬁgure only includes spending in the former Soviet Union, while our ﬁgure 
includes all programs with a cooperative threat reduction component for which information is available.
2 The administration’s count for the Pentagon’s proposed contribution in FY 2006 to the G8 Global Partnership is $416 million, 
though that estimate does not include, as we do, an estimated $10 million for the International Counterproliferation program, or 
an estimated $1.5 million for the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation program.
3 The administration also reports that it is requesting $71 million for the State Department in FY 2006 for cooperative nonprolif-
eration programs as part the G8 Global Partnership.  This ﬁgure includes only the parts of the Export Control and Related Border 
Security Assistance program and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund expected to go towards work in the former Soviet 
Union, while our ﬁgure includes the entirety of these programs’ funding.  The government ﬁgure also does not include, as we do, 
an estimated $15 million for the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program (which has some nonproliferation ben-
eﬁts), and an estimated $15 million for the Civilian Research and Development Foundation.
4 The totals reported for FY 1992-2003, FY 2004 Final Enacted, and the FY 2005 President’s Budget in Table 4-1 of our 2004 report 
differ slightly from those reported here due to revisions in past budget information available from DOD and DOE; a $50 million 
rescission of prior year DOD balances that was applied to FY 2003; and the expiration of $32.1 million in FY 2001 funds and $4.2 
million in FY 2002 funds transferred from DOD to DOE for the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production program 
(which were subsequently reappropriated to FY 2004 and 2005, respectively).
5 As of April 2005, Congress and the administration were still deliberating on a FY 2005 supplemental appropriations bill, so no 
funding from that supplemental is reﬂected in this table.  Initial versions of the bill passed in the House of Representatives and 
the Senate included $55 million in FY 2005 funding for projects to secure nuclear materials outside the former Soviet Union.  The 
House also included $55 million for the Megaports program, while the Senate initially allocated only $29 million.  The House ini-
tially did not include $15 million for the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, while the Senate did.
(see the ﬁnal FY 2005 level in Table 4-7).26  As of April 
2005, with the Russian construction season fast ap-
proaching and with both the United States and Russia 
planning to begin site preparation activities in May 
2005, a liability deal had still not yet been reached, 
though as noted earlier the United States has of-
fered compromise language and hopes are running 
high that a deal will be concluded soon.  DOE and the 
State Department are also working to secure ﬁnanc-
ing from other governments rather than having the 
United States pay entirely for this effort on its own 
(having secured $850 million in commitments thus 
far, counting U.S. commitments, which is enough to 
fund facility construction, but not operation), though 
here too a lack of resolution on the liability issue may 
be holding up greater international support.27
For HEU, as we discussed in earlier reports, suf-
ﬁcient funds are in place to carry out the current 
approaches to disposition of U.S. HEU, and for the 
purchase of Russian HEU, which is ﬁnanced primarily 
through commercial means rather than government 
26  Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2005. 
27 See National Nuclear Security Administrator Linton Brooks’s testimony in Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic 
Forces, Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2006 Energy Department Budget Request for Atomic Energy Defense Activities, United States House of 
Representatives, 109th Congress, 1st Session (2 March 2005).
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expenditure.  For FY 2006, DOE proposes to cut all 
new funding from the initiative to purchase HEU fuel 
from Russia for use in American research reactors. 
DOE attributed the proposed cut to delays in reach-
ing an agreement with the Russians on the price 
and manner of transporting the HEU.28  If the United 
States and Russia decided to pursue a large-scale ac-
celeration of the HEU blend-down rate, as proposed 
in detail in our 2003 report, signiﬁcant additional 
funding would be required.  
TOTAL THREAT REDUCTION FUNDING
As Table 4-8 shows, with the FY 2005 allocation, total 
appropriations since 1992 for all cooperative threat 
reduction efforts, including chemical, biological, and 
other nonproliferation cooperation, has eclipsed $10 
billion (using a broad deﬁnition of threat reduction 
funds that includes some funds spent outside the 
former Soviet Union that the administration does not 
count toward its G8 Global Partnership contribution). 
Just over half of that sum, nearly $5.2 billion, has been 
appropriated to DOD, though DOE programs have 
accounted for most of the recent growth, and over 
recent years has received roughly the same amount 
of annual funding as DOD.
For FY 2006, at $1.312 billion, the proposed budget 
for all cooperative nuclear, chemical, biological and 
missile threat reduction activities would be $159 mil-
lion higher than the ﬁnal approved FY 2005 budget, 
and just short of 25% greater than the Bush adminis-
tration’s own proposal for FY 2005.29  The DOD threat 
reduction budget is slated to fall in FY 2005 and 2006, 
compared to its FY 2004 level, as less new funding is 
required to pay for construction of a chemical weap-
ons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye, Russia.  
Beyond the accomplishments already discussed in 
this report, that $10 billion investment has produced 
clear results.  Over 6,500 former Soviet warheads have 
been deactivated, over 1,100 intercontinental and 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles have been de-
stroyed, and over 25 ballistic missile-carrying strategic 
submarines have been demolished, for example.30 
Taken as a whole, the effort started over a decade ago 
has directly contributed to substantial reductions in 
the nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile threat 
pointed at the United States, at a remarkably low cost 
in comparison to other major defense efforts.
28 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 549.
29 Wier, “Interactive Budget Database.”
30 U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, “Cooperative Threat Reduction: Scorecard” (Washington, D.C.: DTRA, 2005; available at 
http://www.dtra.mil/toolbox/directorates/ctr/scorecard.cfm as of 15 March 2005).

Terrorists are energetically seeking nuclear weapons 
and their essential ingredients.  If the world is to win 
the race to lock down nuclear stockpiles before ter-
rorists and criminals can get to them, current efforts 
must be transformed into a fast-paced global part-
nership for nuclear security.  That partnership must 
have a simple but ambitious goal: to ensure, as rap-
idly as possible, that every nuclear weapon and every 
kilogram of separated plutonium and highly enriched 
uranium (HEU), wherever it may be in the world, is 
secure and accounted for, to standards adequate 
to defeat the threats that terrorists and criminals 
have shown they can pose.  The 9/11 Commission 
recommended a  “maximum effort” to keep nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction out 
of terrorist hands; the recommendations in this chap-
ter are designed to transform the current efforts into 
such a  “maximum effort.”
During the last year, with the launch of the Global 
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the passage of UN 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, and the 
Bratislava Bush-Putin summit, the United States and 
other countries laid critically needed foundations 
for such an effort, in three key areas—accelerating 
and strengthening U.S.-Russian nuclear security co-
operation, removing potential bomb material from 
vulnerable sites around the world, and locking down 
the remaining nuclear stockpiles worldwide.  These 
new foundations themselves create new imperatives 
for action, for without an intense and high-level inter-
national effort to follow through, these opportunities 
may be lost.  To meet these new imperatives and 
build a global nuclear security partnership that can 
act at the pace and the scale required, both President 
Bush and Russian President Putin will have to push 
persistently and creatively to overcome the politi-
cal and bureaucratic impediments to action, putting 
this effort near the top of their national security 
agendas.  Breaking through these obstacles requires 
presidential action, as many of the obstacles cut 
across agencies and departments, and cannot be ad-
dressed by individual ministers or cabinet secretaries 
acting alone, however energetic or well-intentioned 
they may be.  Success will require not just occasional 
encouraging statements, but in-depth, day-to-day 
engagement.  The effort will have to be at the top 
of the diplomatic agenda as well—an item to be ad-
dressed with every country with stockpiles to secure 
or resources to help, at every level, at every opportu-
nity, until the job is done.  
A comprehensive global nuclear security partnership 
would have many ingredients, but the three just men-
tioned are essential: accelerating and strengthening 
the effort in Russia, where the largest stockpiles of 
potentially vulnerable nuclear materials still exist; re-
moving the material entirely from the world’s most 
vulnerable sites; and building a fast-paced global co-
alition to improve security for the remaining nuclear 
stockpiles around the world. 
STEP 1: AN ACCELERATED AND  
STRENGTHENED PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA
The ﬁrst and most crucial step is to put in place an ac-
celerated and strengthened effort with Russia, based 
on genuine partnership.  Between them, President 
Bush and President Putin have the power to over-
come the disputes that have been allowed to slow 
progress in these efforts.
Actions by President Putin, in particular, are the key 
to success in building a transformed U.S.-Russian 
nuclear security partnership.  If he decided to make 
securing nuclear stockpiles from theft a top national 
security priority, as he should, he has the power to as-
sign the needed resources to put in place and sustain 
effective security for all of Russia’s nuclear stockpiles, 
to sweep aside the obstacles to accelerated inter-
national cooperation that his agencies have raised, 
and to give his nuclear agencies the mission, author-
ity, and resources to set and enforce nuclear security 
rules that would ensure that only facilities that have 
demonstrated the ability to defend against plausible 
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terrorist and criminal threats (from both insiders and 
outsiders) were allowed to have nuclear weapons or 
weapons-usable nuclear material on-site.
Security for all of Russia’s nuclear stockpiles sufﬁcient 
to defeat the threats that terrorists and criminals 
have shown they can pose in Russia is critical to Rus-
sia’s own security, for there is a very real chance that 
if extreme Chechen or other Islamic terrorists got 
hold of a nuclear bomb, Moscow or St. Petersburg 
could be their target.1  As President Putin agreed in 
the Bratislava statement, nuclear terrorism is one of 
the “gravest threats” that Russia faces; it is not just an 
American problem.  Russia’s nuclear stockpiles are ul-
timately Russia’s to secure, and with a large cadre of 
nuclear experts (many of whom are now familiar with 
modern security and safeguards approaches), Russia 
now has the resources and capabilities to take many 
of the actions needed to ensure effective nuclear se-
curity.
This is not to say that U.S.-funded threat-reduction 
programs are no longer urgently needed investments 
in U.S. national security; they are.  Russian stockpiles 
can be secured more quickly and more effectively, 
in a way that gives the rest of the world more trans-
parency and more conﬁdence that effective security 
measures are in fact in place, if Russia works with the 
United States and the other participants in the G8 
Global Partnership.   Whatever Russia’s recent eco-
nomic successes, its federal budget remains a small 
fraction of the U.S.  federal budget, and with a complex 
web of social, political, and economic transformations 
underway, Russia faces many other urgent priorities; 
as a result, U.S. and other international resources re-
main a key part of the solution to managing Russia’s 
Cold War legacies.  For the moment, it is still true that 
many of the tasks being ﬁnanced by the roughly $1 
billion per year in U.S. threat reduction spending 
(representing less than one quarter of one percent 
of the U.S. defense budget) would simply not occur, 
or not occur at anything resembling the same pace, if 
U.S. assistance were unavailable.  But over time, Rus-
sia needs to move toward providing the resources 
needed to sustain and improve effective nuclear se-
curity on its own, and Russian facilities need to be 
weaned from their current dependency on U.S. nu-
clear security assistance.
President Bush’s critical diplomatic tasks in the af-
termath of Bratislava include: using his excellent 
relationship with President Putin to convince the 
Russian president of the urgency of action, both for 
Russia’s own security and as a central requirement of a 
positive relationship with the United States; pressing 
for agreement with Russia on key steps to strengthen 
and accelerate the nuclear security effort in Russia 
and around the world; and stepping in to overcome 
the obstacles to a fast-paced U.S.-Russian nuclear 
security partnership that still exist on the U.S. side. 
Some of the issues on the U.S. side President Bush 
must address include: excessive access and liability 
demands; undue linkage to a variety of extraneous 
political concerns (as reﬂected in congressional cer-
tiﬁcation requirements and bans on proceeding with 
certain projects until disputes over Russia’s coopera-
tion with Iran are resolved); cumbersome contracting 
and visa procedures that introduce unnecessary de-
lays; and a variety of negotiating approaches that 
reﬂect lingering Cold War suspicions and attitudes.2 
There are a number of speciﬁc actions President Pu-
tin can and should take immediately to ensure that 
security adequate to meet today’s threats is put in 
place for all of Russia’s nuclear stockpiles.  In the af-
termath of the 9/11 attacks, the United States took a 
broad range of actions to improve nuclear security at 
Department of Energy (DOE) facilities:
immediately strengthened guard forces;
launched a fast-paced review of security at all DOE 
sites with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable 
•
•
1 See, for example, Simon Saradzhyan, Russia: Grasping Reality of Nuclear Terror, International Security Program Discussion Paper 
2003-02 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2003; available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_
content/documents/saradzhyan_2003_02.pdf as of 22 March 2005).
2 See “What Are the Main Impediments to Action?” in Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action 
(Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004; 
available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/2004report.asp as of 1 February 2005), pp. 74-75.
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nuclear materials, to ﬁnd vulnerabilities and sug-
gest ways to ﬁx them;
imposed new requirements for DOE nuclear fa-
cilities to defend against larger and more lethal 
terrorist threats;
took steps (admittedly slow-moving, to date) to 
consolidate nuclear material at fewer locations;
examined approaches to transforming DOE guard 
forces into a highly trained, elite ﬁghting force; 
and
increased spending on nuclear security, by a sub-
stantial margin.3
So far, in the aftermath of Beslan, Russia appears to 
have taken the ﬁrst of these steps—increasing guard 
forces at facilities—but not the others.4  Following 
up on the discussions in Bratislava, President Putin 
should direct that the remainder of these steps be 
taken in Russia as well.
President Putin and President Bush must also pursue 
together a broad agenda to translate the Bratislava 
words into effective actions:
Develop a fast-paced joint strategic plan. U.S. 
and Russian experts should rapidly agree on a 
joint strategic plan for implementing comprehen-
sive security upgrades for all nuclear warheads 
and weapons-usable nuclear materials in Russia 
by the end of 2008, allocating both U.S. and Rus-
sian resources to accomplish the joint objectives.
•
•
•
•
•
Overcome obstacles.  The Bodman-Rumiantsev 
interagency committee established at the 
Bratislava summit should move rapidly to identify 
the most important impediments to accelerated 
and strengthened action, and should work out 
speciﬁc steps to overcome them, to be taken 
below the presidential level where possible, or for-
warded to both presidents for immediate action 
where necessary.
Resolve the access problem.  The United States 
and Russia should reach a rapid accord on: an 
agreed approach to access to sensitive sites, in-
cluding Russian agreement to offer access to all 
but a few of the most sensitive areas of Russian 
nuclear sites; U.S. follow-through on President 
Bush’s offer of “equal access” to comparable ar-
eas of comparable sites in the United States; and 
agreed arrangements for accomplishing security 
upgrades at those few areas that are genuinely 
too sensitive for either side to be willing to allow 
access to the other (such as provision of photo-
graphs, videotapes, and operational records of 
installed equipment, and other measures).5  The 
controversy in Russia over misinterpretations of 
the access issue as focused on the United States 
“seizing control” over Russia’s nuclear stockpile is 
certain to make the access issue even more difﬁ-
cult and politically sensitive to resolve, however.6
Agree on liability.  The United States and Russia 
should reach a rapid compromise on the issue of 
liability in the event of an accident during such 
threat reduction cooperation.  Accords will be 
needed both for the speciﬁc issue of plutonium 
•
•
•
3 Summarized in Matthew Bunn, “Nuclear Security in the United States: Response to 9/11” (unpublished:  2005). 
4 “Security Tightened at Russian Nuclear Facilities - Tass,” Dow Jones International News, 1 September 2004.
5 The United States and Russia already reached a signed agreement outlining such measures for particularly sensitive sites in 1999, 
but unfortunately, the United States effectively repudiated the arrangement and demanded direct access by U.S. personnel wher-
ever new contracts for cooperative upgrades were to be agreed.  That mistake has slowed or prevented progress at sites where a 
substantial fraction of Russia’s nuclear material exists for years.  For a roughly contemporaneous discussion of this episode and its 
other implications, see Oleg Bukharin, Matthew Bunn, and Kenneth N. Luongo, Renewing the Partnership: Recommendations for Ac-
celerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory 
Council, 2000; available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/mpca2000.pdf as of 10 March 2005).
6 “Moscow Rally Calls to Prevent U.S. Control over Russian Nuclear Facilities,” Interfax News Service, 20 February 2005; Nabi Abdullaev, 
“A Bush Deal and a Missing Paragraph,” Moscow Times, 1 March 2005; Vladimir Ivanov and Mikail Tollegin, “Myagkiy Yaderny Kontrol’ 
(Soft Nuclear Inspection),” trans. Russian Press Digest, Nezavizimaya Gazeta, 2 March 2005; “Russian Nuclear Installations Not to Be 
Inspected by Americans,” RIA Novosti, 1 March 2005. 
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disposition and for the Cooperative Threat Reduc-
tion umbrella agreement, which will otherwise 
expire in June 2006.  If Russia is unwilling to extend 
the umbrella agreement again with the liability 
language that it ﬁnds offensive, the United States 
may have to modify its insistence that Russia again 
accept language under which Russia would bear 
all of the liability even if an accident was caused by 
intentional sabotage by U.S. personnel.  The United 
States is alone among the major participants in 
the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of 
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in in-
sisting on such language, and in failing to reach an 
acceptable liability arrangement with Russia.
Consolidate stockpiles.  The United States and 
Russia should reach a rapid agreement on con-
solidating nuclear warheads and weapons-usable 
nuclear materials at a smaller number of sites.  To 
date, unfortunately, Russia has taken little action 
toward consolidation, and U.S. efforts to promote 
consolidation have made only modest prog-
ress.  Protecting a much smaller number of sites 
•
would make it possible to achieve more security 
at lower cost, as has already been the case where 
consolidation has been accomplished in the U.S. 
complex.7  Because many Russian sites are op-
posed to giving up their potential nuclear bomb 
material, a consolidation initiative should include 
steps both sides can take to require sites to give up 
their unneeded stockpiles or at least to give them 
incentives to do so.  For example, putting in place 
stringent nuclear security rules would inevita-
bly impose substantial ongoing costs on facilities 
with weapons-usable nuclear material, creating 
an incentive for facilities to give up such materials 
where they are not needed.  The United States and 
Russia should agree to use the giant, highly secure 
Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility not just for 
weapon-grade plutonium and HEU that will never 
again be returned to weapons, but as a site to send 
any separated plutonium or HEU that would oth-
erwise pose a proliferation and terrorism threat.8 
The United States should consider, if necessary, 
providing assistance to rapidly provide consoli-
dated facilities for nuclear warhead storage.9  The 
7 Harold P. Smith, Jr., “Consolidating Threat Reduction,” Arms Control Today (November 2003; available at http://www.armscontrol.
org/act/2003_11/Smith.asp as of 22 March 2005).
8 Currently, the United States insists that only weapon-grade material that Russia commits will never again be used in nuclear 
weapons should be stored in the Mayak facility.  Russia has indicated that since the only weapon-grade plutonium it is legally 
bound not to ever again use in nuclear weapons is the 34 tons of weapons plutonium covered by the U.S-Russian Plutonium Man-
agement and Disposition Agreement, of which roughly nine tons is plutonium oxide produced by Russia’s plutonium production 
reactors that is already in secure storage at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk, only about 25 tons of plutonium is available for storage 
at Mayak under these conditions—which would leave three-quarters of the storage spaces in the facility empty.  One potentially 
promising approach is to segregate different areas of the facility, with part of the facility assigned to material that will meet the 
criteria of being weapon-grade and committed never to be returned to weapons, and the remainder of the facility available for 
storage of any plutonium and HEU that poses a proliferation or terrorism threat.  See Matthew Bunn, “Mayak Fissile Material Stor-
age Facility,” in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2004; available at http://www.
nti.org/e_research/cnwm/securing/mayak.asp as of 14 February 2005).  As of early 2005, loading of the Mayak facility with nuclear 
material had not yet begun, though the facility had been completed in late 2003, as U.S.-Russian disagreements over transparency 
measures to be applied to the facility had not yet been fully resolved.  For a discussion of the transparency talks, see U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2005).  A somewhat similar recommendation, that the Mayak facility be used for storage of potentially vulnerable HEU 
stockpiles, can be found in Charles Ferguson and William Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey, Cal.: Center for Non-
proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, 2004), p. 327. 
9 As four examples of possible approaches that Russia could take, with U.S. assistance or on its own if it judged U.S. assistance in 
some of these cases to be too sensitive: (a) Russia could re-open some centralized national nuclear warhead stockpile sites that 
have been closed, and ship warheads to those sites from their current dispersed locations; (b) Russia could make space for essen-
tially all its stored nuclear warheads available in the gigantic and highly secure underground facility at Yamantau Mountain, which 
Russia spent billions of dollars building in the 1990s, and which appears to be controlled already by the Ministry of Defense, though 
Russia has never been willing to explain its purpose publicly; (c) Russia could make space for thousands of warheads available in 
the large underground plutonium production facility at Zheleznogorsk, where there are huge empty concrete rooms (more than 
100 meters long) built for reprocessing facilities that were never installed, and which are already in a highly secure facility, and could 
readily be adapted for storage of warheads if institutional issues (the ownership of the facility by Rosatom rather than the Ministry 
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United States should: provide brieﬁngs to key Rus-
sian ofﬁcials on the substantial cost savings and 
security beneﬁts the United States has managed 
to achieve through consolidating nuclear material 
in fewer sites and buildings within its own com-
plex, and its ongoing consolidation efforts; work 
to convince the Russian government to direct its 
facilities to give up nuclear materials that are no 
longer needed; and raise the subject to higher lev-
els if progress is not forthcoming.
Strengthen security culture.  U.S. and Russian 
experts should jointly identify key actions that 
both sides can take to strengthen security cul-
ture in their two countries and ensure that all 
security-critical personnel give security the prior-
ity it requires.10  The two governments should then 
immediately begin implementing the steps identi-
ﬁed, in cooperation and on their own.  Developing 
a list of steps for immediate action by govern-
ments should be the goal of the security culture 
workshop agreed to in Bratislava.  The current 
cooperative effort to put in place “culture coordi-
nators” at Russian facilities, similar to the security 
awareness coordinators at DOE facilities, should 
be expanded to include all sites with signiﬁcant 
amounts of nuclear material.
•
Institute design basis threats that match the 
dangers.  As already suggested, Russia should act 
rapidly (with U.S. cooperation to the extent Russia 
desires) to put in place regulations that require ev-
ery facility where nuclear weapons or signiﬁcant 
quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material are 
located to put in place security arrangements ca-
pable of defending against Beslan-scale outsider 
threats, or insider threats of several individuals 
working together, as a condition of being allowed 
to continue to have such nuclear stockpiles on-
site.11  The security and accounting upgrades now 
being installed in U.S.-Russian cooperative efforts 
are designed to defend against signiﬁcantly smaller 
threats; putting in place security rules requiring fa-
cilities to be able to defeat threats comparable to 
those demonstrated at Beslan and in insider thefts 
that have taken place in Russia would require ex-
panding guard forces in many cases, and installing 
additional security and accounting equipment in 
some cases. 
Find and ﬁx weaknesses.  Russia should act rap-
idly (with U.S. cooperation to the extent Russia 
desires) to put in place effective mechanisms to in-
spect and test nuclear security arrangements, and 
to work with sites to ensure that any needed cor-
rective actions are implemented.  Russia needs to 
•
•
of Defense) could be addressed; (d) Russia could rapidly build simple, low-cost, but effective additional bunkers for warhead stor-
age at existing central warhead storage facilities (possibly comparable to the nuclear warhead bunkers at Pantex in the United 
States, for example; though Pantex is one of the most secure facilities in the U.S. complex, the bunkers are little more than Quonset 
huts covered with a thick layer of dirt, with huge steel security doors barred by massive concrete blocks at the entrances).  For a 
discussion of the ﬁrst of these options, see Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part II: Technical 
Issues and Policy Recommendations, FOI-R-1588-SE (Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2005; available at http://www.foi.
se/upload/pdf/FOI-RussiasTacticalNuclearWeapons.pdf as of 12 April 2005). For a discussion of Yamantau Mountain, see “Yamantau” 
(Washington, D.C.: GlobalSecurity.org, undated; available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/yamantau.htm as of 
18 March 2005).  For a discussion of the underground facility at Zheleznogorsk as a possible location for consolidation, see Matthew 
Bunn and John P. Holdren, “Managing Military Uranium and Plutonium in the United States and the Former Soviet Union,” Annual 
Review of Energy & the Environment 22, no. 1 (1997), p. 423.
10 An excellent discussion of the nuclear security culture in Russia can be found in Igor Khripunov and James Holmes, eds., Nuclear 
Security Culture: The Case of Russia (Athens, Georgia: Center for International Trade and Security, The University of Georgia, 2004; 
available at http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/Security%20Culture%20Report%2020041118.pdf as of 18 February 2005).
11 The IAEA recommendations on physical protection for nuclear facilities recommend that every country put in place 
such a regulatory design basis threat.  International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and 
Nuclear Facilities, INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) (Vienna: IAEA, 1999; available at http://www.iaea.or.at/Publications/Documents/
Infcircs/1999/infcirc225r4c/rev4_content.html as of 22 March 2005).  Russia and many other countries, however, have not yet done 
so.  The nuclear safety and security plan adopted by the Russian government in February 2005 does call for preparing a standard-
ized model of potential intruders, for use in assessing the security at nuclear facilities, by the end of 2005—but it is not clear from 
the text whether, once such a model of potential intruders is developed, regulations will be put in place and enforced that would 
require facilities to have security arrangements in place capable of defeating the speciﬁed threat.
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ensure that appropriate agencies have the legal au-
thority, power, resources, and expertise to inspect 
and regulate nuclear security effectively.  Some of 
this mission will inevitably be carried out by the 
Russian regulatory agency Rostekhnadzor (which 
incorporates the agency previously known as Gos-
atomnadzor).   But Rosatom’s internal capability to 
set, inspect, and enforce effective nuclear security 
rules should also be strengthened, as should the 
Ministry of Defense group charged with regulat-
ing security for nuclear weapons, nuclear material 
used by the military, and work involving nuclear 
weapons components at Rosatom.12 A regular sys-
tem of realistic testing of security performance, 
where “red teams” playing outside attackers or 
insider thieves attempt to overcome the system, 
would be an essential part of this overall effort.
Exchange “best practices” and lessons from 
past mistakes.  As called for in the Bratislava sum-
mit, the United States and Russian should begin as 
soon as possible in-depth discussions both of the 
best approaches to dealing with particular nuclear 
security and accounting issues that each country 
has developed over the years and of techniques 
for systematically ﬁnding and ﬁxing past mistakes 
and problems.13  This is not likely to be a one-way 
conversation, as Russian approaches to some as-
pects of nuclear security appear to be superior to 
•
U.S. approaches—or at least to work better in a 
Russian context.14  This discussion of best practices 
and best approaches to ﬁnding and ﬁxing prob-
lems should then be made into a global discussion, 
as envisioned in the Bratislava summit statement.
Launch a new initiative to secure, monitor, and 
dismantle the most dangerous warheads.  In 
the age of nuclear terrorism, the most dangerous 
warheads are not those atop deadly accurate in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles, but the warheads 
most vulnerable to theft—in particular, warheads 
not equipped with modern, difﬁcult-to-bypass 
electronic locks to prevent unauthorized use if 
stolen.  A substantial fraction of Russia’s remaining 
tactical nuclear warheads are believed not to have 
such modern locks, and in some cases are stored 
at remote, difﬁcult-to-defend storage sites.15  The 
United States and Russia should launch another 
round of reciprocal initiatives, comparable to the 
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992, but 
with two critical differences: this round should be 
focused particularly on reducing risks of nuclear 
theft, and it should include some monitoring to 
conﬁrm that the pledged actions are being taken. 
As part of such an initiative, the United States 
and Russia should exchange information on how 
many tactical nuclear warheads they have, they 
should discuss means to reduce this number as 
•
12 Already, with U.S. assistance, Rosatom is reportedly performing internal physical protection inspections at 6-8 sites per year, and 
material control and accounting inspections at a comparable number.  Interview with DOE ofﬁcials, April 2005.
13 “Joint Statement by President Bush and President Putin on Nuclear Security Cooperation” (Bratislava, Slovakia: The White House, 
Ofﬁce of the Press Secretary, 24 January 2005; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050224-8.html as 
of 25 February 2005).
14 For example, in the United States little effort is made to monitor the presence of possible attackers in areas outside the fence of 
nuclear facilities, while in Russia, security agencies attempt to have at least some awareness of a much larger zone surrounding 
nuclear facilities—in the hope of beginning to organize a response well before attackers show up at the fence of a facility.  See 
the discussion in Dmitry Kovchegin, “Approaches to Design Basis Threat in Russia in the Context of Signiﬁcant Increase of Terrorist 
Activity” (paper presented at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 44th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, Arizona, 2003).  On the 
control of information that might be passed during travel by cleared individuals, Russia takes a draconian approach: key personnel 
at nuclear weapons facilities do not have daily access to their passports, which are held in the safe of the site security ofﬁcer and 
only released after ofﬁcial government permission for a particular foreign trip has been granted.  This continues to be true for ﬁve 
years after a nuclear weapon designer retires and no longer has access to classiﬁed information.  (Interview with Russian nuclear 
weapon designer, September 2003.)
15 Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part I: Background and Policy Issues, FOI-R-1057-SE (Stock-
holm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2003); Arbman and Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part II: Technical Issues and 
Policy Recommendations; Anatoli Diakov, Eugene Miasnikov, and Timur Kadyshev, Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Problems of Control 
and Reduction (Moscow: Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, 
2004; available at http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/NSNW_en_v1b.pdf as of 17 March 2005).
RECOMMENDATIONS 95
much as possible, and they should ensure that 
all of them are stored in facilities with the high-
est practicable levels of security.  Speciﬁcally, the 
United States and Russia should each agree to: (a) 
take several thousand warheads—including all 
of those posing the greatest risk of theft16—and 
place them in secure, centralized storage; (b) al-
low visits to those storage sites by the other side 
to conﬁrm the presence and the security of these 
warheads; (c) commit that these warheads will be 
veriﬁably dismantled as soon as procedures have 
been agreed by both sides to do so without com-
promising sensitive information; and (d) commit 
that the nuclear materials from these warheads 
will similarly be placed in secure, monitored stor-
age after dismantlement.17  
Provide resources, organizations, and incen-
tives to sustain security.18  President Bush should 
seek a clear commitment from President Putin that 
Russia will provide the resources to sustain effec-
tive security and accounting for all of its nuclear 
stockpiles after international assistance phases out. 
Such a clear commitment from the top is needed 
to convince facilities to begin planning to wean 
their nuclear security and accounting programs 
from U.S. assistance, and support the current ef-
forts to draft a joint sustainability plan. Russia and 
the United States should act to ensure that each 
•
facility with one or more nuclear weapons or a 
signiﬁcant amount of weapons-usable nuclear ma-
terial has appropriate trained personnel assigned 
to the key tasks of nuclear security and account-
ing, and that each agency charged with managing 
nuclear material has a group speciﬁcally charged 
with overseeing nuclear security and accounting, 
with appropriate authority and resources to ac-
complish their task.  Wherever practical the United 
States and Russia should continue and strengthen 
DOE’s practice of emphasizing “inherently sustain-
able” upgrades—such as massive concrete blocks 
to bar access to material—and should consider 
the life-cycle cost of operating, maintaining, and 
replacing equipment when designing all security 
system improvements.  The two countries should 
also act to ensure that sufﬁcient effectively trained 
personnel are and will continue to be available 
for accomplishing key nuclear security and ac-
counting tasks.  Perhaps most important, the two 
countries should take actions to give facility man-
agers and security personnel strong incentives to 
devote their time and resources to achieving high 
levels of nuclear security.  Managers will always 
be tempted to cut spending on security—which 
brings in no revenue—unless strong incentives 
not to do so are put in place.  Regulations are cru-
cial: if managers know their facilities are going to 
be inspected, and ﬁned or shut down if they do 
16 Ultimately all nuclear warheads not equipped with modern electronic locks should be dismantled.  In the near term, however, nei-
ther side is likely to be willing to dismantle all such warheads, as U.S. submarine-launched warheads are critical to the U.S. nuclear 
deterrent but are not equipped with such locks integral to the warheads, and the same is believed to be true of some warheads crit-
ical to the Russian deterrent.  In general, however, warheads on submarines or on ICBMs in concrete silos pose a lesser risk of theft 
than warheads scattered in forward-deployed storage facilities.  Hence, for the immediate initiative, for all warheads not equipped 
with modern electronic locks, each side should either (a) include them in the set subject to secure, monitored storage and eventual 
veriﬁed dismantlement, or (b) provide the other side with sufﬁcient information to build conﬁdence that they are highly secure. 
Where warheads not equipped with modern electronic locks are not in immediate use, and are not mounted on SLBMs or ICBMs—
as when they are being kept as spares, for example—they should be stored in partly disassembled form, ideally with critical parts in 
separate locations, to make them more difﬁcult to steal.
17 For an earlier description of this idea, see, for example, Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John Holdren, Controlling Nuclear War-
heads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard 
University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2003; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/report.asp as of 1 Febru-
ary 2005), pp. 132-134.  For an up-to-date discussion of the risks posed by tactical nuclear weapons and steps to reduce them, see 
William Potter and Nikolai Sokov, “Practical Measures to Reduce the Risks Presented by Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons” (paper pre-
sented to the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Stockholm, 2005; available at http://www.wmdcommission.org/ﬁles/No8.
pdf as of 18 April 2005).
18 See “Achieving Sustainable Security,” in Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, pp. 48-49.  See also Bukharin, 
Bunn, and Luongo, Renewing the Partnership: Recommendations for Accelerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet 
Union, pp. 27-44.
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not meet stringent requirements, those managers 
will invest in security.
Building Russian Commitment
Many of the steps just outlined are steps the United 
States has proposed in the past, but Russia has not ac-
cepted.  U.S. ofﬁcials reading these recommendations 
may be saying to themselves: “We tried that already. 
How do we get agreement on it?”  Clearly a shift in 
ofﬁcial Russian approaches will be essential if such 
a far-reaching agenda is to be agreed upon.  In par-
ticular, it is crucial to change the prevailing attitude 
among the nuclear technical elite in Russia—and in 
most countries around the world—that the nuclear 
terrorist threat is far-fetched and that existing secu-
rity approaches are adequate.  The Beslan tragedy, 
which showed that the terrorists Russia faces can 
and will strike in force and kill even schoolchildren, 
may have begun to undermine this complacency; 
indeed, additional troops were dispatched to guard 
nuclear facilities after that crisis.  But even today, few 
of Russia’s nuclear leaders believe that substantial im-
provements in nuclear security are urgently needed.
As already noted, the Bratislava statement puts Presi-
dent Putin’s personal imprimatur on the notion that 
nuclear terrorism is one of the “gravest threats” to 
Russia’s own national security.  President Putin should 
make it clear throughout his government that ad-
dressing this grave threat is a top Russian national 
security priority.  U.S. ofﬁcials should spare no op-
portunity to remind their Russian counterparts of 
President Putin’s statement that insecure nuclear 
stockpiles pose a grave threat to Russian security, and 
to draw out the implications of that conclusion.
Several steps might help build the needed sense of 
urgency among Russia’s key decision-makers:
A fast-paced survey of nuclear security vul-
nerabilities.  President Bush should encourage 
President Putin to assemble a team of Russian 
experts to conduct a fast-paced assessment of 
potential vulnerabilities and recommendations 
•
for ﬁxing them at all Russian sites with nuclear 
weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material. 
Such a review would give President Putin an in-
dependent assessment, circumventing those with 
an incentive to present the most positive side of 
Russia’s nuclear security to the president.  Russia’s 
security services could play a central part in such a 
fast-paced assessment, and Russia now has a sub-
stantial cadre of experts trained in both Russian 
and Western approaches to vulnerability assess-
ment.  No U.S. personnel need take part—indeed, 
in a review that really explored every weakness, 
Russia would not allow U.S. personnel to take part. 
Any thorough review would reveal that many 
of these facilities are not adequately defended 
against either Beslan-scale outside attacks or sub-
stantial insider conspiracies.  Such a fast-paced 
review would parallel, for example, action DOE 
took to quickly review security at its own nuclear 
facilities in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.  The 
United States should offer to share its own expe-
rience with such fast-paced reviews and offer to 
help cover the cost of the security upgrades the 
review recommends.
Nuclear terrorism war games.  War games and 
similar exercises have been effective in getting 
policymakers in a number of countries to think 
through, and understand at an emotional, expe-
riential level, the urgent challenges they face.  A 
war game or series of war games for Russia’s na-
tional security policymakers, focused on nuclear 
theft and terrorism (similar to an exercise recently 
conducted in Europe) could help convince par-
ticipants that more needs to be done to secure 
nuclear stockpiles.19
Joint U.S.-Russian threat brieﬁngs. A series of 
brieﬁngs by Russian and U.S. experts for key Rus-
sian policymakers could outline in detail terrorist 
desire for and efforts to get nuclear weapons, and 
the very real possibility that terrorists could 
make at least a crude nuclear bomb if they got 
the needed nuclear materials.  Ongoing training 
for nuclear security personnel should highlight 
•
•
19 The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) organized the “Black Dawn” war game in 
Europe and are now working to organize a similar event in Moscow.
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the urgency of maintaining high security, ide-
ally in graphic terms that get to the heart, as well 
as the head.  (As part of the nuclear safety train-
ing program in the U.S. nuclear navy, for example, 
key personnel are required every year to listen to 
a several-minute audiotape of a submarine that 
failed, killing everyone aboard.20  Presentations to 
policymakers and key nuclear security ofﬁcials of 
images from Hiroshima and Chernobyl might sim-
ilarly highlight, in an emotionally gripping way, the 
scale of the catastrophe that could occur if nuclear 
security measures failed and terrorists succeeded 
in detonating a nuclear bomb or sabotaging a ma-
jor nuclear facility.)
From Assistance to Partnership
Ultimately, gaining the needed Russian commitment 
to this effort, and the buy-in of Russian experts cru-
cial to long-term sustainability, will require a genuine 
partnership, in which Russian experts play key roles, 
working with foreign partners, in the conception, 
design, implementation, and evaluation of the en-
tire effort.21  Indeed, data from a wide range of other 
types of international assistance efforts makes clear 
that the success rate is far higher when assistance 
recipients are deeply involved in project design and 
implementation than when this is not the case.22
How would a real, and not just rhetorical, shift from 
assistance to partnership actually be different?  Both 
the United States and Russia would have to change 
some of their past approaches to this work.  Russia 
would have to assign more of its own resources to 
the effort, it would need to reverse the past habit, 
in many areas, of cutting Russian funding for activi-
ties the United States is willing to help pay for, and 
it would need to be willing to openly discuss key is-
sues for the joint effort, such as how nuclear security 
arrangements are and will be funded, or how good 
security performance by managers, guards, and work-
ers is and will be rewarded.  Russia’s security services 
would have to do less to impede cooperation and 
more to facilitate it.  The United States would have 
to be willing to bring Russian experts more fully into 
the process by which decisions are made on what 
security upgrades will be done.
Strategic plans, timetables, and milestones should be 
developed jointly, using both U.S. funds and Russia’s 
own funds, rather than in Washington alone, without 
Russian consultation, as has often been past practice. 
Guidelines for the kinds of upgrades and the stan-
dards of security needed should be discussed and 
agreed wherever possible.  In the past, the United 
States has often decided what kinds of security 
measures to tell its teams to put in place without con-
sulting Russian experts, and has kept Russian experts 
from seeing those guidelines even as they were used 
as the basis to reject security upgrade projects that 
Russian experts proposed.  Progress should be re-
viewed by experts from both sides working together, 
replacing the past U.S. practice of having U.S.-only 
evaluation teams assess progress of each project and 
recommend changes.  Key personnel should lead the 
effort at particular sites for extended periods of time, 
so they can build the site-level relationships needed 
for a real partnership to grow.
A partnership approach does not necessarily mean 
putting U.S.-funded projects under Russian manage-
ment—which might well slow projects down rather 
than speeding them up.  A good example of how 
the kind of partnership recommended here works 
in practice can be found in the case of the work to 
improve security and accounting for the nuclear 
warheads and materials of the Russian Navy.  In that 
case, a small, consistent U.S. team has been leading 
the effort for years, building conﬁdence with Russian 
counterparts over time.  A Russian team at the Kurcha-
tov Institute has taken the lead in overseeing much 
of the work, and, with a daily on-the-ground presence 
20 See testimony of Rear Admiral Paul E. Sullivan, Naval Sea Systems Command, in Committee on Science, NASA’s Organizational and 
Management Challenge, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives (29 October 2003). 
21 Bukharin, Bunn, and Luongo, Renewing the Partnership: Recommendations for Accelerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the 
Former Soviet Union.
22 See, for instance, World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why: A World Bank Policy Research Report (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1998).
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in Moscow and Russian security clearances, has been 
able to overcome obstacles far more effectively than 
remote U.S. managers would be able to do.  A highly 
committed Russian Navy team has also been willing 
to make the hard decisions needed to move forward, 
and to provide Navy resources for sustaining the new 
security and accounting equipment once installed.23
The United States should also take advantage of its 
Russian partners’ expertise wherever possible.  Al-
though Russia is not likely to be in a position to help 
ﬁnancially with security improvements in the United 
States, as part of the ongoing discussion of “best 
practices,” when Russian experts visit key U.S. nuclear 
facilities, the United States should actively solicit their 
suggestions for security improvements and should 
make a conscious effort to adopt in the United States 
any Russian equipment, software, or procedures that 
may be useful.  Few steps could more quickly dispel 
the perception of Russia as a passive recipient of U.S. 
assistance than well-publicized U.S. adoption of an 
innovative piece of Russian equipment or a Russian 
procedure superior to U.S. approaches for improving 
security at U.S. nuclear facilities.
Finally, as suggested in the Bratislava statement, rather 
than U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear security fo-
cusing only on U.S. assistance for improvements in 
Russia, the United States and Russia, as the countries 
with the largest nuclear stockpiles and the greatest 
experience in securing them, should jointly lead a 
global effort to secure nuclear stockpiles around the 
world.  Beyond addressing real nuclear security prob-
lems around the world, visible actions to cooperate in 
securing material in the rest of the world would go a 
long way toward demonstrating that this really was a 
partnership in which Russia has a leading part to play, 
thereby strengthening the effort within Russia itself. 
Building support in Moscow for the United States and 
Russia working together as joint leaders of a global 
effort—beginning with getting their own houses in 
order—will be far easier than gaining support for the 
notion that Russia is a weak country that needs even 
more U.S. help to secure its own nuclear stockpiles.
Russia’s help in leading a global effort could be im-
portant in many countries, in validating the issue as 
not just a “U.S.-only” concern, in bringing additional 
experiences and best practices to the table, and in 
adding to the pool of available experts for security re-
views, training, and the like.  Russian leadership could 
be crucial in a number of key cases where the United 
States does not have the relationships to succeed:
North Korea. Russia should pressure North Korea 
to return the signiﬁcant quantity of HEU still pres-
ent at the Soviet-supplied IRT research reactor in 
North Korea, and should accept the return of that 
fuel with or without help from the United States to 
pay for the costs.
Iran. Russia should work with Iran to convince the 
Iranian government to allow the U.S.-supplied 
research reactor HEU in Iran to be removed.  Rus-
sia might be able to broker a deal, for example, in 
which Russian experts would package and trans-
port the material, but the material would ultimately 
be shipped to the United States or Europe.24
India.  As India’s principal nuclear supplier, Russia 
should work to ensure that India puts in place ad-
equate security measures at India’s most important 
nuclear facilities, both military and civilian.
Libya.  Russia should actively work with Libya to 
accelerate the effort to convert Libya’s research re-
actor to low-enriched uranium (LEU) and ship the 
HEU now in that reactor’s core back to Russia, in co-
operation with U.S. experts.
Soviet-supplied HEU.  Russia should actively 
provide incentives for countries that received So-
viet-supplied HEU to send it back to Russia as quickly 
•
•
•
•
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23 For an account, see, for example, Morton Bremer Maerli, “U.S.-Russian Naval Security Upgrades: Lessons Learned and the Way 
Ahead,” Naval War College Review 56, no. 4 (Autumn 2003; available at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/pdfs/
art2-a03.pdf as of 18 April 2005).
24 Since this material is subject to U.S. obligations under the Atomic Energy Act, it cannot be legally shipped to Russia until the Unit-
ed States and Russia negotiate an Agreement for Cooperation under Section 123 of the Act—which the United States has refused 
to do until U.S.-Russian disputes over Russia’s cooperation with Iran are resolved.
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as possible, instead of continuing to do nothing un-
less the United States pays all of Russia’s costs for 
each step.  Russia should also insist that countries 
that possess Soviet-supplied HEU provide stringent 
security for it, and should send physical protection 
teams to ﬁnd and ﬁx any security vulnerabilities for 
this material that may exist, pending removal.
Such a genuine partnership cannot be built in a po-
litical vacuum.  As noted in Chapter Three, a range of 
factors have increased suspicions between the U.S. 
and Russian security establishments in recent years, 
despite the strong Bush-Putin relationship.  Such sus-
picions inevitably make sensitive nuclear cooperation 
more difﬁcult, and strengthen the arguments of those 
who oppose such cooperation.  Addressing these con-
cerns will require a sustained diplomatic effort, going 
well beyond the scope of this report—but it is none-
theless likely to be an important ingredient of success 
in reducing the threats of nuclear terrorism.  
As part of that larger effort, the United States should 
undertake a substantially increased public diplomacy 
effort to build support for cooperation to secure, 
consolidate, and eliminate nuclear stockpiles, in Rus-
sia and around the world.  The United States should 
sponsor articles, workshops, brieﬁngs, and the like that 
emphasize such matters as: how much has been ac-
complished that serves Russia’s own security interests; 
how limited the access to sensitive sites the United 
States has requested really is, and how few nuclear 
secrets are actually revealed; the United States’ willing-
ness to give parallel access at its own sites; the large 
fraction of the equipment that is being installed that 
is produced by Russian manufacturers, in systems de-
signed and installed by Russian experts, not American 
ones; and the beneﬁts to the Russian public’s safety 
and security from this cooperation.  Expanded efforts 
should be pursued to engage the Russian Duma, the 
Russian press, non-government organizations, and the 
rest of civil society in Russia in these critical issues for 
Russia’s national security.
Finally, to build and sustain such a partnership, and to 
overcome the impediments to progress as they arise, 
new mechanisms for organizing the effort are likely to 
be essential—in both Washington and Moscow.  The 
new interagency committee on nuclear security that 
President Bush and Russian President Putin agreed to 
establish at their Bratislava summit is potentially an 
important ﬁrst step; while its co-chairmen, Rosatom Di-
rector Alexander Rumiantsev and Secretary of Energy 
Samuel Bodman, do not have the power themselves 
to resolve many of the difﬁcult obstacles that reach 
across agencies, this committee can and should be 
used as a mechanism for ﬁnding such obstacles and 
raising them quickly to higher political levels for ac-
tion to address them.  To ensure that this effort moves 
forward as quickly as possible, both presidents should 
appoint a senior ofﬁcial, with the access necessary to 
get a presidential decision whenever needed and with 
responsibility for leading the joint effort to ensure that 
all potentially vulnerable nuclear stockpiles are se-
cured as quickly as possible.  It would also be desirable 
to re-establish the mechanism of bilateral interagency 
meetings just below the summit level, perhaps twice 
per year—in the past, when these were chaired by 
the U.S. vice president and the Russian prime minister, 
these events proved a useful mechanism for bringing 
issues and obstacles forward to high political levels for 
action to move the joint cooperation forward. 
STEP 2: FAST-PACED REMOVAL FROM  
VULNERABLE SITES WORLDWIDE
The surest way to ensure that nuclear material will 
not be stolen from a particular site is to remove it, so 
there is nothing left to steal.  What is needed now is 
a fast-paced effort to remove the weapons-usable 
nuclear material entirely from the world’s most vulner-
able sites, particularly including HEU-fueled research 
reactors.  The goal should be to remove the nuclear 
material entirely from the world’s most vulnerable 
sites within four years—substantially upgrading se-
curity wherever that cannot be accomplished—and 
to eliminate all HEU from civil sites worldwide within 
roughly a decade.25  The United States should make 
every effort to build international consensus that the 
25 In saying that all the HEU should be removed from the world’s most vulnerable sites within four years—a recommendation we 
have been making for several years—we are not suggesting that it is possible to convert every HEU-fueled research reactor within 
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civilian use of HEU is no longer acceptable, that all HEU 
should be removed from all civilian sites, and that all 
civilian commerce in HEU should be brought to an end 
as quickly as possible.  The basic principle should be to 
secure, consolidate, and eliminate both stocks of HEU 
and commerce in HEU wherever possible.
The goals just outlined are challenging, and achiev-
ing them would require a substantial effort, but the 
scale and urgency of the threat demands no less. 
Success in achieving them will require focusing com-
prehensively on all the facilities that have vulnerable 
potential nuclear bomb material, not just those that 
happen to be operating civilian research reactors, 
or whose nuclear material happens to be Russian-
supplied or U.S. supplied.  It will require ﬂexible and 
creative tactics, with approaches—including incen-
tives to give up the nuclear material—targeted to the 
needs of each facility and host country.  And it will 
require the United States to convert and adequately 
secure its own HEU-fueled research reactors, as part 
of convincing others to do so.
A Comprehensive Approach
In the past, different U.S. programs have focused on 
particular subsets of the problem posed by weap-
ons-usable nuclear material around the world, leaving 
substantial gaps uncovered.26  Reactor conversion 
efforts focused primarily on high-power research re-
actors that needed regular supplies of fresh fuel.  One 
HEU removal effort focused on that portion of the HEU 
the United States exported that was eligible for the re-
newed U.S. take-back offer announced in 1996 (which 
amounted to only about one-third of the material the 
United States had exported), while another focused 
on Soviet-supplied HEU.  Fortunately, the Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative (GTRI), launched in the spring of 
2004, is explicitly intended to take a comprehensive 
approach, and ﬁll such gaps.  To its credit, DOE has pre-
pared a ﬁrst draft of a list of the facilities around the 
world where weapons-usable nuclear materials exist, 
and is planning to transform this list into a regularly 
updated database.27
But there is still much to be done to match the scope 
of the actual effort to the ambition of the statements 
that have been made in describing it.  DOE is now 
working to identify all the caches of nuclear material 
that could pose a theft threat, and develop means to 
address them.  In that context, it is important to ensure 
that the GTRI effort will fully address the following.
The two-thirds of U.S.-supplied HEU abroad 
that is not yet covered by the U.S. take-back of-
fer.  Some 12 tons of U.S.-supplied HEU abroad is 
not covered by the U.S. takeback offer.  When the 
takeback offer was renewed in 1996, it was limited 
to types of HEU for which the United States already 
had capabilities or plans for processing for disposal. 
DOE has extended the takeback offer in time, and is 
considering extending the offer to additional cate-
gories of U.S.-supplied HEU, but no decision has yet 
been reached.
Facilities other than research reactors. Of the 128 
research reactors or associated facilities worldwide 
estimated to have 20 kilograms or more of HEU, 41 
are fuel fabrication and processing facilities, not re-
search reactors at all (and many of those have large 
quantities of HEU, often in its particularly prolifera-
tion-sensitive metallic form, as most HEU research 
reactor fuel is manufactured from metal).28
•
•
four years.  Rather, the argument is that all HEU should be removed from those sites identiﬁed as having both (a) enough HEU for a 
nuclear bomb, and (b) inadequate security to meet the threats they face, within that time.  In some cases, this may mean encourag-
ing reactors that are no longer needed to shut down rather than converting; where neither conversion nor shut-down is realistically 
possible in a short time span, substantial security upgrades need to be put in place rapidly, sufﬁcient to remove the site from the list 
of the world’s most vulnerable facilities.
26 See “Gaps in Current Programs to Remove HEU From Vulnerable Sites,” in Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, 
pp. 58-59.
27 Interview with DOE ofﬁcials, February and April 2005.
28 The 128-facility ﬁgure is mentioned in U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to 
Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, GAO-04-807 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2004; available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04807.pdf as of 2 February 2005), p. 28.  The 41 fuel facilities ﬁgure is from interviews with DOE 
and Argonne National Laboratory experts, February 2005.
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Shut-down research reactors. A number of the 
research reactors around the world with the most 
worrisome stocks of HEU are facilities that are 
already shut down.  As a result, the issue of con-
version may not be relevant (except for facilities 
that are seeking to establish some renewed HEU-
fueled operation), but the facilities nevertheless 
require signiﬁcant attention either to removing or 
to securing their fuel (or both).
Research reactors in Russia.  Russia has more 
HEU-fueled research reactors than any other 
country.  Though there are now signs that Russia 
is moving to convert a small number of its own 
research reactors,29 to date, no Russian HEU-fu-
eled research reactor has converted to LEU, and 
Russian authorities have been unwilling to lay out 
a comprehensive plan for converting Russian re-
actors.  The Bratislava summit statement referred 
only to converting reactors in “third countries,” a 
point Russian ofﬁcials have since emphasized in 
refusing to engage in depth on conversion of re-
actors in Russia.  Yet despite U.S.-funded security 
and accounting upgrades, many of these facili-
ties continue to pose serious security risks—and 
maintaining security sufﬁcient to protect against 
demonstrated terrorist and criminal threats at all 
these sites will cost far more than the research 
these reactors are doing is worth.  Moreover, if 
Russian reactors are unwilling to give up their 
HEU and convert to LEU, it will be much more 
difﬁcult to convince the operators of Soviet-sup-
plied HEU-fueled facilities in other countries to 
do the same. Converting or shutting down HEU-
fueled research reactors within Russia should be 
a high priority, as one part of an effort to con-
•
•
solidate nuclear weapons and materials in fewer 
locations, as recommended above.
Research reactors that would be difﬁcult to 
convert to LEU.  Of the more than 130 research 
reactors worldwide still operating with HEU fuel, 
56 (over 40%) are not targeted for conversion un-
der current plans—and a substantial number of 
additional facilities are not likely to convert un-
less a very substantial package of positive and 
negative incentives can convince them it is in their 
interest to do so.30  Many of these facilities are not 
realistically needed, and should be given strong 
incentives to shut down, rather than converting 
(an issue discussed in more detail below).
Critical assemblies and pulse reactors.  Many 
of the world’s research reactors are critical assem-
blies and pulse reactors—systems used to model 
nuclear reactor cores and other processes, in which 
only a few ﬁssions occur, or ﬁssions occur only in 
brief pulses.  These facilities effectively never con-
sume their HEU fuel, and hence never need new 
fuel—and the fuel they have, even when inside the 
core of the reactor, typically is effectively identical 
to fresh HEU fuel.  Some of these facilities have 
huge quantities of HEU, but because they never 
need new fuel, attention is only beginning to be 
devoted to converting them to LEU, or otherwise 
addressing the security risks they pose.
Reactors for medical isotope production. There 
have long been efforts to develop means to pro-
duce medical isotopes using LEU targets instead 
of HEU targets, and to convince the isotope pro-
duction ﬁrms to convert to LEU.  But there is cur-
rently little progress in convincing some of the 
•
•
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29 Two Russian research reactors have told U.S. ofﬁcials that they have been instructed to convert to LEU.  Interviews with DOE of-
ﬁcials, April 2005.
30 As the U.S. General Accountability Ofﬁce points out, DOE’s conversion effort covers 105 reactors worldwide, of which 29 have 
already fully converted to LEU (and are no longer on the list of reactors currently operating with HEU); 10 have partly converted 
(and are still operating with some HEU in their core); 35 more could convert with already developed fuels; and 31 cannot convert 
without signiﬁcant reductions in capability until new, denser fuels are developed.  In addition, there are 56 operating HEU-fueled 
reactors that are not slated for conversion, including (among others) fast-neutron reactors (which cannot readily be converted to 
use LEU), military research reactors, reactors with specialty fuel types for which developing new fuels for small numbers of facilities 
has not been judged cost-effective. U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of 
Weapons-Usable Uranium, pp. 10-11, 38-39.  Hence the total number of research reactors currently using HEU, by this accounting, is 
10+35+31+56=132.
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31 For more on this topic, see Peter Bradford et al., “Letter to Representatives Joe Barton and John Dingell, Energy and Commerce Com-
mittee” (Washington, D.C.:  2005).  For the latest on relevant legislative action, see also Anthony Wier, “Legislative Update,” in Nuclear 
Threat Initiative Research Library: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials (2004; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/
overview/legislative.asp as of 2 February 2005). 
32 For a brief discussion, see Bunn, Wier, and Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, p. 
128.  For a disturbing recent analysis of security for transport of separated plutonium in France (authored by an engineer with long 
experience in physical protection at DOE, though commissioned by Greenpeace), see Ronald E. Timm, “Security Assessment Report 
for Plutonium Transport in France” (Paris: Greenpeace International, 2005).
33 George Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, March 2005; available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ﬁles/UC2.FINAL3.pdf as of 21 March 2005).
key producers (notably Canada’s MDS Nordion) 
to convert.  One step that should certainly not 
be taken is to substantially weaken U.S. controls 
on the export of HEU for these facilities, as is pro-
posed in the new version of the energy bill now 
being debated in the 109th Congress.31
Icebreaker, naval, and military production reac-
tors.  Russia’s nuclear icebreakers use hundreds of 
kilograms of weapons-usable HEU every year but 
no signiﬁcant effort to convert those reactors has 
yet been funded.  Similarly, no signiﬁcant effort to 
convert naval or those military plutonium-produc-
tion or tritium-production reactors that use HEU 
“spike” fuel has yet been undertaken.
HEU not supplied by either the United States or 
Russia.  Past U.S. programs to remove HEU from 
vulnerable sites focused primarily on bringing 
U.S.-origin HEU back to the United States, and Rus-
sian-origin HEU back to Russia.  While the United 
States and Russia supplied the vast majority of the 
world’s civilian HEU, there are stockpiles to be ad-
dressed that do not come from either source.  One 
obvious example the GTRI program is now con-
sidering is the substantial stockpile of HEU at the 
Safari reactor in South Africa, much of which was 
produced by South Africa itself (including material 
produced for its former nuclear weapons pro-
gram).
In addition to these categories of HEU to be ad-
dressed, there is the problem of separated plutonium, 
whose proliferation risks must be addressed as well. 
Today, there is a large industry, focused in France, 
Britain, Russia, and Japan, separating plutonium from 
civilian spent fuel for recycling as fuel in large power 
reactors.  This material is weapons-usable, and it is es-
•
•
sential that security and accounting commensurate 
with post–9/11 threats be maintained throughout 
all stages of that process.32  The large investments 
in plutonium separation facilities that have already 
been made make it unlikely that proposals for an im-
mediate moratorium on plutonium reprocessing will 
be adopted.33  But the Bush administration should 
renew the effort to negotiate a U.S.-Russian morato-
rium, and over the long term, civilian use of separated 
plutonium should be phased out, in favor of fuel 
cycles that do not use weapons-usable separated 
plutonium.  As with HEU, there are also a few research 
reactors or other small and potentially vulnerable 
facilities using separated plutonium as fuel, and the 
security issues these pose must also be addressed.  
A Creative and Flexible Set  
Of Tactics for Addressing the Problem
Rapidly convincing facilities and countries all over 
the world to stop using potential nuclear bomb ma-
terial and allow the material they have to be removed 
will be an immense challenge, requiring consider-
able tactical creativity, ﬂexibility, and perseverance. 
A number of approaches that will likely need to be 
included are described below.
A broad range of incentives. One overwhelming 
message from past removals of HEU from vulnerable 
sites is that each case was unique, and required a dif-
ferent set of incentives to convince the facility and 
the country to allow the HEU to be removed.  Some of 
these incentives related directly to the nuclear facility 
itself, such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s help with 
managing the remaining nuclear waste on-site that 
proved to be crucial to getting a deal with Yugosla-
via to remove the HEU from Vinca in 2002, but others 
were almost entirely unrelated, such as the broader 
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34 Philipp C. Bleek, Global Cleanout: An Emerging Approach to the Civil Nuclear Material Threat (Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing 
the Atom, Harvard University, September 2004; available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/bleekglobal-
cleanout.pdf as of 13 April 2005).
35 Where necessary, this should include help paying for the cost of new LEU fuel (especially in cases were reactor otherwise would 
not buy new LEU fuel because it already has HEU that will last for many years, or for the lifetime of the reactor).
36 U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of Weap-
ons-Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the United States and Russia, GAO-05-57 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2004; available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0557.pdf as of 2 February 2005).
37 Iain Ritchie, “IAEA Presentation on Threat Reduction Activities” (paper presented at the Global Threat Reduction Initiative Interna-
tional Partners’ Conference, Vienna, Austria, 18-19 September 2004).
38 International Atomic Energy Agency, “New Life for Research Reactors? Bright Future But Far Fewer Projected” (Vienna: IAEA, 2004; 
available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/ResearchReactors/reactors20040308.html as of 22 March 2005).
threat reduction assistance provided to Kazakhstan 
as part of the arrangements for Project Sapphire, or 
the relief from sanctions provided to Libya as part of 
its agreement to abandon its weapons of mass de-
struction programs and allow the fresh, unirradiated 
HEU at its nuclear research institute to be removed.34 
Hence, it is important, as GTRI moves forward, to be 
creative and ﬂexible in offering packages of incen-
tives for HEU removal, tailored to the needs of each 
individual facility.  This could include help with con-
verting to LEU or with shutting and decommissioning 
a reactor, contracts for other research by the scien-
tists at a site after agreement is reached to shut the 
site’s reactor, help with managing the wastes from a 
research reactor, and other steps, many of which will 
not even be thought of until a particular case arises.35 
It appears that additional incentives are also likely to 
be needed to convince facilities to return even that 
portion of the U.S.-supplied HEU abroad that is cov-
ered by the current U.S. take-back offer.36
In legislation sponsored by Senator Pete Domenici 
(R-NM) and Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) in 2004, 
Congress took an essential step in the right direc-
tion, authorizing the provision of an enumerated list 
of incentives to convince facilities to give up their 
HEU.  This year, Congress should consider broader 
language authorizing the secretary of energy to take 
such actions as may be necessary to implement GTRI 
effectively.
Shut-down, in addition to conversion.  Most of the 
world’s research reactors are aging and unneeded. 
The best answer for many of them is to provide incen-
tives to shut them down.  The same is true for the 56 
HEU-fueled research reactors that are currently con-
sidered too difﬁcult to convert to LEU.  There is good 
evidence that such an approach can succeed, as even 
in the absence of any effort to provide shut-down 
incentives, far more HEU-fueled reactors have shut 
down since 1978, when the effort to convert these 
reactors to LEU began, than have successfully con-
verted.37  Indeed, IAEA experts have estimated that of 
the more than 270 research reactors still operating in 
the world (both HEU-fueled and otherwise), only 30-
40 are likely to be needed in the long term.38  Helping 
reactor operators see the virtues in shutting down will 
take considerable care, as no approach perceived by 
the world’s reactor operators as anti-science or anti-
nuclear is likely to succeed.  As part of such an effort, 
the international community should help establish a 
smaller number of more broadly shared research re-
actors—the same direction that high-energy particle 
accelerators went long ago.
Security upgrades, in addition to material remov-
als.  Removing nuclear material from the world’s 
most vulnerable sites should be done as quickly as 
possible, but it cannot happen overnight.  Therefore 
efforts to remove nuclear material should go in par-
allel with programs to upgrade security at the sites 
where the material now resides.  The international 
community should not be shy about investing to pro-
vide effective security at a site where the material will 
be removed in a few years; such an investment avoids 
leaving a weak link in nuclear security during the crit-
ical time before removal takes place.  Through GTRI or 
whatever other rubric is most appropriate, the United 
States should assist countries around the world in 
strengthening security at small, vulnerable sites with 
weapons-usable nuclear material, and should work 
with states to put in place nuclear security rules re-
104 SECURING THE BOMB 2005
39 For a discussion of this recent shift, see, for example, Ann MacLachlan, “DOE Replaces Long-Time Heads of Program to Convert 
HEU Reactors,” Nucleonics Week, 11 November 2004.
quiring that every facility with signiﬁcant quantities 
of weapons-usable material on hand have security 
measures sufﬁcient to defeat plausible terrorist and 
criminal threats.  (The cost of complying with such 
regulations will provide a strong incentive to facilities 
to eliminate the nuclear material they have on hand.) 
In particular, those remaining research reactors that 
are still genuinely needed and cannot convert to 
available LEU fuels without a substantial degradation 
of their scientiﬁc performance should be effectively 
secured for now, and given incentives to convert 
when development of new, higher-density LEU fuels 
is completed—which is not likely to occur until early 
in the next decade.
High-level, high-priority diplomacy.  In the past, 
conversion of research reactors to LEU, and removal 
of HEU from vulnerable sites, have in most cases been 
handled by program managers and technical ex-
perts, not by cabinet or subcabinet national security 
ofﬁcials.  They have been treated, in essence, as “nice 
to do” nonproliferation initiatives, not as urgent na-
tional security priorities deserving of attention from 
the highest levels.  In part as a result, discussions with 
many reactors around the world have dragged on for 
years, often with the hope that agreement to con-
vert the reactor is just around the corner, but often 
never quite getting there.  If the United States is now 
to succeed in drastically increasing the pace of HEU 
removals around the world, it is likely to be necessary 
to put this issue on the agenda for senior ofﬁcials, 
as one critical element of the global effort to keep 
nuclear bomb material out of terrorist hands and 
therefore a high priority for U.S. diplomacy.  In some 
cases, such as in the effort to convince Ukraine to al-
low the HEU to be removed from its nuclear facilities, 
this is already beginning to occur.  
Effective, partnership-based management and 
approaches.  The effort to remove HEU from more 
than 100 sites around the world, in scores of countries, 
including the conversion or shut-down of more than 
100 research reactors around the world, will inevi-
tably be challenging and technically, politically, and 
institutionally complex.  Personnel with experience 
in such efforts, familiarity with the sites and their op-
erators, and considerable creativity in ﬁnding ways to 
surmount the obstacles to success will be essential. 
Convincing a research reactor operator to adopt a 
new LEU fuel, never before tried in his reactor, will re-
quire building trust and conﬁdence—elements that 
will be even more essential for convincing states to 
shut reactors down—and that will require person-
nel who have built relationships with these operators 
over the years. 
For all these reasons, DOE’s recent decision to shift 
the leadership of the reactor conversion effort away 
from the Argonne team that had been leading it for 
decades, in favor of personnel with little prior ex-
perience in the effort, is almost certain to result in 
both technical delays and increased difﬁculties in 
working with reactor operators around the world.39 
DOE should now take action to: (a) ensure against 
further rapid changes in approach or personnel that 
could undermine conﬁdence among reactor opera-
tors being asked to participate in the effort (while 
continuing to be open to changes that could build 
conﬁdence and strengthen the effort); (b) pursue 
approaches that involve the operators of research 
reactors and other key foreign decision-makers 
on these potentially vulnerable nuclear stockpiles 
in direct partnership where possible; and (c) con-
vince personnel with extensive experience in the 
conversion effort to continue to take an active part, 
keeping them as close to the heart of the enterprise 
as possible.
Getting the United States’ Own House in Order
If the United States wants to convince other countries 
to convert their research reactors to use fuels that 
cannot be used in nuclear weapons, to put rules in 
place requiring high security for those facilities where 
HEU is still present, and to ensure stringent security 
for all potential nuclear bomb material, whether in 
military or in civilian use, it needs to be willing to do 
the same itself.  In particular, the United States should 
take the following steps.
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Convert all U.S. HEU-fueled research reactors to 
LEU as soon as possible.  In 1986, the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission approved a rule requiring all U.S. 
HEU-fueled research reactors to convert to LEU as 
soon as appropriate fuels and DOE ﬁnancing for the 
conversions were available.40  Yet nearly 20 years later, 
there are still eight U.S. HEU-fueled research reactors 
slated for conversion that could convert with existing 
fuels, but which have not converted, because DOE 
has not yet provided the necessary funds (along with 
six more reactors slated for conversion that require 
the new fuel still in development before they will be 
able to convert).41  Converting U.S. reactors is a critical 
step, not only because of the security risks they pose 
themselves, but because research reactors all over 
the world point to the lack of U.S. action as reason 
to delay action themselves.  Many research reactor 
operators continue to believe—however unjustiﬁed 
this view may be—that using HEU will provide more 
scientiﬁc opportunities, and do not want to accept a 
double standard in which U.S. facilities may use HEU 
and they may not.  
In launching GTRI, former Secretary of Energy Spen-
cer Abraham pledged conversion of U.S. HEU-fueled 
research reactors would be completed by 2013 
(when the fuel now in development is expected to 
be licensed and commercially available),42 but it is 
worth noting that (a) there is no mention of funding 
for U.S. reactors to convert in the administration’s 
FY 2006 budget request; and (b) nine U.S. HEU-fu-
eled reactors are not currently on the target list for 
conversion at all (because they are military research 
reactors which probably could not perform their 
missions with current or projected LEU fuels).43  In 
the spring of 2005, DOE announced that it would 
fund the conversion of two U.S. reactors.  DOE 
should (a) provide funding to convert all HEU-fu-
eled reactors that can use available fuels as rapidly 
as possible; (b) take every action available to ensure 
that development, licensing, production, and use of 
new, higher-density LEU fuels remains on track, and 
is accelerated if possible; and (c) explore whether 
all of the U.S. reactors currently using HEU are still 
needed, or whether some should be shut down.
Require U.S. HEU-fueled research reactors to 
maintain effective security.  Remarkably, U.S. 
HEU-fueled research reactors are exempted from 
key security requirements.  All facilities licensed 
by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
that possess more than ﬁve kilograms of U-235 in 
HEU—unless the HEU is in a form so radioactive that 
it would be difﬁcult to steal, referred to as “self-pro-
tecting,” in NRC parlance—must maintain so-called 
Category I physical protection, which involves secu-
rity arrangements (including armed guards) capable 
of defeating a speciﬁed “design basis threat.”  But 
when this rule was ﬁrst put in place, research reactors 
were exempted from a key element of it: as long as 
the fresh HEU on-site contains less than ﬁve kilograms 
of U-235, research reactors do not have to have secu-
rity capable of defeating any particular threat, even if 
the HEU in the reactor core and in the spent fuel pool 
is not self-protecting and is more than enough for a 
nuclear bomb.44  Thus weapons-usable nuclear mate-
rial that would require stringent protection were it 
40 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Limiting the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Domestically Licensed Research and Test 
Reactors,” Federal Register 51, no. 37 (25 February 1986; available at http://www.rertr.anl.gov/REFDOCS/NRCRULE.pdf as of 20 March 
2005).
41 U.S. Government Accountability Ofﬁce, DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium, pp. 13-22.
42 Spencer Abraham, “International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna: Remarks Prepared for Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham” (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 26 May 2004; available at http://www.energy.gov as of 18 March 2005).
43 Data provided by U.S. laboratory ofﬁcials.  Of the nine, three are at Sandia (the Annular Core Research Reactor, the Sandia Pulse Re-
actor II, and the Sandia Pulse Reactor III); four are at Los Alamos (SKUA, FLATTOP, GODIVA, and Honeycomb); and two belong to the 
Department of Defense (the Army Pulsed Radiation Facility Reactor at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and the Fast Burst Reactor at 
White Sands Missile Range).
44 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Limiting the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Domestically Licensed Research and Test 
Reactors.”  In addition, see Edwin Lyman and Alan Kuperman, “A Re-Evaluation of Physical Protection Standards for Irradiated HEU 
Fuel” (paper presented at the 24th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors, Bariloche, Argen-
tina, 5 November 2002). 
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45 Currently, in both NRC regulations and IAEA guidelines, material is considered self-protecting if it emits more than 100 rad/hr at 1 
meter.  Calculations by one U.S. nuclear laboratory suggest that terrorists stealing nuclear material would receive a radiation dose 
roughly equal to the hourly radiation rate at one meter, divided by the number of terrorists who divided up the task.  Thus if ﬁve 
terrorists stole the material, they might each get a dose of 20 rads.  A dose of 400 rads will kill roughly half of those exposed, over 
the course of days or weeks after exposure; it takes substantially higher doses still to be acutely disabling.  For discussion, see Lyman 
and Kuperman, “A Re-Evaluation of Physical Protection Standards for Irradiated HEU Fuel.”
46 For the speciﬁcs of categorizing different types of material, current DOE orders still refer back to U.S. Department of Energy, Guide 
to Implementation of DOE 5633.3b, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials (April 1995) (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 1995).
47 HEU and plutonium should be Category I materials except in cases where chemical processing experts judge that it would be 
extremely unlikely that terrorists would be able to recover the nuclear material for use in a bomb.
48 Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, 
D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994; available at http://books.nap.edu/html/plutonium/0309050421.pdf as of 20 March 2005), pp. 31, 
102.
49 U.S. Department of Energy, “Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement,” Federal Register 62, no. 13 (21 January 1997; available at http://www.eh.doe.gov/
nepa/rods/1997/3014.pdf as of 31 March 2005).
located anywhere else does not require high security 
if it happens to be located at a research reactor.  
This exemption was made because, except for a few 
very high-power research reactors, most research 
reactor fuel is not radioactive enough to be self-pro-
tecting, and the reactors complained that they simply 
could not afford the cost of serious security for their 
facilities and would be forced to shut down if required 
to maintain Category I protection.  The exemption, ap-
proved in the 1970s, was intended to be temporary, 
giving the reactors time to convert to LEU, arrange to 
maintain less than ﬁve kilograms of U-235 at any time, 
or make other arrangements.  But the exemption has 
never been lifted.  The result is that most U.S. HEU-fu-
eled research reactors, prior to the 9/11 attacks, had 
no on-site armed guards at all; today, many have only 
one.  None has a security plan in place to defeat the 
NRC-speciﬁed design basis threat for theft of nuclear 
material.  
NRC should immediately modify its rule, requiring all 
research reactors that have more than ﬁve kilograms 
in HEU that is not self-protecting to meet Category 
I security requirements.  It should also substantially 
increase the radiation level considered self-protect-
ing against theft: the radiation from material at the 
current lower limit for self-protection, set long before 
the 9/11 attacks, would do little to deter suicidal ter-
rorists from stealing nuclear material.45
Modify DOE deﬁnitions of material requiring high 
security.  Just as the NRC has an exemption to its se-
curity rules for research reactors, DOE’s security rules 
exempt a wide range of types of material that pose se-
rious security risks from major security requirements, 
including most HEU research reactor fuel.  DOE’s rules 
deﬁne any material that has less than 10% by weight 
U-235 as falling outside Category I, which is the only 
category that requires stringent security measures.46 
This applies even in the case, for example, of 90% en-
riched HEU research reactor fuel containing uranium 
and aluminum with less than 10% of the weight com-
ing from the U-235—though separating aluminum 
from uranium is so easy a chemical separation that 
it could be carried out in a covert facility, such as a 
large garage, by personnel with no specialized nu-
clear chemistry experience.  DOE should modify its 
categorization of nuclear material, eliminating this 
exemption from Category I requirements for mate-
rial with less than 10% by weight weapons-usable 
nuclear material.47 
Require effective security for U.S. civilian use of 
separated plutonium.  In 1994, a committee of the 
National Academy of Sciences argued that because 
getting the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons 
was the hardest part of making a nuclear bomb, HEU 
and separated plutonium should, to the extent prac-
ticable, be secured to the same standards applied to 
nuclear weapons themselves—and argued further 
that this “stored weapon standard” should be applied 
to all separated plutonium and HEU worldwide.48  
Although DOE at one time endorsed this standard,49 
it is now pushing in very much the opposite direction 
as part of the plutonium disposition program.  DOE’s 
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new policy risks undermining U.S. efforts to ensure 
stringent security for weapons-usable nuclear mate-
rial in use at reactors around the world.  Under NRC 
security rules, fabricated uranium-plutonium mixed 
oxide (MOX) fuel is considered Category I material 
requiring the most stringent security arrangements. 
As part of the plutonium disposition program, how-
ever, Duke Energy, which plans to burn MOX fuel in 
its Catawba and McGuire plants, has applied for ex-
emptions from many of NRC’s Category I security 
requirements, arguing that MOX fuel would not be 
an attractive target for theft, and that there should be 
no need to increase the current guard force intended 
to protect the reactor from sabotage to protect the 
fresh MOX fuel from theft.  The NRC has now autho-
rized the use of MOX fuel at these facilities, and has 
indicated that although the plants would “technically” 
be Category I facilities, “there is no rational reason” for 
them “to have a signiﬁcantly different level of security 
than is already existing at the reactor site.”50  
For the United States to take the position that its 
reactors can use fuel containing weapon-grade plu-
tonium with no signiﬁcant increase in security would 
make it impossible for the United States to credibly 
urge other countries to provide stringent security 
for weapons-usable material when it was in use at 
their reactors, be they power reactors using MOX or 
research reactors using HEU.  It would also make it 
essentially impossible for the United States to insist 
that Russia maintain stringent security for weapons 
plutonium throughout the disposition process.  Risk-
ing U.S. national security in these ways is entirely 
unnecessary, as DOE is paying the cost for the MOX 
program, and paying for the complete Category I 
security requirements to be met would be a trivial in-
crease in the cost of the disposition program.  DOE 
should immediately direct Duke Energy to withdraw 
its request for an exemption, and NRC should require 
that all facilities with Category I nuclear materials pro-
vide security meeting NRC’s Category I requirements. 
STEP 3: A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP  
TO PREVENT NUCLEAR TERRORISM
The problem of insecure nuclear material is global. 
Solving it will require forging a global coalition of 
countries around the world willing to work together 
to improve security for nuclear materials, wherever 
they may be.  The steps already described, if success-
ful, will drastically reduce the security risks posed by 
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear mate-
rials in Russia and at facilities around the world from 
which weapons-usable nuclear materials can rapidly 
be removed.  But there will inevitably be vulnerable 
caches of potential nuclear bomb material that are 
not in Russia and cannot be rapidly removed.  Hence, 
a crucial third step is a global effort to ensure that 
every cache of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable 
nuclear materials worldwide is secure and accounted 
for, to a level sufﬁcient to defeat plausible terrorist 
and criminal threats (both outsiders and insiders).
Given the devastating global economic impact a nu-
clear terrorist attack would have, every country has 
a strong self-interest in cooperating to reduce this 
threat.  But senior ofﬁcials in many countries around 
the world simply do not see nuclear terrorism as a 
signiﬁcant threat, downplaying the likelihood that 
terrorists could get nuclear bomb material or could 
make a nuclear bomb from it if they could.  Hence, an 
absolutely critical element of success in forging the 
needed global campaign to secure these stockpiles 
will be convincing governments around the world 
that the threat of nuclear theft and terrorism is real, 
urgent, and a threat to their countries as well as to the 
United States.  Approaches similar to those suggested 
above in the Russian case—joint brieﬁngs on the 
nuclear terrorist threat, simulations and war games 
focused on nuclear terrorism scenarios, training vid-
eos for nuclear personnel that highlight the dangers, 
and rapid reviews of nuclear security vulnerabilities 
by each country’s own personnel—should also be 
pursued with other countries around the world.  Even 
if governments can be convinced of the reality of 
50 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, In the Matter of Duke Energy Corporation (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-29 
(Washington, D.C.: NRC, 2004; available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/orders/2004/2004-29cli.pdf 
as of 29 March 2005).
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51 See Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, pp. 87-88. 
52 The experience in Russia has been that cooperation has proceeded best when either (a) it was allowed to go forward “under 
the radar screen,” with technical experts communicating directly with each other with relatively modest intervention from central 
governments, or (b) at the other extreme, when action was taken at the presidential level to push the cooperation forward and 
overcome obstacles.  When the discussion was lodged at levels in between those extremes, ofﬁcials who wanted to raise objections 
were able to do so, and ofﬁcials who wanted to sweep aside these obstacles did not have the power to do so.  In the case of coun-
tries such as Pakistan, India, and China, however, it appears likely that nuclear security cooperation will be so sensitive and so closely 
monitored by conservative government security agencies, that the “under the radar screen” approach may not be possible.
the danger, the intense secrecy surrounding nuclear 
stockpiles and their security arrangements, and the 
decades-long practice of leaving decisions on how 
much security to provide to nuclear stockpiles almost 
entirely to each state where these stockpiles exist, will 
mean that building the needed global effort will be 
an extraordinary challenge, again requiring sustained 
presidential leadership. A number of the steps that 
should be taken are described below.
Build a global nuclear security partnership.  De-
spite the creation of the G8 Global Partnership 
Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of 
Mass Destruction in 2002, the reality today is that no 
global coalition genuinely focused on rapidly improv-
ing nuclear security around the world yet exists.  The 
non-U.S. members of the Global Partnership have al-
located only a tiny fraction of their Global Partnership 
efforts to improving security for nuclear stockpiles or 
interdicting nuclear smuggling.  No country other 
than the United States has made any substantial in-
vestments in assistance to improve nuclear security 
beyond the former Soviet Union, and the IAEA ofﬁce 
intended to help member states improve nuclear se-
curity struggles along with a budget and staff that 
are dwarfed by the scale of the work to be done.
The U.S. government should place high priority on 
convincing leading states that could contribute to 
nuclear security upgrades, or whose stockpiles are 
critical to secure, to join in a fast-paced coalition of 
the willing to upgrade nuclear security.  Institution-
ally, such a coalition could be based on a transformed 
Global Partnership, or it could be a new effort in par-
allel to the existing Global Partnership.  One group of 
U.S. non-government experts, for example, has pro-
posed the creation of a “Contact Group to Prevent 
Nuclear Terrorism,” including many of the G8 states 
along with China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and other 
states with weapons-usable nuclear material that 
wish to join, designed to pursue securing the world’s 
nuclear stockpiles at very high levels of each govern-
ment.51  In many cases, countries might ﬁnd it easier 
to explain to their domestic audiences that they are 
joining with the United States and other leading nu-
clear powers in leadership of a cooperative effort to 
solve a global security problem, instead of acknowl-
edging that they require U.S. assistance because they 
cannot adequately control their own nuclear stock-
piles. 
Put nuclear security at the top of the diplomatic 
agenda.  Forging such a global effort and getting 
on-the-ground action moving at the pace required 
to meet the threat will likely require a substantial 
increase in the intensity and political level at which 
the subject of nuclear security is addressed with 
other leading states.  The leaders of the critical states 
need to hear, at every opportunity, that action to en-
sure nuclear security is crucial to their own security 
and to a positive relationship with the United States. 
The United States can no longer afford to let the is-
sue languish when obstacles are encountered, or to 
leave the discussion to specialists.  The United States 
government should make nuclear security a central 
item on the diplomatic agenda with all of the most 
relevant states.52
Implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. 
UNSCR 1540, approved unanimously in April 2004, 
creates new binding legal obligations on every U.N. 
member state to put in place “appropriate effective” 
laws making it a crime to help non-state actors with 
weapons of mass destruction.  It requires states to 
put in place “appropriate effective” laws and proce-
dures for export, border, and transshipment controls. 
And, for those states that possess nuclear, chemical, 
or biological weapons and their means of delivery or 
related materials, UNSCR 1540 mandates “appropri-
ate effective” security and accounting and physical 
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53 For discussion, see “Challenges of Adapting Threat Reduction to New Contexts,” in Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda 
for Action, pp. 104-105. See also James E. Goodby et al., Cooperative Threat Reduction for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, September 2004; available at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/
CTR%20for%20a%20New%20Era.pdf as of 21 March 2005); Lee Feinstein et al., A New Equation: U.S. Policy toward India and Paki-
stan after September 11 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2002; available at http://www.ceip.
org/ﬁles/pdf/wp27.pdf as of 21 March 2005); Rose Gottemoeller and Rebecca Longsworth, Enhancing Nuclear Security in the Coun-
ter-Terrorism Struggle: India and Pakistan as a New Region for Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, August 2002; available at http://www.ceip.org/ﬁles/pdf/wp29.pdf as of 21 March 2005).
54 These types of assistance would in no way violate the nuclear weapon states’ Nonproliferation Treaty obligations not to assist 
other states in acquiring nuclear weapons. And, with appropriate care, they could be implemented while remaining fully within the 
export control rules in place in the United States and in other countries.
protection for these stockpiles.  This provides a crucial 
opportunity for the United States to work with other 
countries and the IAEA to: (a) detail the essential ele-
ments of an “appropriate effective” system for nuclear 
security; (b) assess what improvements countries 
around the world need to make to put these essential 
elements in place; and (c) assist countries around the 
world in taking the needed actions.  Indeed, the entire 
global effort to put in place stringent nuclear secu-
rity measures for all the world’s stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials can 
be considered simply as the implementation of the 
unanimously approved obligations of UNSCR 1540.  
This opportunity may be ﬂeeting, however: it is now 
already a year since UNSCR 1540 was approved, and 
there has been little pressure on states to change 
their practices to fulﬁll its mandates in the interven-
ing year.  Many states are therefore likely becoming 
complacent that little or nothing will be required of 
them.  The United States should immediately join 
with other leading powers in a fast-paced effort to 
implement UNSCR 1540, deﬁning what is needed to 
meet its obligations, assessing what countries need 
to meet those standards, and helping countries put 
the necessary measures in place as quickly as pos-
sible.
Adapt cooperative threat reduction to new con-
texts.  Adapting the threat-reduction approaches 
developed in cooperation with Russia and other 
former Soviet states to the speciﬁc circumstances of 
each other country where cooperation must go for-
ward is likely to be an enormous challenge.  Attempts 
to simply copy the approach now being used in 
Russia are almost certain to fail.53  For many states, de-
scribing the cooperation as joining with the world’s 
leading nuclear nations in the leadership of a global 
effort to solve a global problem may be substantially 
more appealing politically than describing it as U.S. 
assistance to put in place controls they are unable to 
put in place on their own.  Cooperation with states 
with small nuclear weapons arsenals, such as Paki-
stan, India, China, and Israel, is likely to be especially 
difﬁcult.  For all of these states, nuclear activities take 
place under a blanket of almost total secrecy, and di-
rect access to many nuclear sites by U.S. personnel is 
likely to be impossible in the near term.  
Nonetheless, there is much that can be done coop-
eratively to improve nuclear security in such cases, 
including (a) training experts in vulnerability assess-
ment, physical protection system design, material 
accounting, nuclear security regulation, and other 
areas of expertise critical to an effective nuclear se-
curity and accounting system; (b) discussions of “best 
practices” and means to ﬁnd and ﬁx nuclear security 
vulnerabilities; and (c) provision of modern secu-
rity and accounting equipment for these states to 
install themselves, with their own funds.54  Methods 
that have been developed in U.S.-Russian coopera-
tion to assure that U.S.-ﬁnanced upgrade work has 
been completed as agreed without requiring direct 
access could also be pursued, such as photographs 
and videotapes of installed equipment and opera-
tional reports on its use, and reliance on personnel 
who are citizens of the recipient country, with secu-
rity clearances from that country, but employed by a 
U.S. contractor, who can visit relevant sites and certify 
that work has been done appropriately—so-called 
“trusted agents.”  In general, working out arrange-
ments to improve nuclear security—and to build 
conﬁdence that effective nuclear security really is in 
place—will require considerable creativity and per-
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sistence.  The United States should step up its efforts 
to move such cooperation forward, as part of the 
broader global partnership described in this section. 
U.S. ofﬁcials should seek to discuss with counterparts 
from these countries possibilities for cooperation that 
would not reveal any nuclear secrets.  In some cases, 
it may be desirable to build conﬁdence initially with 
less sensitive cooperation, such as programs focused 
on installing radiation portal monitors at key border 
sites to interdict nuclear smuggling.
Exchange best practices.  As noted above, dis-
cussions of best practices in nuclear security and 
accounting—including means that have been 
used to rapidly ﬁnd and ﬁx nuclear security weak-
nesses—should take place globally, not just between 
the United States and Russia.  Such discussions can 
provide a rapid, non-intrusive, and low-cost means 
to help countries around the world improve their nu-
clear security and accounting approaches.  The IAEA’s 
Ofﬁce of Nuclear Security can play a key role in iden-
tifying and promoting best practices, and organizing 
international discussions.  It should be given the re-
sources and mandate to do so.  
In addition, the nuclear industry should establish a 
cooperative industry organization focused on improv-
ing security standards worldwide through exchanges 
of best practices, peer reviews, and peer assistance, 
comparable to the role the World Association of 
Nuclear Operators (WANO) has played in improving 
nuclear safety around the world.  A terrorist nuclear 
attack using stolen plutonium or HEU would be a po-
litical disaster for the nuclear industry on a scale even 
larger than the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl acci-
dents; hence, just as in the case of safety, the industry 
has a strong self-interest in ensuring that those facili-
ties with the worst security performance are helped 
to reach the standards of the top performers.
Forge stringent global nuclear security stan-
dards.  Facing terrorists with global reach, nuclear 
security is only as good as its weakest link: as former 
Senator Sam Nunn has said, insecure nuclear mate-
rial anywhere is a threat to everyone, everywhere. 
Yet today, there are no binding global standards for 
how well nuclear weapons and materials should be 
secured, and the actual security in place ranges from 
excellent to appalling.  Efforts to negotiate an effec-
tive global standard in a treaty have not succeeded 
in the past, and are not likely to succeed in the near-
term future, as such negotiations inevitably become 
bogged down by country representatives who see 
little urgency for action and considerable poten-
tial for added costs and unwanted intrusion for the 
organizations they represent.  But UNSCR 1540, in 
creating overnight a binding legal obligation on ev-
ery state to provide “appropriate effective” security 
and accounting for whatever nuclear stockpiles it 
may have, creates an opportunity that should not 
be missed.  If broad agreement could be reached on 
what a nuclear security and accounting system must 
include to meet the “appropriate effective” require-
ment, that would, in effect, become a legally binding 
global standard for nuclear security.  
If the words “appropriate effective” mean anything, 
they should mean that nuclear security systems could 
effectively defeat threats that terrorists and criminals 
have shown they can pose.  Thus one possible deﬁni-
tion would be that to meet its UNSCR 1540 physical 
protection obligation, every state with nuclear weap-
ons or weapons-usable nuclear materials should have 
a well-enforced national rule requiring that every fa-
cility with a nuclear bomb or a signiﬁcant quantity of 
nuclear material must have security in place capable 
of defeating a speciﬁed set of insider and outsider 
threats comparable to those terrorists and criminals 
have demonstrated in that country (or nearby).  This 
approach has the advantages that (a) the logic is sim-
ple, easy to explain, and difﬁcult to argue against; (b) 
the standard is general and ﬂexible enough to allow 
countries to pursue their own speciﬁc approaches, as 
long as they are effective enough to meet the threats; 
and (c) at the same time, it is speciﬁc enough to be 
effective, and to provide the basis for questioning, as-
sessment, and review.55  Others have proposed other 
standards to meet similar objectives: Graham T. Al-
55 Questions to explore a country’s compliance with this standard could include such items as: is there a rule in place specifying 
that all facilities with nuclear weapons or signiﬁcant quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material must have security in place 
capable of defending against speciﬁed insider and outsider threats?  Are those speciﬁed threats big enough to realistically reﬂect 
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demonstrated terrorist and criminal capabilities in that country or region?  How is this requirement enforced?  Is there a program 
of regular, realistic tests, to demonstrate whether facilities security approaches are in fact able to defeat the speciﬁed threats?  Are 
armed guards used on-site at nuclear facilities, and if not, how is the system able to hold off outside attack or insider thieves long 
enough for armed response forces to arrive from elsewhere?
56 Graham T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2004).
57 Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, pp. 31, 102. 
Other sources could also be drawn on for insight in deﬁning what should be included in an “appropriate effective” physical protec-
tion system, including the “principles and objectives” in the proposed amendment to the physical protection convention (though 
these are very general and include few speciﬁcs), and the IAEA’s recommendations on physical protection (INFIRC/225 Rev. 4).  Un-
fortunately, while both of these provide valuable considerations for physical protection, it is possible to comply fully with both of 
them and still not have a secure system.  
58 The multi-year effort that led to these proposed amendments is an example of the difﬁculty of forging global nuclear security 
standards.  Although the United States at one point proposed making the IAEA physical protection recommendations mandatory, 
this was rejected by essentially all the parties;  all options that would have actually imposed legally binding standards for nuclear 
security were rejected by most of the negotiators.  The resulting amendments have signiﬁcant value in providing some general 
guidelines, but compliance with them would by no means ensure that a nuclear security system was effective enough to meet 
modern-day threats. 
59 Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, pp. 150-153.
lison, for example, has proposed a “gold standard,” 
arguing that given the devastating potential conse-
quences of nuclear theft, all nuclear stockpiles should 
be secured to levels similar to those used for large 
stores of gold such as Fort Knox.56  As noted above, a 
committee of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences 
proposed a “stored weapon standard,” arguing that to 
the extent practicable, plutonium and HEU should be 
subject to the same stringent standards of security 
and accounting that nuclear weapons themselves are 
(an approach that presupposes that nuclear weapons 
themselves have effective protection, which may not 
always be the case).57  
The United States should immediately begin discus-
sions with other leading governments to attempt 
to reach broad agreement on a stringent deﬁnition 
of the nuclear security measures required for an 
“appropriate effective” system, and integrate that un-
derstanding with assessment and assistance efforts 
designed to implement UNSCR 1540.  The amend-
ments to the physical protection convention that 
are likely to be approved at a diplomatic conference 
scheduled for July 2005 are valuable, but contain 
only very generally worded principles, not binding 
standards, and are no substitute for an effort to build 
effective global nuclear security standards from the 
foundation provided by UNSCR 1540.58
Build conﬁdence that effective nuclear security is 
in place. Among the most difﬁcult issues related to 
nuclear security is the problem of building interna-
tional conﬁdence that effective nuclear security is in 
fact in place.  Every country has a direct national se-
curity interest in making sure that all countries with 
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials pro-
vide effective security for them.  But in nearly every 
country with such stockpiles, the details of nuclear 
security arrangements are highly classiﬁed, making 
it difﬁcult to reveal enough information to prove 
that the security measures in place are fully effec-
tive.  The problem is especially difﬁcult in cases such 
as Pakistan, India, and Israel, whose nuclear programs 
are deeply shrouded in secrecy.  For those countries 
willing to accept international peer reviews of their 
security arrangements, IAEA-led peer reviews can be 
effective in building conﬁdence, and such peer re-
views should increasingly become a normal part of 
the nuclear business for developed and developing 
states alike, just as international safety reviews are.  
Graham Allison has proposed that nuclear weapon 
states invite experts from another nuclear weapon 
state to review their nuclear security arrangements 
and certify that they are effective.  This is a sensible 
goal to aim for, though it will be extremely difﬁcult 
to achieve.59  In the immediate term, states should do 
more to provide general descriptions of their nuclear 
security approaches, photographs of installed equip-
ment, results of security tests, and related data that 
could be made public without providing data that 
could help terrorists and criminals plan their attacks.
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60 Having the support of all of the G8 leaders—whose countries control 95% or more of the world’s stockpiles of nuclear weapons 
and weapons-usable nuclear materials—for such a standard would be a dramatic step forward.  But ideally, private discussions 
should be pursued with states such as China, India, and Pakistan, which are not members of G8, to gain their general support as 
well, so that any G8 accord on this subject does not appear to force them to agree to something worked out solely among other 
powers.
Strengthen the role of the IAEA.  The IAEA’s Ofﬁce of 
Nuclear Security, established in its current form in the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks, can play a crucial role in help-
ing to set standards and disseminate best practices 
for nuclear security, in providing training, in assessing 
countries’ needs, and in coordinating nuclear security 
assistance to countries around the world.  In many 
countries, assessment teams and assistance organized 
by the IAEA would be far more welcome than U.S. as-
sessment and assistance.  With UNSCR 1540, there are 
now scores of countries that may require assistance to 
meet the binding legal obligations to provide effective 
nuclear security that they now face.  Yet the Ofﬁce of 
Nuclear Security has so far labored with an extraor-
dinarily small staff and a tiny budget (a total of $35 
million has been pledged to the IAEA’s Nuclear Secu-
rity Fund in the three and a half years since the 9/11 
attacks, while the cost of substantially upgrading secu-
rity at one site often exceeds $10 million).  
The United States should work with other leading 
governments to expand the mission, personnel, and 
resources of the Ofﬁce of Nuclear Security, allowing 
the IAEA to substantially increase its contribution to 
preventing nuclear terrorism.  Speciﬁcally, this of-
ﬁce should be given the resources to perform larger 
numbers of more in-depth nuclear vulnerability assess-
ments and other evaluations of needs for prevention 
of nuclear terrorism.  It should be allocated sufﬁcient 
funds to ﬁnance some of the security upgrades iden-
tiﬁed in reviews as needed itself, rather than relying 
entirely on donor states to provide needed upgrades. 
And it should be given the mission and resources to 
take a leading role in assessing states’ needs and help-
ing them to comply with the nuclear provisions of 
UNSCR 1540.  The annual budget of the Ofﬁce of Nu-
clear Security should be increased to at least the range 
of $30-$50 million, and the ofﬁce’s budget should be-
come part of the IAEA’s regular assessed budget, rather 
than relying entirely on voluntary contributions.
STEPS THE G8 AND OTHER  
LEADING POWERS SHOULD TAKE
The leaders of the G8 and the other participants in the 
Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and 
Materials of Mass Destruction have a crucial role to play 
in all three of the key steps to secure nuclear weapons 
and materials around the world just described.  At the 
G8 summit slated for June 2005, the G8 leaders should 
join in forging a fast-paced global partnership for nu-
clear security, including the following steps:
Explicitly identify locking down nuclear stockpiles 
and interdicting nuclear smuggling as top priori-
ties for expenditure of the $20 billion they have 
indicated they will provide;
Put the “global” back in the Global Partnership, ex-
plicitly focusing the effort not just on Russia and the 
former Soviet states, but on helping states world-
wide put in place the controls on weapons of mass 
destruction and related materials and technologies 
mandated in UNSCR 1540 (in parallel with strength-
ening their own controls, gaps in which have been 
revealed by the Abdul Qadeer Khan network);
Agree that, given that expanded global mandate, 
the original $20 billion target should be signiﬁ-
cantly increased;
Agree that, to meet their binding legal obliga-
tion under UNSCR 1540 to provide “appropriate 
effective” security and accounting for all nuclear 
stockpiles, states must establish national rules 
requiring every facility with nuclear weapons or 
signiﬁcant quantities of weapons-usable nuclear 
material to be protected against demonstrated 
terrorist and criminal threats;60
Agree that they will work with other countries that 
have received weapons-usable nuclear material 
from them to ensure that they meet this standard 
•
•
•
•
•
RECOMMENDATIONS 113
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Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, pp. 152-153.
where possible, and that they will require that it 
be met in any further exports of weapons-usable 
nuclear materials; and
Agree on speciﬁc steps to accelerate the consoli-
dation of weapons-usable nuclear material into 
fewer sites and buildings around the world.  (Brit-
ain and France, in particular, as states with major 
facilities capable of processing irradiated research 
reactor fuel, should agree to join with the United 
States and Russia in being willing to accept re-
search reactor fuel without requiring that wastes 
from it eventually be returned, creating a more 
ﬂexible set of options for locations to send poten-
tially vulnerable HEU stockpiles.)
Each of the G8 leaders should then follow through 
consistently, appointing senior ofﬁcials to be respon-
sible directly to them for ensuring rapid action on 
securing nuclear stockpiles, and for ﬁnding and ﬁxing 
obstacles to progress.
Each of the states in the world with nuclear weapons 
bears a special responsibility for ensuring that these 
stockpiles are effectively secured.  Security improve-
ments are likely to be needed in all of the nuclear 
weapon states.61  Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile, in par-
ticular, while reportedly heavily guarded, poses urgent 
risks because of the immense threats it faces, both from 
armed remnants of al Qaeda operating in the country 
and from nuclear insiders with strong sympathies for 
extreme Islamic causes and a proven willingness to 
provide nuclear technology to others.62  In China and 
India, the potential threats to nuclear stockpiles appear 
•
to be less extreme than in Pakistan, but nonetheless 
worrisome—and these countries have traditionally 
placed only modest reliance on modern safeguards 
and security technologies.  Almost nothing is known 
publicly about nuclear security in Israel, but Israel has 
long experience in battling terrorist threats and a 
reputation for taking harsh measures against those in-
volved in nuclear security breaches (as in the case of 
former nuclear weapons worker Mordechai Vanunu).63 
In all of these cases, a commitment to securing nuclear 
stockpiles against demonstrated terrorist and criminal 
threats will be important. 
China’s leaders should:
Adopt national rules requiring every facility with 
nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear ma-
terial to be secured against speciﬁed outsider and 
insider threats, comparable to those terrorists and 
criminals have demonstrated in China;
Agree that UNSCR 1540’s requirement for “ap-
propriate effective” physical protection should be 
interpreted as requiring such national rules;
Agree to join in a global nuclear security partner-
ship, including approving broad cooperation with 
the United States, the IAEA, and others to ensure 
that China is able to share in the nuclear secu-
rity technologies, approaches, and best practices 
adopted elsewhere (while protecting China’s legit-
imate nuclear secrets), and possibly assisting with 
nuclear security in other states with which China 
has a close relationship, such as Pakistan;64
•
•
•
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Make public information chosen by China, such as 
general descriptions of nuclear security arrange-
ments, photographs of installed nuclear security 
equipment, results of security tests, and the like, 
that would build international conﬁdence that 
effective nuclear security was in place (while pro-
tecting China’s legitimate nuclear secrets); and
Seek to consolidate nuclear stockpiles to the 
extent possible, including launching efforts to 
convert China’s HEU-fueled research reactors 
(and those China has exported) to LEU. 
India’s leaders should:
Adopt national nuclear security rules similar to 
those just discussed for China;
Agree that UNSCR 1540’s requirement for “ap-
propriate effective” physical protection should be 
interpreted as requiring such national rules;
Agree to join in a global nuclear security partner-
ship, including approving broad cooperation with 
the United States, the IAEA, and others, similar 
to that just described for China (while ensuring 
that no information is transferred that would be 
contrary to the Nonproliferation Treaty’s prohibi-
tion on directly assisting states such as India with 
their nuclear weapons);
Keep all nuclear weapons in partly disassembled 
form, ideally with key components necessary for a 
nuclear detonation stored at separate locations;
Make public information chosen by India, such as 
general descriptions of nuclear security arrange-
ments, photographs of installed nuclear security 
equipment, results of security tests, and the like, 
that would build international conﬁdence that 
effective nuclear security was in place (while pro-
tecting India’s legitimate nuclear secrets); and
Seek to consolidate nuclear stockpiles to the ex-
tent possible, including completing the conversion 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
of its Apsara HEU-fueled research reactor that India 
is carrying out without U.S. cooperation.65
Pakistan’s leaders should:
Adopt national nuclear security rules similar to 
those just discussed for China and India;
Agree that UNSCR 1540’s requirement for “ap-
propriate effective” physical protection should be 
interpreted as requiring such national rules;
Agree to join in a global nuclear security partner-
ship, including approving broad cooperation with 
the United States, the IAEA, and others, similar 
to that just described for China and India (while 
ensuring that no information is transferred that 
would be contrary to the Nonproliferation Treaty’s 
prohibition on directly assisting states such as 
Pakistan with their nuclear weapons);
Keep all nuclear weapons in partly disassembled 
form, ideally with key components necessary for a 
nuclear detonation stored at separate locations;
Make public information chosen by Pakistan, 
such as general descriptions of nuclear security 
arrangements, photographs of installed nuclear 
security equipment, results of security tests, and 
the like, that would build international conﬁdence 
that effective nuclear security was in place (while 
protecting Pakistan’s legitimate nuclear secrets); 
and
Seek to consolidate nuclear stockpiles to the ex-
tent possible, including returning to the United 
States the HEU provided long ago for Pakistan’s 
research reactor.
Israel’s leaders should:
Adopt national nuclear security rules similar to 
those just discussed for China, India, and Pakistan 
(to the extent that such approaches are not in 
place already);
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
65 Data provided by U.S. laboratory ofﬁcials.
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Agree that UNSCR 1540’s requirement for “ap-
propriate effective” physical protection should be 
interpreted as requiring such national rules;
Agree to join in a global nuclear security part-
nership, including approving broad cooperation 
similar to that just described for China, India, and 
Pakistan (while ensuring that no information is 
transferred that would be contrary to the Nonpro-
liferation Treaty’s prohibition on directly assisting 
states such as India with their nuclear weapons);
Keep all nuclear weapons in partly disassembled 
form, ideally with key components necessary for a 
nuclear detonation stored at separate locations;
Make public information chosen by Israel, such as 
general descriptions of nuclear security arrange-
ments, photographs of installed nuclear security 
equipment, results of security tests, and the like, 
that would build international conﬁdence that 
effective nuclear security was in place (while pro-
tecting Israel’s legitimate nuclear secrets); and
Seek to consolidate nuclear stockpiles to the ex-
tent possible, including following through on the 
plan to shut its HEU-fueled research reactor in 
2006,66 and removing all HEU from the site expedi-
tiously after that occurs.
THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY  
REVIEW CONFERENCE
The NPT review conference scheduled for May 2005 
should:
Call on all states with nuclear weapons or weap-
ons-usable nuclear material to adopt national rules 
requiring every facility where these stockpiles exist 
to be secured against outsider and insider threats 
comparable to those terrorists and criminals have 
demonstrated;
Agree that UNSCR 1540’s requirement for “ap-
propriate effective” physical protection should be 
interpreted as requiring such national rules;
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Agree that all states should, as required by 
UNSCR 1540, immediately put in place: “appropri-
ate effective” criminal laws barring any assistance 
to terrorists in acquiring weapons of mass de-
struction, “appropriate effective” export laws and 
requirements, and “appropriate effective” border 
and transshipment controls to interdict illicit traf-
ﬁcking in materials and technologies related to 
weapons of mass destruction;
Call on all states in a position to do so to help other 
states put these controls in place;
Agree that as soon as possible HEU should be elim-
inated from all civilian sites, and civil commerce in 
HEU should be phased out;
Call on all states with HEU-fueled research reac-
tors to convert them or shut them down as soon 
as possible, and to eliminate their HEU fuel;
Call on all states to seek to end additional accumu-
lation of stockpiles of weapons-usable separated 
plutonium, and to phase out the civil use of sepa-
rated plutonium as more proliferation-resistant 
technologies become available;
Call for the rapid conclusion and entry into force of 
amendments to both the physical protection con-
vention and the proposed convention on nuclear 
terrorism;
Call for new steps to ensure security, improve 
transparency, and pursue continued reduction and 
eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons;
Call for the rapid conclusion and entry into force 
of a veriﬁable ﬁssile material production cutoff 
agreement, which, by ending further production 
of HEU and plutonium for weapons purposes, 
would limit further additions to the stockpiles to 
be secured; and
Agree that the technologies of uranium enrich-
ment and plutonium reprocessing should not 
spread further, and to achieve that objective, 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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agree on (a) the ﬁve-year moratorium on new 
enrichment and reprocessing facilities that IAEA 
Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei has pro-
posed, and (b) on new arrangements in which the 
major nuclear fuel suppliers, backed by the IAEA, 
would offer guaranteed lifetime nuclear fuel sup-
plies and guaranteed lifetime management of 
spent fuel, at excellent prices, for all nuclear re-
actors in any country that agrees that it will not 
establish enrichment or reprocessing facilities of 
its own, and will accept the Additional Protocol to 
verify that commitment.  Like the ﬁssile cutoff, this 
would constrain the growth in the number of pos-
sible sources of plutonium and HEU, and hence 
ease the task of securing the world’s nuclear stock-
piles. 
STRENGTHENING THE LATER LINES OF DEFENSE
Preventing nuclear weapons and weapons-usable 
nuclear materials from being stolen in the ﬁrst place 
is the strongest leverage point in the battle to pre-
vent nuclear terrorism.  Once stolen, these items 
could be anywhere, and ﬁnding and recovering 
them, or interdicting their smuggling, is an extraordi-
narily difﬁcult task.  Nonetheless, because efforts to 
lock down nuclear stockpiles around the world may 
not be 100% successful—and because some unde-
tected thefts of nuclear material may already have 
occurred—investment in later lines of defense is im-
portant as well.
Smuggling interdiction. As described in the review 
of progress in key areas earlier in this report, the 
United States and other countries are now making 
substantial investments in putting in place improved 
means to detect smuggling of nuclear materials, 
particularly detection at border crossing points in 
key countries.  What is needed now is to pull exist-
ing efforts together into a prioritized strategic plan 
that goes well beyond detection at borders.  This 
plan would detail what police, border, customs, and 
intelligence entities in which countries should have 
what capabilities by when—and what resources will 
be used to achieve those objectives.  Making the 
needed connections between terrorists who want 
nuclear material and nuclear workers in a position to 
steal such material already appears to be one of the 
more difﬁcult obstacles that potential nuclear ter-
rorists face.  There is much that intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies can do to make this connec-
tion still harder to make, through sting operations, 
scams, publicizing opportunities for people who be-
come aware of a nuclear theft or smuggling incident 
in progress to inform the authorities, and more.
Improved approaches to nuclear monitoring at the 
U.S. borders and within the United States are also 
needed—as the Bush administration has proposed 
with the establishment of the new Domestic Nu-
clear Detection Ofﬁce (DNDO) in the Department of 
Homeland Security.  But it should be recognized that 
once a nuclear bomb has reached U.S. shores, it may 
already be too late (which is the rationale for the on-
going Megaports initiative, designed to ensure that 
at the ports sending most container cargo to the 
United States, containers are inspected for nuclear 
contraband at the ports where they depart).  More-
over, given the long, complex, and heavily trafﬁcked 
U.S. borders, and the difﬁculty of detecting the ma-
terial needed for a nuclear bomb, such measures 
will never be more than a very partial last line of de-
fense.
Global nuclear emergency response. Within the 
United States, the Nuclear Emergency Support Team 
(NEST, formerly the Nuclear Emergency Search Team) 
is charged with searching for and disabling a terror-
ist nuclear bomb, in the event of a nuclear terrorist 
threat or other information suggesting that such an 
attack may be imminent.  NEST teams are equipped 
with sophisticated nuclear detection equipment, and 
specialized technologies which, it is hoped, would 
make it possible to disable even a booby-trapped 
bomb before it went off.   Because of the great dif-
ﬁculty of detecting nuclear material at long range, 
broad-area searches are not practicable; if the only 
information available was that there was a nuclear 
bomb somewhere in a particular city, the chances of 
ﬁnding it would be slim.  But if additional information 
made it possible to narrow the search to an area of a 
few blocks, the chances of ﬁnding it would be sub-
stantial.  The United States should work with other 
countries to ensure that an international rapid-re-
sponse capability is put in place—including making 
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all the necessary legal arrangements for visas, import 
of technologies such as the nuclear detectors used 
by the NEST team (some of which include radioac-
tive materials), and the like—so that within hours of 
receiving information related to stolen nuclear ma-
terial or a stolen nuclear weapon anywhere in the 
world, a response team could be on the ground.
Stabilizing employment for nuclear personnel. 
With Russia’s economy stabilized, nuclear workers in 
Russia are now paid an above-average wage, on time; 
the desperation of the late 1990s has largely eased. 
The situation at many nuclear facilities has substan-
tially stabilized.67  With thousands of nuclear workers 
soon to lose their jobs as major facilities close, how-
ever, serious proliferation risks remain.  (In early 2005, 
for example, a group of Russian Strategic Rocket 
Forces ofﬁcers—people who had spent their career 
working with nuclear weapons, and presumably know 
a great deal about security arrangements for them—
became so desperate after having been left behind 
with their families in a remote garrison when the mis-
sile base was closed down that they agreed to bypass 
the Ministry of Defense and petition the United States 
directly for assistance.68)  The threat is not just nuclear 
weapons scientists who might help a foreign state de-
velop a nuclear bomb, but nuclear workers or guards 
who might help thieves steal the essential ingredients 
of a bomb.69  The United States should work closely 
with Russia and other countries to take a broader 
approach, using all the economic tools available, to re-
vitalizing the economies of those nuclear cities where 
the major facilities are closing or shrinking, and reem-
ploying other nuclear workers and experts who could 
otherwise pose a proliferation threat.70
Stockpile reduction.  In addition to securing nuclear 
material at sites, and removing material from espe-
cially vulnerable sites, actually destroying nuclear 
material is a key tool in the theft-prevention toolbox. 
As noted earlier, the United States is currently buying 
LEU blended from 30 tons of Russian HEU each year—
but similar efforts to destroy stockpiles of excess 
weapons plutonium have not yet begun.  A relatively 
modest capital investment in providing more blend-
ing capability at Russian nuclear sites, coupled with 
modest expenditures for additional operations costs, 
could make it possible to substantially increase the 
blend-down rate, eliminating the proliferation risks 
posed by more HEU, faster.  While the commercial 
market is not ready to absorb additional quantities of 
HEU, the United States or other countries could pay 
Russia to blend the additional material to LEU and 
keep it off the market in monitored storage until the 
market was ready for it, decoupling the national se-
curity imperative from the market constraint.  
While ofﬁcial discussions in 2002 did not produce 
agreement on a substantial increase in the blend-
down rate, at the same time Russia agreed to a 
non-ofﬁcial study, ﬁnanced by the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative, of the feasibility and costs of a range of dif-
ferent options for accelerated HEU blend-down.  That 
study is almost complete, and could provide the ba-
sis for government action to move forward in rapidly 
destroying additional stockpiles of HEU, eliminating 
the nuclear terrorist risks that the destroyed stock-
piles would pose.71  
At the same time, it is important to move forward as 
quickly as possible with safe, secure, and transparent 
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disposition of excess weapons plutonium.  Disposi-
tion of the 34 tons of excess Russian plutonium and 
the 34 tons of excess U.S. plutonium covered by the 
U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition 
Agreement, however, will only be a substantial con-
tribution to U.S. and international security if it is but 
the ﬁrst step toward a much larger reduction in the 
stockpiles of weapons plutonium that now exist.72
INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE  
TO SUPPORT POLICY
Solid information on the scope of the nuclear secu-
rity problem worldwide, on where the most urgent 
problems lie, on which global changes create new 
opportunities for reducing these threats, on what fac-
tors pose the most difﬁcult obstacles to addressing 
those threats, on which issues and perceptions most 
affect the thinking of key foreign leaders on these 
topics, and more will be critical to success in carrying 
out all the initiatives just described.  As the report of 
the commission on U.S. intelligence on weapons of 
mass destruction noted, good intelligence is crucial 
to the struggle to prevent nuclear terrorism, and this 
must be a top priority for U.S. intelligence agencies 
(and those of other countries as well)—but current 
U.S. intelligence in this area is weak.73  Not all of the 
needed information should be collected by intelli-
gence agencies: much of the needed information is 
available by more open means, and should be col-
lected and analyzed in ways that do not carry the 
taint, with other governments, of U.S. “spying.”  Indeed, 
one of the greatest challenges for gathering and ana-
lyzing information to support policy in these areas is 
to ﬁnd the best means to balance and integrate open 
and secret collection of information, so that the best 
of each can be used without either undermining the 
other.  In particular, if experts visiting nuclear sites to 
help upgrade security come to be seen as spies there 
to collect nuclear secrets—or worse yet, are con-
ﬁrmed to be such—that may well be fatal to efforts 
to build the trust and partnership necessary for suc-
cess in securing the world’s nuclear stockpiles.
A prioritized global threat assessment.  Perhaps the 
ﬁrst priority for information collection and analysis 
is a prioritized assessment of which facilities world-
wide pose the most urgent risks of nuclear theft to be 
addressed.  An assessment of the overall risk posed 
by each facility would involve analyzing the prob-
ability of successful theft from that site (determined 
by the effectiveness of the security arrangements at 
the site, and the magnitude of the insider and out-
sider threats those arrangements must defeat) and 
the consequences of such a theft (determined by the 
quantity and quality of the nuclear weapons or mate-
rials at that site).  DOE has developed a list of facilities 
believed to have weapons-usable nuclear material 
around the world, and is working to integrate what 
limited information is available about security ar-
rangements and threats at these sites and to turn it 
into a regularly updated database, as we have rec-
ommended in previous studies.74  But to date, this 
list represents an inventory, not a risk-based assess-
ment of where the highest priorities for action lie. 
Such a prioritized global threat assessment should 
be developed as quickly as possible—identifying not 
only what is known that gives reason for concern, 
but what is not known, and using those knowledge 
gaps to drive efforts to collect additional informa-
tion to ﬁll them.  The record of past U.S. interactions 
with nuclear facilities should also be documented to 
the extent possible, so that U.S. ofﬁcials are aware, in 
their discussions with facility operators, of what has 
gone before; in this way, judgments of where the 
highest-priority risks reside can be integrated with 
judgments concerning where the highest-leverage 
opportunities may be, or where higher-level political 
intervention may be needed to make progress.
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Refocused intelligence.  While penetrating the ter-
rorist organizations that might be planning a nuclear 
terrorist attack is an extraordinarily difﬁcult challenge, 
many of the other pieces of information crucial to sup-
porting an effective global effort to prevent nuclear 
terrorism are much more readily available.  As noted 
above, developing a prioritized assessment of the 
greatest dangers of nuclear theft requires informa-
tion on the facilities around the world where nuclear 
caches exist, the quantity and quality of nuclear weap-
ons and materials at these sites, their security levels, 
and the terrorist and criminal threats to these facili-
ties.  Some of this information is difﬁcult to acquire, 
but many sites are open civilian facilities where cru-
cial data on everything from the amount and types of 
material on site to the pay and morale of workers can 
be collected easily, by visiting and asking.  (Indeed, 
in many cases this information should be collected 
by open programs of cooperation, untainted by an 
intelligence connection.)  Today, no one in the U.S. 
government (or other governments, as far as we are 
aware) is collecting information in a focused way on, 
for example, the conditions for workers at HEU-fueled 
research reactors in developing or transition countries, 
or what levels of corruption and crime may exist at or 
near these nuclear facilities.  Closing that gap primar-
ily requires simply reallocating current collection and 
analysis efforts, to focus on the issues that are most 
important to the problem that President Bush has 
identiﬁed as the most urgent national security threat 
to the United States.  
Similarly, a greatly intensiﬁed effort to track and 
analyze nuclear and radiological smuggling, and to 
smash nascent nuclear smuggling rings, is urgently 
needed.  Key indicators and potential observables for 
all the steps on the terrorist pathway to the bomb 
should be identiﬁed, and collection efforts focused 
on them.  International intelligence and law enforce-
ment cooperation in this area should be dramatically 
strengthened, with the goal of bringing cooperation 
in blocking smuggling of nuclear weapons and ma-
terials, or of other materials and technologies of mass 
destruction, to a level of intensity and effectiveness 
comparable to that which now exists in counterterror-
ism more generally.  The new U.S. director of national 
intelligence, John Negroponte, should make putting 
in place a focused intelligence effort on all aspects of 
preventing nuclear terrorism an early priority.
OPTIONS FOR THE U.S. CONGRESS
The U.S. Congress has a crucial role to play in 
furthering global efforts to lock down nuclear stock-
piles—making the priority of these efforts clear, 
exerting performance-based oversight, enabling 
and authorizing key steps while removing legal 
constraints, and mandating particular steps where 
necessary.  In 2004, Congress again authorized threat-
reduction cooperation going beyond the boundaries 
of the former Soviet Union, and played a key role in 
the establishment of GTRI, passing legislation that 
provided key legal authorities for the effort and ap-
propriating $30 million beyond the budget request 
to accelerate it.  Further congressional steps in 2005 
can help ensure that the opportunities created by 
the Bratislava summit, UNSCR 1540, and the launch 
of GTRI are seized.  Indeed, some legislation focused 
on these objectives has already been proposed.75  The 
steps Congress should take can be grouped in sev-
eral categories.
Authorizing policy efforts and removing obsta-
cles.  First, Congress should act to remove obstacles 
it has created in the past.  Congress has imposed a 
range of requirements that the president certify 
that recipient countries are meeting particular stan-
dards before threat reduction funds can be spent. 
When President Bush declined to certify Russia’s 
compliance with all of its arms control obligations, 
crucial threat reduction programs ground to a halt 
for months, until Congress passed waiver authority 
and President Bush issued a waiver.  But the pres-
ident’s legal authority to waive these certiﬁcation 
requirements if the national security demands it ex-
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pires this year.  Congress will have to act to ensure 
that critical threat reduction programs, including 
securing nuclear weapon sites, are not cut off again. 
Congress could choose to approve permanent or 
long-term waiver authority, or could eliminate the 
certiﬁcation requirements entirely, as Senator Rich-
ard Lugar (R-IN) has proposed.76  
Last year, Congress authorized the secretary of energy 
to offer an enumerated list of incentives for facilities 
to give up their HEU.77  But past experience suggests 
that the incentives needed to close a deal in each 
situation are different, and cannot be predicted in ad-
vance.  Hence, Congress should consider broadening 
the authorization provided last year, by authorizing 
the secretary of energy to take such actions as may 
be necessary to accomplish the objective of remov-
ing potential nuclear bomb material from vulnerable 
sites around the world.78 Congress should also autho-
rize the administration to expend threat reduction 
funds from DOE, DOD, and the State Department on 
a global effort to help states around the world put 
in place the effective controls on weapons of mass 
destruction and related materials and technologies 
mandated by UNSCR 1540.  Finally, Congress should 
authorize the use of the Mayak Fissile Material Stor-
age Facility to store any separated plutonium or HEU 
that could otherwise pose a threat to the United 
States, rather than limiting its use only to material 
that ﬁts essentially arbitrary deﬁnitions of “weapon-
grade.”
Appropriating budgets.  Congress should consider 
targeted increases to the administration’s budget 
requests in a number of areas.  To help countries 
around the world put in place the controls mandated 
by UNSCR 1540, Congress should signiﬁcantly in-
crease budgets for DOE programs to improve nuclear 
security; DOE, DOD, and State Department programs 
to interdict nuclear smuggling; and DOE and State 
Department programs to help countries improve ex-
port controls.  To ensure that GTRI has the resources 
it needs to provide facilities substantial incentives 
to give up their HEU, and the ﬂexibility needed to 
seize opportunities as they arise, Congress should 
consider again adding $20-$40 million to GTRI’s bud-
get, while ensuring that DOE would be free to shift 
priorities within the GTRI program as needed.  To 
create an opportunity for substantially accelerating 
the destruction of dangerous HEU, Congress should 
consider making a conditional appropriation in the 
range of $200-$300 million, to ﬁnance accelerated 
blend-down of HEU in Russia, should U.S. and Russian 
negotiators be able to reach agreement on such an 
accelerated blend-down.79
Mandating and directing new actions.  Congress 
can also launch new programs or require the ad-
ministration to take particular actions.  Having been 
initiated by congressional action in 1991, the entire 
Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction effort is a 
perfect example.    Congress could consider passage 
of broad legislation mandating fast-paced efforts 
to secure nuclear stockpiles and interdict nuclear 
smuggling worldwide, including removing potential 
nuclear bomb material from as many sites as pos-
sible.  Such legislation might also provide important 
direction and authorities for such efforts, and require 
the president to take a number of speciﬁed actions 
to accelerate and strengthen efforts to lock down all 
the world’s nuclear stockpiles.
Congress may also wish to consider legislating on 
the subject of liability.  Given the ongoing delays in 
RECOMMENDATIONS 121
disposing excess plutonium caused by the liability 
dispute, and the very real possibility that the entire 
cooperative threat reduction effort could collapse in 
June 2006 if the dispute is not resolved, the need for 
near-term action is clear.  Members of Congress have 
a variety of tools at their disposal, from putting holds 
on key nominees until they are satisﬁed with the ac-
tions the administration is taking, to requiring reports 
on progress in solving the problem (potentially every 
month in the months leading up to June 2006), to 
passing legislation that restrains the ability to spend 
money for certain critical activities until the matter is 
resolved, to directing speciﬁcally that the administra-
tion propose language that would abandon the U.S. 
insistence that Russia accept liability for sabotage by 
U.S. personnel. 
Exercising performance-based oversight.  Con-
gress should set clear goals, and insist that the 
executive branch prepare coherent plans for achiev-
ing them, including measurable milestones.  And it 
should hold the executive branch accountable for 
performance in achieving these goals.  At the same 
time, Congress should give the executive branch con-
siderable ﬂexibility in how these goals are achieved, 
making it possible to seize opportunities and adapt 
approaches as circumstances change.  To exercise 
such ﬂexible, performance-based oversight, Congress 
will need to delve into the progress and problems of 
these efforts in detail, learning both the good news 
and the bad news.  For that purpose, in-depth hear-
ings on the threat and what is being and could be 
done to address it will be essential—possibly com-
plemented with staff investigations.  It is crucial that 
such hearings include testimony from independent 
witnesses—hearing only from the government ofﬁ-
cials managing these efforts, Congress will rarely hear 
the bad news.  
A SENIOR LEADER FOR A STRENGTHENED EFFORT
None of what we have recommended here will hap-
pen without sustained leadership and political heavy 
lifting from the White House and its counterparts 
around the world.  President Bush should appoint a 
senior full-time White House ofﬁcial, with the access 
needed to walk in and ask for presidential action 
when needed, to lead these efforts, and keep them 
on the front burner at the White House every day. 
That ofﬁcial would be responsible for ﬁnding and 
ﬁxing the obstacles to progress in the scores of ex-
isting U.S. programs scattered across several cabinet 
departments of the U.S. government that are focused 
on pieces of the job of keeping nuclear weapons out 
of terrorist hands—and for setting priorities, eliminat-
ing overlaps, and seizing opportunities for synergy.
SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITIES
Much has been done in the last year to build the 
foundation for the fast-paced global partnership to 
secure nuclear stockpiles around the world that is 
so urgently needed.  But much remains to be done 
to build on those foundations, to transform current 
programs into the “maximum effort” the 9/11 Com-
mission called for.  The steps described here are an 
initial sketch of such a maximum effort.  But the need 
for action is urgent—both because terrorists and 
criminals will not wait, and because the opportuni-
ties created by GTRI, UNSCR 1540, and the Bratislava 
summit may well be ﬂeeting.  If, a year from now, no 
substantial breakthrough in accelerating, expanding, 
and strengthening global efforts to lock down nu-
clear materials has been reached, the opportunities 
for rapid action created by the actions of the last year 
may be lost.  But President Bush and President Putin, 
working with other world leaders, have the power 
to take actions that would transform the global ef-
fort to secure nuclear stockpiles and interdict nuclear 
smuggling.  Between them, they have an historic op-
portunity to leave behind, as a lasting legacy, a world 
in which the danger of nuclear terrorism has been 
drastically reduced.  If the world can muster the will 
to change its past approaches, there remains an ex-
cellent chance of preventing a nuclear 9/11.
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